Empty Chair at the Table: Bargaining, Costs and Litigation at the World Trade Organization by Grey, Felicia Anneita
Old Dominion University 
ODU Digital Commons 
Graduate Program in International Studies 
Theses & Dissertations Graduate Program in International Studies 
Summer 2017 
Empty Chair at the Table: Bargaining, Costs and Litigation at the 
World Trade Organization 
Felicia Anneita Grey 
Old Dominion University, felicia.grey@fulbrightmail.org 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds 
 Part of the Economics Commons, International Law Commons, and the International Relations 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Grey, Felicia A.. "Empty Chair at the Table: Bargaining, Costs and Litigation at the World Trade 
Organization" (2017). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion 
University, DOI: 10.25777/f269-1765 
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/18 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at 
ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & 
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@odu.edu. 
EMPTY CHAIR AT THE TABLE: BARGAINING, COSTS AND LITIGATION AT THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
by 
 
Felicia Anneita Grey 
BSc. September 2004, The University of the West Indies 
MSc.  January 2011, The University of the West Indies 
 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of  
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of 
 








Approved by:    
 
David C. Earnest (Director)  
  
Jesse T. Richman (Member)  
  
       David Selover (Member) 
 
              Kurt T. Gaubatz (Member) 
 





EMPTY CHAIR AT THE TABLE: BARGAINING, COSTS AND LITIGATION AT THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
 
Felicia Anneita Grey 
Old Dominion University, 2017 




This study examines the WTO to test how, if at all, its Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
serves the needs of its members. More specifically, it probes why countries would join the 
institution but do not use it if a trade dispute arises. To test this expectation, the study 
hypothesizes that exorbitant dispute settlement costs can inhibit litigation. This occurs, however, 
across all dyads and not just when developing and developed countries litigate.  
The project uses mixed methods comprising an extensive form game, case studies and the 
information theory approach for comparative case analysis. The cases selected have power 
disparities, and variation in the dependent variable, since not all of them are litigated. 
Additionally, they all feature cement as the contested good and invocation of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement for reprieve. These disputes are China – Cement (between China and Jamaica); 
Guatemala – Cement I and II (between Guatemala and Mexico); and United States – Cement 
(between the United States and Mexico).  
The formal model shows that with the same litigation costs, there is a pure subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium where both states will engage in protectionism and avoid filing. In 
situations where one state has a higher burden to seek recourse, its trading partner will protect as 
its dominant strategy. The affected state is then forced to continue
	  
with free trade and not use the DSB, or respond with protectionism and then acquiesce since it 
cannot afford the full litigation process. 
The case studies highlight how legal capacity and other associated costs can catalyze 
DSB participation, or induce non-involvement. Countries that have membership in other dispute 
settlement organizations, DSB experience, as well as domestic and international experience with 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement are more likely to litigate. The likelihood of litigation also 
increases if the contested good contributes significantly towards GDP and if the country expects 
to win. The information theory approach tests these results under conditions of reduced 
uncertainty and validates some of these findings. 
Generally, the study shows that non-participatory membership is relative to the timing of 
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The extant literature on institutions1 focuses on reasons for their creation and design. 
Scholars have given far less attention to the reasons why states use – or choose not to use- 
institutions once they have been created. The presumption is that material benefits are sufficient 
for rational actors. Benefits, however, are a necessary cause, but not a sufficient one. The 
decision by states to coalesce in international institutions is a distinguishing feature of the 
international trading system2. This speaks volumes about the perceived benefit of participating in 
these mechanisms. Concurrently, however, this also highlights a voluntary abnegation of some 
state power to supranational organizations to at least effectuate the desired outcomes. Achieving 
universal consensus and satisfaction in an organization replete with diverse members is onerous. 
Yet, since inception, the World Trade Organization (WTO) aims to accomplish this feat and has 
had considerable success in doing so. What then is the WTO and what is its scope and main 
functions?  
The World Trade Organization is the main international framework for regulating trade 
among countries. It was established by the Marrakesh Agreement of April 15, 1994 and aims to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For the purposes of this study, Krasner’s definition of institutions is applicable. Krasner (1983) conceives of 
institutions as “implicit or explicit norms, principles and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations can converge in a particular issue area.”  
2 Much of this is due to the perceived efficacy of institutions that liberalism purports. International institutions are 
said to matter in the international system because they create norms around which behaviors converge, set the rules 
and so facilitate predictability, and reduce transaction costs (legal, transportation, dispute). They are responsible for 
setting the agenda, increase transparency because of mechanisms whereby actors can “look in,” act as a forum for 
positions and platforms, and lengthen the shadow of the future. All of these are facilitated because corporation 
becomes necessary in a world of increased interconnectivity and interdependence. See for example, Robert O. 
Keohane in  After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). 
 
	  
	   	  
2 
ensure that trade flows as smoothly and as predictably as possible3. It came into existence on 
January 1, 1995 and has a membership of 164 countries4. This is noteworthy since there are 
about 191 recognized countries in the world. Article II of the Marrakesh Agreement delineates 
the WTO’s scope. It is firstly mandated to “provide the common institutional framework for the 
conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters related to the agreements” and 
associated legal instruments included in the Agreement’s Annexes.5 In a broader sense, this 
means that the institution administers WTO trade agreements, provides a forum for trade 
negotiations, handles trade disputes, monitors national trade assistance and training for 
developing countries, and cooperates with other international organizations.6  
The WTO’s functions are outlined in Article III of the Marrakech Agreement. It is legally 
bound for example, to “facilitate the implementation, administration and operation” of the 
Marrakech Agreement itself, the Multilateral Trade Agreements7 and to provide the framework 
within which the same operations can take place for the Plurilateral Agreements.8,9 Generally 
however, the WTO functions primarily by five central principles. These include 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 “What is the WTO?”  https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm  
4 See “Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm  
5 The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. (The WTO Secretariat: 
Geneva Switzerland, 2002), 4.  https://www.hse.ru/data/2011/11/14/1272847001/LEGAL%20TEXTS%20ENG.pdf  
6 “What is the WTO?”  https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm  
7 These are binding on all Members. Annex 1A encompasses the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Annex 
1B deals with the General Agreement on Trade in Services, while Annex 1C covers the Agreement on Trade – 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Annex 2 is the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes, while Annex 3 is titled, Trade Policy Review Mechanism. The Legal Texts: The Results 
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. (The WTO Secretariat: Geneva Switzerland, 2002), 5. 
https://www.hse.ru/data/2011/11/14/1272847001/LEGAL%20TEXTS%20ENG.pdf 
8 See for example, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. (The 
WTO Secretariat: Geneva Switzerland, 2002), 5. 
https://www.hse.ru/data/2011/11/14/1272847001/LEGAL%20TEXTS%20ENG.pdf 
9 These are outlined in Annex 4. They include the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Agreement on Government 
Procurement, International Dairy Agreement and International Bovine Meat Agreement. These Agreements 
however, are binding only on those Members who have accepted them. 
 
	  
	   	  
3 
nondiscrimination10, reciprocity11, enforceable commitments12, transparency13, and safety 
valves14. 
Many countries become Members of the WTO because of the reprieve that they have in 
the event of a trade violation.  This is embodied in the three main trade remedies that are 
available as recourse for disputes over trade in goods. These include countervailing duties15, 
safeguards16  and antidumping17, of which, antidumping has been the one most frequently used. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This is embedded in the main WTO rules on goods, services and intellectual property and includes the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) rule and the National Treatment principle. “The MFN rule requires that a product made in 
one member country be treated no less favorably than a “like” (very similar) good that originates in any other 
country.” Conversely, “national treatment ensures that liberalization commitments are not offset through the 
imposition of domestic taxes and similar measures.” It stipulates that foreign products should “be treated no less 
favourably than competing domestically produced products.” See Bernard Hoekman’s chapter, “The WTO 
Functions and Basic Principles” in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Phillip English, eds. 2002. 
Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook. (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2002), 41 -49. 
11 This is a guiding principle in the negotiations process and is used as a preventative measure against “free – riding, 
which may result because of the MFN rule.” It seeks to facilitate specific quid pro quo concessions. See Bernard 
Hoekman’s chapter, “The WTO Functions and Basic Principles” in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Phillip 
English, eds. 2002. Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook. (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2002), 
41 -49. 
12 The fact that commitments made by Members are legally binding, promotes compliance. This is supported by 
reprieve at the Dispute Settlement Body. 
13 The principle of transparency is delineated in Article X of the GATT and Article III of the GATS. “WTO 
members are required to publish their trade regulations, to establish and maintain institutions allowing for the review 
of administrative decisions affecting trade, to respond to requests for information by other members, and to notify 
changes in trade policies to the WTO. These internal transparency requirements are supplemented by multilateral 
surveillance of trade policies by WTO members, facilitated by periodic country-specific reports (trade policy 
reviews) that are prepared by the secretariat and discussed by the WTO General Council.” See Bernard Hoekman’s 
chapter, “The WTO Functions and Basic Principles” in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Phillip English, eds. 
2002. Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook. (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2002), 41 -49. 
14 This principle provides that in specific instances, governments should be able to restrict trade. “Articles allowing 
for the use of trade measures to attain noneconomic objectives,” those “aimed at ensuring “fair competition”; and 
“other provisions permitting intervention in trade for economic reasons” all facilitate this principle. See Bernard 
Hoekman’s chapter, “The WTO Functions and Basic Principles” in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Phillip 
English, eds. 2002. Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook. (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2002), 
41 -49. 
15 Article VI of the GATT 1994 explains that countervailing duties are actions taken by the importing country, 
usually in the form of increased duties to offset subsidies given to producers or exporters in the exporting country. 
16 The WTO defines safeguard measures as “’emergency’ actions with respect to increased imports of particular 
products into its territory by an exporter, where such imports have caused or threaten to cause serious injury to the 
importing Member’s domestic industry.” This is pursuant to Article XIX of the GATT 1994. 
17 Article VI (1) of the GATT 1994 explains that, “dumping is the process by which products of one country are 
introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products.” This is further 
clarified with the clause - “if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the 
comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the 
exporting country.” It can take place as sales below cost or international price discrimination whereby the product is 
exported at “an unduly low price to drive out competition in the importing country”; or the product is exported 
 
	  
	   	  
4 
An aggrieved party may therefore use the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) which evokes a 
process of consultation, adjudication, and implementation to get redress for trade violations.18 
Research Rationale 
There is much debate about institutions and their role in international affairs. Robert 
Keohane for example, explicates the assumptions of neoliberal institutionalism in After 
Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Here, the positive-sum 
logic of neoliberalism is advanced. Multilateral institutions arguably cause voluntary 
cooperation, which in turn effectuates utility gains for each cooperating state or government. 
Realism proponents like Waltz, Grieco, Mastaduno and Mearsheimer however, attack these 
tenets. In their estimation, “cooperation under anarchy” is problematic because decentralized 
enforcement, national interests, and relative gains impede the efficiency of institutions.19 
Multilateralism supporters point to the general membership and success of the WTO as evidence 
for their theory. This optimism, however, has been countered by the seemingly disparities in how 
developed and developing countries use the DSB for trade recourse. The paucity of cases from 
developing countries suggests that the system may be inherently biased against them and so they 
are to some extent disenfranchised. Scholars who explore the extent to which the DSB functions 
in satisfying the  needs of its developing country Members highlight power asymmetries, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“from a country where wages are extremely low (and therefore, where the export price is low), or where the level of 
working conditions is far below that of advanced countries.” Usually both markets are relatively isolated and 
arbitrage takes place. See Mitsuo Matsushita and Thomas Schoenbaum in The World Trade Organization: Law, 
Practice and Policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 302-303. 
18 See Constantine Michalopoulous in Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook  (2002), 61. Edited by 
Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Phillip English. 
19 See for example, Lloyd Gruber in Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions 
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initiation and retaliation costs, start-up expenses and low domestic, institutional capacity as 
possible impeding factors.20 
Every conflict within the DSB is fundamentally a dyadic / relational grievance. 
Highlighting solely the variance in usage between developing and developed countries is 
therefore intellectually myopic. If participation in this mechanism is taken as the dependent 
variable and power asymmetries an independent variable, then there is an implicit assumption 
that trade violations follow only a unidirectional path. This reasoning takes it for granted that 
only large states are violators, that they exploit weaker states, and that weaker states do not 
contravene WTO provisions. How then would one account for trade disputes between 
developing countries and also those between developed ones? Moreover, if economic and 
institutional capabilities are directly related to a state’s tendency to file a dispute, what explains 
the fact that not all wealthy countries litigate although they may have the ability to do so? 
Moreover, some affluent nations are more frequent users of the DSB than others. What explains 
this?  
General participation in the DSB is taken as an indication that its provisions are 
accessible to all its Members. A state’s usage as a complainant or a defendant therefore indicates 
its ability to at least file or respond to a dispute. Participation by itself however, does not account 
for the calculated opportunity cost of participation versus nonparticipation.  In essence, several 
factors outside of those mentioned may precipitate participation and conversely, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See for example, “Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: the Selection of Defendants in World Trade 
Organization Disputes” by Guzman and Simmons (2005), “Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/ 
WTO Adjudication” by Davis and Bermeo (2009), and “WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing 
Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector” by Bown and Hoekman (2005). Of the three articles, Guzman and 
Simmons (2005), examine power and capacity as possible inhibiting factors to developing country participation in 
the Dispute Settlement Body. The other two authors deal specifically with the low levels of developing country 
cases. Davis and Bermeo (2009), argue that while cost could be a factor, it is really the cost to begin the process in 
the first instance that is overwhelming, as economies of scale are achieved with continuous use. The final article by 
Bown and Hoekman (2005), highlights the fact that though inequalities are evident, poorer countries can offset this 
deficit by working in tandem with the private sector at home and abroad. 
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nonparticipation, even if the state is able to do so. If the world trading system is an international 
chess board upon which moves and countermoves are weighed based on preferences, perceived 
options and payoffs, then participation in the DSB needs to be revisited. Under conventional 
views of the DSB, nonparticipation could indicate that a state: 
a. Has no trading rights that are being violated. 
b. Has been violated but is unable to file a dispute proceeding. 
c. Has been violated but is fearful that litigation may make it worse off ex ante. 
Less examined are the possibilities that a violated state may: 
a.  Choose not to file although it is able to do so. 
b. Choose not to file because it is fearful of retaliation 
c. File outside of the WTO. 
d. Retaliate.  
Many Members of the WTO are simultaneously bound in bilateral and regional 
arrangements. What therefore explains their choice to proceed with the formal dispute 
settlement arrangements within the WTO versus informal means, or even the selection of 
multilateral over bilateral and regional mechanisms and vice versa? Examining this 
phenomenon may add value to the debate about the (in) efficacy of the WTO generally, and 
the Dispute Settlement System specifically, since states have other options at their disposal 
and may therefore choose the one that gives the best payoff at the moment in question. As 
one tries to make a conclusion about the usefulness of institutions in facilitating cooperation, 
the example of the DSB which is embedded is an interwoven international trading system 
may also help to explain state behaviour in other dispute resolution mechanisms and 
especially their ability to opt in and out at will.  
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Research Questions 
While this project nests in the general theoretical debate about the independence and clout of 
institutions, the intention is to utilize formal models, statistical analyses and case studies to 
explicate the decision- making process behind filing. In essence, this study does not intend to 
regurgitate the archaic discussion on the efficacy of institutions. Debates about whether and how 
institutions matter have been explored ad nauseam. This study will therefore go beyond those 
arguments to contemplate the possibility that there are robust institutions that are sometimes 
underutilized. Since neoliberal institutionalists do not give sufficient acknowledgement of this 
phenomenon, findings from this research can therefore be used to fill this important gap in the 
literature. This will deflect the attention away from institutions to states, their consideration of 
what type of trading partners they are interacting with, and the consequent choices that they need 
to make when a trade dispute emerges. 
The primary interrogative that this research hopes to answer is, why do countries choose 
to (not) litigate within the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body? This question zones in on the fact 
that states have options and as a result, some deliberations inform their choice.  
There are however, several secondary questions that are also critical to this study. These 
include: 
1. What effect does participation or nonparticipation have on states’ trading relations? 
2. Does the DSB create opportunities for trading partners to exploit members? 
3. Does the DSB influence state behaviour? Does the DSB control undesirable state 
behaviour? 
4. Does the DSB mitigate defection between trading partners with asymmetric interests? 
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5. To what extent is the DSB representative of dispute resolution mechanisms in institutions 
generally? 
6. Why do institutions ossify? 
Realism contends that states are naturally self-interested. In the toughest cases for 
cooperation, it is therefore useful to probe trade relations in a context in which cheating / 
defecting is the dominant strategy. In order to do this, the study employs both quantitative and 
qualitative elements including formal models, statistical analyses and case studies. This mixed 
methods approach provides for a more comprehensive analysis of the dynamics of interstate 
trade disputes, state decision making and the role of the WTO. 
Non-Participatory Membership 
It is very important to outline from the onset, what non-participatory membership means 
in the context of this research. It is not expected, for instance, that states be parties to disputes 
just because they can, even if they have no real reason to do so. That is not the purpose of this 
research. Consequently, the ideal situation whereby trading partners engage in free trade and 
avoid the DSB is an example of non-participatory membership, but is not under consideration in 
this study. Instead, emphasis is on those situations where a country has a reason to be either a 
complainant or respondent in a trade dispute and opts not to do so for a variety of reasons. This 
study contends that non-participatory membership can manifest in three main ways. These 
include: 
1. Pure Non-Participation 
a. In this scenario, states pay no attention to the institution and try to provide for themselves 
what the institution purports to provide. Examples of these can be seen in the collective 
action whereby it is difficult to elicit cooperation and solutions in large groups. Capable 
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states that are frustrated by this may simply solve these problems on their own instead of 
being stymied by institutional weaknesses. In the context of trade disputes, some affected 
countries may agree on amicable solutions without seeking help from their mutual 
institutions. Others may not compromise, but instead, engage in trade wars outside the 
institution. Regardless of the path taken, these countries choose to stay outside the 
institutional framework for recourse because they can afford to do so. 
b. Pure non-participation can also take place because countries are unable to afford the costs 
associated with the dispute settlement process. This is one of the main types of non-
participatory membership that this study emphasizes. Here, countries have legitimate 
cases, but consider the financial, reputational, audience and potentially retaliatory 
consequences of using the institution and choose to stay outside. It should be noted, 
however, that different costs affect countries differently. Some may therefore not 
participate in dispute settlement because the possible reputational costs from losing are 
too high, while others may avoid the institution because of the financial burdens. As a 
result, costs vary across cases and be a reason for pure non-participation in the DSB. 
2. Strategic Bargaining 
Strategic bargaining occurs when countries do not use the institution, but evoke its authority 
to force concessions or signal resolve. In this regard, the presence and clout of the institution 
serve as bargaining tools. Countries may therefore have no intention to use the institution, but 
threaten to use it in order to change the outcome of the dispute. There are many instances at 
the WTO where one trading partner formally requests consultations with the other party and 
the dispute is squashed. In other cases, the potential defendant accepts the challenge and the 
complainant withdraws its case. In these instances, the countries do not truly intend to 
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litigate, but use the recourse that they have at the institution as a threat in order to change the 
equilibrium solutions. 
3. Free Riding 
Institutions provide material benefits that in most cases, accrue to all members. In the case of the 
WTO, some countries may therefore have an interest and even be affected by trade disputes, but 
opt not to participate. In these instances, the countries hope to free ride by having others pay the 
costs of the litigation process and they enjoy the benefits. Free riders therefore gain from the 
trade liberalization that may come from the case rulings, and also avoid the acrimony that 
sometimes come from disputes. This is often a win-win situation for free riders if the results of 
the disputes are not limited to the litigants.  
 One counterargument to these types of non-participatory membership is that countries 
mostly adhere to the system of governance that the World Trade Organization provides. By 
doing so, they are technically participating in the institutional norms, principles and beliefs, even 
if they do not litigate. Consequently, there are countries that may never use the DSB, but that 
does not mean that they are inactive members in the WTO generally. This argument is 
meritorious. It should be noted, however, that this study is not focused on what countries do with 
their WTO membership broadly speaking. Instead, it examines only those cases where countries 
have trade disputes and need institutional recourse, but do not use it. Again, the expectation is 
not that all countries should be suing. Indeed, states join the WTO with the expectation that 
communal norms of free and fair trade will prevail. This, however, is not a realistic expectation. 
The same institution that promotes these ideals therefore has litigating process in place in the 
event that they are breached. This study therefore examines those instances of violation and the 
options that states pursue at those times. This is an important phenomenon to study because if 
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institutions have agency and are efficacious, then we should see more litigation when states are 
aggrieved. If, however, there are barriers to DSB usage, then steps need to be taken to make the 
process less cumbersome. 
 In order to probe the puzzle of non-participation, the study proceeds as follows. Chapter 
Two provides a discussion on institutions, but only as they relate specifically to participation. 
Previous studies are predominantly focused on developing countries and the challenges that they 
face in using the DSB (Bown; Davis and Blodgett Bermeo; Busch et al.) While acknowledging 
the value of these studies, the chapter takes the stance that any two countries in a dispute will 
have to weigh the costs of using the institution and this determines whether they will participate. 
It therefore argues that states may avoid institutional recourse because they prefer the status quo 
ante (Gruber 2000), or have options in other forums (Busch 2007; Fang 2010). Countries may 
also be frustrated in their efforts to litigate because of asymmetric information (Collins-Williams 
and Wolfe 2010), and the fact that both winners and losers gain and suffer when they litigate. 
(Fischer 1982; Collins-Williams and Wolfe 2010; Leal-Arcas 2007; Hoekman and Mavroidis 
2000). Participation in the DSB is the result of strategic calculations by states. States therefore 
deliberate on how much they will have to pay in material and immaterial ways, consider how 
much benefit the litigation will be to their interests, and their odds of winning. (Fischer 1982; 
Pauwelyn 2000; Maggi 2015; Reinhardt 2001). A key is concern is also interdependent payoffs, 
i.e., how might the results of one case be used as a precedent in future cases (Davis 2012; Leal-
Arcas 2007; Pauwelyn 2000; Reinhardt 1999). These authors help to lay the foundation for the 
study’s discussion of estimated legal capacity and calculated costs as determinants of 
participation in the DSB. 
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 Chapter Three outlines the methodology for this research. It uses a mixed methods 
approach which includes an extensive form game and case studies, which are assessed 
comparatively by using the information theory framework. This extensive game models trade 
and dispute settlement between two trading partners and is explored in Chapter Four. Formal 
models have empirical implications. These give rise to case selection. The study therefore 
analyzes four cases that involve the same product – Ordinary Portland Cement, the same WTO 
provision – the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and have variations in power and outcomes. These 
cases include China – Cement (a non-litigated dispute between China and Jamaica); Guatemala 
Cement I and II (two disputes between Guatemala and Mexico); and United States – Cement (a 
long standing dispute between the United States and Mexico). Before the cases are discussed, 
Chapter Five provides justification for their selection, and discusses the technicalities and 
ambiguous nature of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a possible impediment to using the DSB. 
By doing this, the study contributes to the extant literature by discussing how the specific 
provision can inhibit participation and not just the general WTO rules for dispute settlement. 
 Chapter Six examines how estimations of legal capacity can affect DSB usage. It builds 
on the work of Busch et al. and Davis and Blodgett Bermeo to define and discuss the concept. It 
includes Busch et al.’s conceptualization that experience promotes legal capacity, but broadens 
that experience to include membership in other WTO negotiation groups, as well as other 
regional and international dispute settlement organizations. As a departure from Davis and 
Blodgett Bermeo, the case studies also measure whether the affected countries actually file, and 
not just the likelihood that they will file. The chapter is also distinct from these and other works 
in that it evaluates legal capacity up to the point of the disputes, and not the countries’ general 
capability. The chapter therefore includes assessments how whether the states had used the DSB 
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as a complainant, respondent or third party when their disputes emerged. Since all the cases 
include an invocation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the research also discusses whether the 
countries had any domestic or DSB experience with the Agreement. It reveals that domestic 
usage of the Agreement and even participation as a third party may not easily translate to 
participation as a complainant as in the case of China. On the other hand, the opposite happens 
with Guatemala where it had no previous experience with the Agreement domestically or 
multilaterally, but defended itself against Mexico and won. This demonstrates that legal capacity 
is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for DSB participation.  In all these ways, the study 
departs from previous studies. 
 Chapter Seven features a discussion on calculated costs and these may inform litigation. 
It builds on Bown’s work on how market share, expected benefit from the litigation and other 
political economy costs may affect the chances that an exporter will participate as a complainant 
or third party. As a distinction from Bown, however, it also analyzes how evaluations of cost can 
influence importing countries to be defendants as in the case of Guatemala and the United States. 
The study also includes thoughts from Chaudoin, Busch, Fang, Davis and Brewster to discuss 
how reputational costs and benefits, domestic audience costs, the expectation to win, as well as 
alternative forums can affect the choice to litigate. By doing this, the study uses a composite 
measure for costs and does not focus on a single factor. The cases therefore show that financial 
costs are not the only consideration that states make. In the case of China, for example, it did not 
file against Jamaica, arguably because that market share was small. Mexico, however, filed 
against Guatemala. Based on conventional arguments, it should have been too expensive for 
Guatemala to defend itself and so it should have acquiesced. Guatemala’s case therefore 
exemplifies how interdependent payoffs domestic audience costs can supersede those associated 
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with retaliation fears and vulnerability interdependence. These are rich discussions that emphasis 
on a few variables cannot provide. 
 Chapter Eight ends with concluding remarks on the puzzle of non-participatory 
membership. It examines the Central American countries and why some like El Salvador, 
Honduras and Ecuador formally supported Guatemala, while those like Belize, Costa Rica and 
Panama stayed outside. It highlights free riding, fear of retaliation, low DSB experience as 
possible reasons for non-participation. On the other hand, the countries that were also affected by 
the dumped product and had closer ties to Guatemala joined. These incidences demonstrate that 
no single reason can be advanced as to why non-participatory membership occurs. Each country 
weighs what is in its best interest and makes the choice relative to the dispute. The four cases in 
this study, however, add important ideas to the literature because they defy the expectations of 
power dynamics. Specifically, the study contributes to the literature by highlighting how the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement itself can be an impediment to recourse for those states that evoke it. 
By examining legal capacity costs, the project also enhances its conceptualization by measuring 
it at the particular times of the disputes, experience in other dispute settlement organizations, and 
experience with the particular Agreement. In regards to other dispute settlement costs, this 
research complements other scholars by modeling costs as a composite variable. When this is 
disaggregated, the findings show that countries will only litigate if the good is a significant GDP 
earner, and if they expect to win. Importantly, the study shows that developing countries can and 
will also be sued, and measures their inclination to participate in dispute settlement based on 
their assessment of the associated costs. It is also the first known study to use the information 
theory approach to find the strength and direction of relationships under conditions of reduced 
uncertainty. These conclusions can therefore be built on to look at a larger N to see if the results 
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hold. For now, non-participatory membership remains a phenomenon that can be seen when 
developing and developed countries alike have trade disputes, and especially as countries 









The international system is replete with specialized regional and multilateral institutions 
that cater to the common and diverging needs of their members. It is therefore expected that the 
coalescence of states in these bodies would be because of the public goods that are provided and 
the succour that is available in times of distress. The global political economy is structured in 
such a way that conflicts over the gains from cooperation frequently occur. The potential for 
emerging conflicts is also present. This makes it critical for states to have specific “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures” around which their 
expectations can converge.1 This necessitates the role of organizations like the World Trade 
Organization with its governance of trade policies and disputes as they emerge. One of the 
assumptions, of course, is that states cannot unilaterally regulate the world system of trade and 
therefore need a mechanism through which they can make binding commitments to each other.  
This study uses the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an exemplar for institutions.  
Many countries accede to it because of its influence and governance of the world trading system. 
Specifically, the WTO is designed in such a way that it is theoretically possible for any Member 
that has been violated in the ordinary course of trade to bring its grievances before the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB). On a more practical level, not all countries that have legitimate cases 
have sought reprieve at the DSB. Additionally, there is a discrepancy in the types of goods that 
frequently contested. What explains this? 
The extant literature on institutions is vast. Dispute settlement at the WTO and especially 
the variance in usage between developing and developed countries make up a substantial portion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Stephen D. Krasner. International Regimes. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2.  
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of these writings. Yet, this study finds an important deficiency in the previous scholarship. While 
work on the WTO has delved into possible reasons for filing, not many have explored costs 
beyond the advanced/third world dynamic.2 This study therefore uses dispute settlement costs at 
the DSB as the independent variable, and postulates that these affect the choice to pursue cases 
(dependent variable). The intention of this project is to investigate whether there is a minimum 
cost threshold for the threat to use the DSB to be credible, and a maximum level beyond which 
institutional recourse becomes irrelevant as countries will find it too expensive. In essence, while 
industrialized countries may be better able to afford DSB procedural costs, this study focuses on 
the strategies of the two states in the dispute and their preferences relative to costs. Two 
advanced as well as two developing countries could therefore be caught in this predicament and 
would have to make similar choices based on what they have to pay. The intention, then, is to 
answer the question of non-participatory membership and examine the instances in which 
litigation costs could inhibit legitimate participation in the DSB/WTO. 
The main puzzle that this research probes is the often-overlooked fact that membership in 
institutions does not necessarily equate to participation. It therefore argues that there are specific 
reasons why states join institutions.3 If, however, some specific reasons informed the choice for 
institutional membership, then we should see active participation, especially when those reasons 
are evoked. If, however, the opposite occurs, then induced participation based solely on 
membership becomes a non sequitur. Participation may therefore not be an automatic process. 
What factors, then, could account for non-participatory membership in robust institutions? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See for example, Chad Bown in Bown in “Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested 
Parties, and Free Riders.” The World Bank Economic Review. Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 287- 310.  
Here, by examining WTO trade litigation trends between 1995 – 2000, he finds that the organization generates an 
implicit “institutional bias” through its rules and incentives. This has the effect of discouraging developing country 
participation in the dispute settlement process. Their low retaliatory and legal capacities also impede their 




	   	  
18 
There are six major explanations for the underutilization of multilateral institutions for 
reprieve. These include availability of alternative forums, preference for the status quo ante, 
expected utility, interdependent payoffs, asymmetric information and complainant versus 
respondent utilities. While there may be other possible explanations for the avoidance of dispute 
settlement mechanisms within institutions, I find these to be the most compelling and pertinent to 
this study. This chapter will therefore explore each of these points, in order to highlight the 
strategic use or avoidance of multilateral institutions. 
Availability of Alternative Forums 
What explains a state’s decision to respond singlehandedly, use a bilateral or regional 
arrangement, seek help in a multilateral institution or simply do nothing if there is a trade 
violation? If the rational choice thesis holds true for example, then it could mean that the timing, 
type of goods contested and the institution selected for relief are all calculations made by the 
strategic state. This section will therefore explore the debate about why and when states use 
multilateral institutions for reprieve.  
Busch explicates how forum shopping, i.e. availability of alternative mechanisms for 
resolving the dispute may influence state decision-making in the event of a trade violation. From 
his perspective, complainants often have overlapping memberships in various institutions, and 
this helps them to “strategically discriminate” among them to meet their objectives.4 Using a 
two-dimensional spatial model with applicability to Mexican brooms and Canadian periodicals 
disputes, Busch contends that “the key to forum shopping is not simply which institution is likely 
to come closest to the complainant’s ideal ruling against the defendant.”5 On the contrary, his 
studies find that the medium selected for litigation will be one “where the resulting precedent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Marc L. Busch. “Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade.” 
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will be more useful in the future, enabling the complainant to bring litigation against other 
members.”6 In essence, states choose to use institutions successfully, to offset possible cases 
against them in the future. A state is therefore very deliberate in selecting a bilateral, regional or 
multilateral organization to file its grievances because the institutional findings have implications 
for its future trading relations and possible litigations.7 This has a two-fold effect in that case 
settlement may temper the defendant’s protectionism, and also set a precedent whereby other 
members of the institution can be forced into acquiescence based on the results of the 
complainant’s case.  
Busch’s argument is compelling, both for its originality and logic. It is often conceived 
that aggrieved states will choose institutions based on how they serve their interests now. With 
that thought in mind, countries would therefore consider which forum gives it the best payoff and 
choose accordingly. Busch says that this is not so. In his mind, there are some cases that states 
would want to settle bilaterally, regionally or multilaterally, not for the immediate benefits, but 
for how this can increase its bargaining advantage later on. Implicit in Busch’s assumptions is 
the expectation that institutions have clout and that their findings are binding on all members, or 
at least that they generate norms for future behaviour. Consequently, institutional deliberations 
and judgments affect state behaviour and bargaining tools. This would make it critical as Busch 
suggests, for states to not just pick an institution for instant reprieve, but also to litigate in the one 
whose findings will give it the greatest advantage when it deals with others. 
Fang examines bilateral and multilateral institutions and comes to conclusions similar to 
those of Busch. While her work does not model precedent specifically, she uses a formal model 
with the assumptions of Rubinstein’s bargaining model to explicate why countries locked in a 
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bilateral dispute would evoke the multilateral structure.8 Based on the model’s equilibrium, high 
capacity institutions can induce cooperation, but low capacity ones do not.9 Countries therefore 
moderate their actions based on the type of institutions that they are dealing with.10 Since Fang’s 
work specifically examines dyadic disputes, her model shows that the choice of international 
succour is only attractive to one party. Arguably, this could be based on expectations about the 
outcome, as well as perceived calculations about financial costs, time, reputation and effects on 
the trading relationship. 
One important finding that Fang highlights is the fact  that a country’s bargaining 
position can be strengthened by an institution, even if that institution is not directly involved in 
the dispute settlement.11 In Fang’s words, “given a prior belief, the country with a lower 
noncompliance cost is more likely to have a credible threat of appealing to an institution, thus 
more able to extract concessions at the bargaining table.”12 This is a counterintuitive result since 
one would expect that higher noncompliance costs would make the threat to go to the institution 
even more credible. This is especially true since evoking the institution is one way in which a 
state can signal its resolve to litigate to its domestic audiences, the responding party, as well as to 
the world.13 If, however, a country has less to lose if it does not implement an institution’s 
findings, then the state that has a higher noncompliance cost could indeed be cajoled to acquiesce 
and avoid the institution as Fang intimates. In this case, noncompliance costs affect the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See for example, Wolfgang Alschner in “Amicable Settlements of WTO Disputes: Bilateral Solutions in a 
Multilateral System” for a counter argument. Alschner reasons that because the WTO sanctions Mutually Agreed 
Solutions (pursuant to Article 3 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding), countries may simply resort to settle their 
disputes bilaterally instead of the potentially prolonged multilateral process. In this sense, the countries may initiate 
the dispute at the DSB, but come to an amicable solution outside. By doing this, they show that having the bilateral 
alternative available, they may forego the longevity of the DSB process and choose a quicker resolution. 
9 Songying Fang. “The Strategic Use of International Institutions in Dispute Settlement.” Quarterly Journal of 
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equilibrium that is formed and determines whether states locked in a bilateral dispute will settle 
or use an international institution. 
Allee and Huth add their spin to the debate on the strategic use of international 
institutions for dispute settlement. Using multivariate analyses of 348 territorial disputes across 
all regions from 1919-1995, they show that there are specific domestic situations where states 
leaders would prefer to use an international institution than to settle their disputes through 
bilateral negotiations. In this sense, the availability of the international forum would take 
precedence over the bilateral arrangement and serve as an explanation for its usage. Allee and 
Huth call this phenomenon “political cover.” What they mean by this is that state leaders often 
use the legitimacy of an international institution to offset the possible negative repercussions of a 
controversial dispute settlement.14This occurs in cases where leaders believe that there could be 
huge domestic political consequences if they make concessions through negotiations at the 
bilateral level.15 The international institution, however, provides “political coverage” whereby 
the state can use it to take some blame for the result, or point to its judgment as the unbiased 
resolution of the conflict. 
The study by Allee and Huth is very pertinent to this research because it highlights how 
domestic actors can influence a state’s foreign policy. It also peels away at the notion of the state 
being a unitary actor, and instead demonstrates how a country’s constituents can force the state 
to forego the recourse that it has in bilateral arrangements and participate in international 
institutions. If this argument is valid, then states would not only consider their chances of 
winning, financial cost, or even the precedent that they want to set when they use international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth.  “Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rules as Domestic 
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institutions as opposed to bilateral ones. Instead, their intention may be to avert large domestic 
political costs. This is different from what Fang argues. 
The interplay of the domestic and international levels runs parallel to Putnam’s 
arguments and also as a possible explanation for which forum is used when trade disputes arise. 
According to him, an interaction of domestic and national interests determines what a country’s 
win-set is when it sits at the negotiating table. A combination of regime type, institutions, 
preferences, power and rules at the domestic level plus the negotiator’s skill relative to an 
interlocutor therefore helps to determine the outcome.16 While the decision to use an 
international institution for dispute settlement may not be a negotiation in the way that Putnam 
characterizes it, his arguments also have applicability here. In a sense, states are calculating what 
the domestic populace wants and how this coincides with its international goals. The “win-set” to 
go to the DSB would therefore be contingent upon whether it has strong national support (or at 
least a weak / non-existent opposition to do so), or needs the backing of the institution to reduce 
the effects of possible domestic dissent and backlash. These factors then, help to create national 
consensus, which tips the balance in favour of formal, multilateral litigation versus alternative 
avenues for resolution. 
Audience features is another argument that has been postulated in support of how 
domestic constituents can affect the strategic use of international institutions. This theory is 
posited by Chaudoin. Chaudoin questions, for example, why WTO members wait so long to 
object to their trading partners’ illegal trading practices. For him, evoking the DSB is 
synonymous with sounding an alarm, but this “alarm” is raised discriminately.17 This is because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Robert Putnam. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two – Level Games.” International 
Organization. (Summer, 1988) Volume 42, Number 3. 
17 Stephen Chaudoin. “Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes.” International Organization, 
Volume 68, (Fall 2014), pp. 877. 
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governments are aware that there are variations in the preferences and strength of the audience 
that hears the alarm. As a corollary, sounding the alarm is strategic.18 Consequently seeking 
institutional recourse may be dependent on not just precedent setting as Busch intimates, or even 
on its projected effect on the outcome as Fang argues. Additionally, while Chaudoin’s view 
coincides with Allee and Huth’s thinking about the impact of level two actors, his treatise is 
more focused on the calculated litigation timing. To substantiate this claim, Chaudoin uses WTO 
disputes against U.S. tariff barriers and the critical role that timing plays in the use of the 
institution. He shows, for instance, that election years are more likely to feature trade disputes 
since during these times, macroeconomic indicators reveal broader support for free trade.19As a 
result, the frequent litigation by the U.S. during election years would not mean that trade 
violations are prevalent only during those times. On the contrary, they would indicate periods in 
which leaders feel that electors of are more in favour of addressing trade violations, even if they 
were tolerated at other times. 
Chaudoin’s examination of how domestic audiences affect DSB litigation is relevant to 
this study because it firstly explains why we do not see more filing at the DSB. It also explains, 
to some extent, the specific types of goods that are contested and the frequency with which 
litigants appear before the Body.  While his focus is not on how institutions provide “political 
cover” as Allee and Huth articulate, the clout that domestic audiences have is central to 
understanding the strategic use of international institutions. It shows, for instance, that states read 
and tap into the political will and preferences of the electorate, and use this knowledge to their 
advantage. DSB litigation is therefore not haphazard, but instead is done at times where 
governments perceive that they have the most domestic support. 
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Davis also explores the strategic use of international institutions in her book, Why 
Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO. She too underscores how domestic politics can 
help to determine the cases that appear before the DSB. While she allows for the influence of 
international politics in her delineations, she finds that industry lobbying and legislative demands 
also have a decisive input in a state’s decision to litigate. To validate her claims, she uses high 
profile U.S. trade disputes with China over intellectual property rights and the numerous 
challenges that the Japanese made to American protectionism. Davis’s main argument is that 
evoking the DSB is a potent signal of a country’s intentions and can ultimately mitigate 
imminent trade wars. In her estimation, formal dispute settlement enables governments to 
indicate their resolve to address the issues that are important to interest groups and this can affect 
how policy makers respond. This would be similar to what Allee and Huth argue, except that 
they would see the “political cover” as the end result while Davis, based on her cases, would see 
it as the first critical step for leaders. In essence then, states operate at both the international and 
domestic levels. They have multiple avenues in which to pursue trade litigation and they use this 
knowledge to their advantage. The goal can be to signal resolve, to set a precedent, tip the 
bargaining scales in favour of the outcome, or to seek political cover. The timing is also 
important. In the end, whatever strategy is chosen reveals calculations about the choices and a 
combination of domestic and international factors determines which of the available forums is 
used, and when.  
Preference for the Status Quo Ante 
All states have to think about their economic and political survival in the global political 
economy. Membership in multilateral institutions is one means of safeguarding their survival. In 
this section I will therefore use the work of Gruber and other scholars to argue that states may 
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join institutions to protect their international bargaining position, but become inactive users of 
those same organizations to express their preference for the status quo ante. 
 Gruber writes explicitly about why states may choose to join supranational 
organizations. For him, “institutionalized cooperation by one group of actors (the winners) can 
have the effect of restricting the options available to another group of actors (the losers), altering 
the rules of the game such that members of the latter group are better off playing by the new 
rules despite their strong preference for the original, pre-cooperation status quo.”20  In essence, 
even in the face of being potentially worse off, a coopted state may find it rational to accede to a 
new regime because it knows that its counterparts can afford to unite and benefit without it.21 
Since the status quo changes when the new regime is formed, the state may therefore find it more 
prudent to become a member rather than suffer the exclusion costs.22 If Gruber’s arguments are 
valid, it would therefore mean that non-participatory membership allows a state to express its 
preference for the pre-cooperation status quo while sparing it the costs of exclusion. In other 
words, the avoidance of costs (exclusion) and the realization of benefits (inclusion) are separate 
calculations for states. Gruber’s postulation helps disentangle these calculations. 
Gruber’s arguments help to explain the near universal participation in the WTO. China’s 
accession in 2001, for example, was a means of benefiting from the special and differential 
treatment that is available to WTO members but is inaccessible to non-members. China therefore 
weighed the costs and benefits and felt that it had more to gain within than without. This thinking 
may serve as a counter to the widely held view that the WTO is the most successful international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Lloyd Gruber. Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 7. 
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institution because of its membership. Based on Gruber’s surmising, the exclusion cost may be 
far greater than accession, and so states join even though they may prefer the status quo ex ante. 
There are, however, some challenges to Gruber’s thesis. He contends, for example, that it 
is the fear of exclusion and not the possibility of mutual gains that generates regime membership. 
This is a subtle relative gains argument because the outside state that is really concerned about 
power contemplates how its exclusion will allow the included members to increase their power 
positions relative to it. Joining this regime would therefore eliminate this disadvantaged 
situation. By emphasizing how power serves as an impetus for regime formation, however, 
Gruber does not give enough credence to the role of prevailing norms that constructivism 
advocates. It could be that states are socialized to be functionally similar and so since norms of 
institutionalization have ossified in the international system, states join these supranational 
institutions because they have come to believe that these are good for their welfare and not 
because of any calculation about relative power configurations. If this is true, then states would 
institutionalize as a “rite of passage” and not for the reasons that Gruber suggests. If, however, 
one should consider the near universal participation in institutions like the United Nations and 
the WTO, and especially the countries that are moderating their policies to accede to the latter, 
then Gruber’s summations are meritorious. Exclusion costs, real or imagined, may therefore be a 
motivational factor for institutional membership, with some states simply unwilling to stay 
outside when they can join and potentially enjoy all the benefits. 
Conversely, some countries are sufficiently capable of retaliating against a violating state 
and do not appear to need to use the DSB.  Additionally, many find reprieve in regional trade 
agreements as recompense. Along with non-participatory membership, this suggests that the 
DSB is neither necessary nor sufficient for the resolution of trade disputes, at least for some 
 
	  
	   	  
27 
states. This makes the use, or non-use, of the DSB all the more problematic theoretically. 
Regionalism is therefore one of the ways that states coalesce in institutions as a counterbalance 
to multilateralism. While there are many reasons for economic regionalism, Gilpin surmises that 
“it is also driven by the dynamics of an economic security dilemma.”23 His argument is that 
states fear exclusion from certain blocs and form their own as a counterbalance.24 This argument 
is parallel to Gruber’s in that states believe that they have more to gain by joining than staying 
outside. On a comparative level, it therefore can be posited that the propagation of regional 
trading agreements may be due to calculations by states that these may yield greater payoffs than 
the multilateral structure that the DSB entails. This thinking may coincide with Olson’s 
resolution of the collective action problem where he asserts that smaller groups are better 
equipped to deal with the free rider problem than larger ones.25 In this regard, trade liberalization 
would be a public good, with not many nations willing to pay the price for it by acquiescing to 
the wishes of other traders, especially in a context where they can gain more in the short term 
through protectionism.26 In regional groupings, however, this problem may be more easily 
curtailed because there are stronger checks and balances, with the cost of defection being much 
higher. In this sense, regionalism and simultaneous non-participatory membership in multilateral 
institutions may therefore be ways in which states demonstrate their predilection for the status 
quo ante. 
Calculations about institutional design can also help us understand why states may join, 
but use their nonparticipation to express their preference for the pre-institutional status quo. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Robert Gilpin. Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2001), 360. 
24 Ibid  
25 See Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. (Cambridge, 
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Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, for instance, posit that many multilateral organizations start out 
with “substantially smaller memberships and expand over time.”27 They use a rational choice 
treatise to support the claim that these organizations do not form an “inclusive” agreement at the 
onset. On the contrary, these smaller groups are able to sequentially select potential members 
based on their own preferences, and this perpetuates a path-dependent process whereby the 
institution is able to become progressively deeper in facilitating cooperation than it would be if it 
had been fully inclusive from the onset. The articulations of Downs, Rocke and Barsoom are 
similar to what Gruber contends. Here, both works agree that the “winners set and entrench the 
new status quo” in the international system. The only difference here is that whereas Gruber 
predicts a contagion effect whereby C and D as rational actors will want to join the institution 
that A and B as winners form, Downs, Rocke and Barsoom show the winners actively choosing 
the additional members based on their perceived preferences for cooperation. 
The trajectory of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) seem to 
substantiate the arguments that Downs, Rocke and Barsoom present.28 The GATT was founded 
by twenty-three countries, whose major issue was tariffs.29 Tariffs continued to be the main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27George W Downs, David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. “Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism.” 
International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 397. 
28 The clout that the winners/initial members have in selecting additional members is seen in the disparity in 
accession terms for each prospective member. Pursuant to Article XII of the WTO Agreement, “Any state or 
customs territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies is eligible to accede to the WTO.” 
Accession, however, is based “on terms to be agreed” between the acceding government and the WTO. It is 
therefore based on negotiation between the two parties and is not an automatic process. See for example, Accession: 
Explanation – How to Become a Member of the WTO.” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm 
Pelc also addresses this inconsistency in his work, “Why Do Some Countries Get Better WTO Accession Terms 
Than Others?” For him, existing members use their domestic export interests to elicit favorable accession terms 
from new members. Countries that have larger markets are therefore required to give more and vice versa. In this 
case, the institutional design would determine the different accession terms, and ultimately, who is allowed to join. 
See Krzysztof J. Pelc. “Why Do Some Countries Get Better WTO Accession Terms Than Others?” International 
Organization, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Fall, 2011), pp. 639. 
29 The founding 23 members of the GATT were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, 
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, 
Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States. See for example, “Press Brief – 
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course on the agenda until the Kennedy Round when antidumping measures were included.30 As 
more and more countries, and especially developing countries, acceded, the flaws of the GATT 
became more glaring. This precipitated the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Arguably, the very large membership that the WTO now has may be one of the reasons the Doha 
Round, which has been happening since 2001, has vacillated, ebbed and flowed without any 
successful conclusion.31Importantly, even with the increased membership that the WTO has, 
some countries have remained inactive participants in the dispute settlement process, while 
others are frequent litigants. This disparity in usage could be an indication of the separate 
considerations that states make to stay outside versus joining but not adjudicating. 
Escape clauses are another means by which states join institutions but use it strategically 
to reflect their preferences for a world without them. Rosendorff and Milner investigate and 
clarify this claim. Based on the findings of a two-stage game, they reason that, “escape clauses 
are an efficient equilibrium under conditions of domestic uncertainty.”32 For Rosendorff and 
Milner, “the greater the uncertainty that political leaders face about their ability to maintain 
domestic compliance with international agreements in the future, the more likely agreements are 
to contain escape clauses.”33 They caution, however, that “for escape clauses to be useful and 
efficient, they must impose some kind of cost on their use.”34 This caveat convincingly submits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See for example, “The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakech.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm       
31 The Doha Round is unique in that it has 157 countries participating in the talks. It began in November 2001, and 
to date, has not come to a successful end. Some of the issues that have been negotiated include agriculture, non-
agricultural market access (NAMA), services, trade facilitation, rules that cover anti-dumping, subsidies and 
countervailing measures, fisheries subsidies and regional trade agreements, the environments, geographical 
indications: multilateral register for wines and spirits, other intellectual property issues and dispute settlement, with 
a view of improving and clarifying the Dispute Settlement Understanding.  For more on the Doha Round, see “Doha 
Round: What are They Negotiating?”  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/update_e.htm  
32 Peter B. Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner. 2001. “The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: 
Uncertainty and Escape.” International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 4, The Rational Design of International 
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that institutional agreements can be vitiated if members frequently evoke escape clauses with no 
penalty. An exorbitant cost, however, mitigates against frequent use and signals intent to stick 
with the institutional rules in the future.35  
The inclusion of escape clauses in institutional arrangements highlights the calculations 
by states of not only how the institution should be designed at conception, but also how such a 
structure may support their interests in the future. Importantly, states seeking to join institutions 
may be reluctant to become parties to agreements that would restrict their actions if the need for 
change comes up. As Rosendorff and Milner aptly indicate, however, escape clauses should have 
some significant cost if they are to keep states committed to the institution, but at the same time, 
give them some amount of flexibility. Other prospective states, for example, may worry how 
others can use escape clauses to take advantage of them and would be disinclined to join if the 
institution makes it too easy. In the same vein, this flexibility could be states’ way of expressing 
their preference for the status quo ante. The only difference would be that in this regard, they 
would use the same institutions to sanction their non-participatory membership. 
It should be noted, however, that writers like Pelc challenge the assertion that escape 
clauses have to be costly for them to be effective. He argues that on the contrary, in 
organizations like the GATT/WTO, members can “appeal to exception” whereby they can use 
domestic circumstances to justify their request for temporary escape.36 This would be based on 
the “institution’s ability to verify the severity and exogeneity of the domestic circumstances of 
states seeking temporary escape.”37 While both arguments are meritorious, both of them 
highlight the fact that states are more incentivized to join institutions if there are possibilities to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid 
36 See Krzysztof J. Pelc in “Seeking Escape: The Use of Escape Clauses in International Trade Agreements.” 
International Studies Quarterly (2009), Volume 53, pp. 349 – 368. 
37  Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. “The Rational Design of International Institutions.” 
International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 4, The Rational Design of International Institutions (Autumn 2001), pp. 365 
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circumvent the rules that they sign on to.38 This amounts to minimizing exclusion costs and 
maximizing inclusion benefits. Conversely, however, significantly costly escape clauses may 
also induce non-participatory membership. This could occur in cases where the costs of 
escape/derogation may be too high, while costs of litigation are also exorbitant. For the affected 
states, inaction (nonuse) may be the least costly alternative. This would therefore see them 
avoiding the institution so as to avoid both potentially high costs.  
Expected Utility 
Expected Utility and Probability of Success 
There are other reasons outside of the tensions between domestic and international 
interests that inform the strategic use of multilateral institutions. Fischer for one examines the 
pre-litigation phases of four cases to explicate the rationale for using the International Court of 
Justice.39 These cases shed light on factors that the applicant states considered, as well as the 
deliberations that the respondent states made in light of the imminent proceedings, which 
ultimately help us to answer why states choose to use multilateral institutions.  
There are three factors that Fischer says the applicant states considered as they prepared 
to use the International Court of Justice. These include time and diplomacy, dispute and context, 
and probability of winning/losing. In regards to time and diplomacy, Fischer posits that “all the 
applicant states felt that they had exhausted all other peaceful methods of dispute settlement 
before turning to the Court”, with some of the cases being unsuccessfully resolved for many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See for example, Jeffrey Kucik and Eric Reinhardt in “Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to 
the Global Trade Regime.” International Organization, Volume 62, Number 3, (Summer 2008), pp. 477-505. They 
argue that countries that are able to take advantage of the WTO’s flexibility on antidumping whereby they can have 
their own domestic laws, are more likely to join. 
39 The cases include nuclear tests as evidenced by Australia v. France and New Zealand v. France; The United 
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years.40 While not all disputes take a considerable amount of time before they are brought before 
an international tribunal, it is reasonable to assert that when they finally do, that states have 
exhausted all possible means for an amicable resolution. This would mean that attempts at 
diplomacy have failed and the Court is evoked as a last resort. The WTO, for instance, allows for 
consultations and mediation between the two parties as the first step in dispute settlement.41 It is 
only after the two countries are unable to resolve their differences that a panel is set up for 
adjudication.42 This would also mean that during the time when attempts are being made to 
resolve the dispute in other forums, at the WTO level, this would be seen as examples of non-
participatory membership. 
In regards to “dispute and context,” Fischer postulates that not only had the countries 
exhausted all avenues for the pacific settlement of their disputes, but all felt that there were 
broader implications for their foreign policy objectives.43New Zealand, for example, felt that the 
intervention of the Court was needed to isolate the case from its otherwise harmonious 
relationship with France,44 while in the North Sea continental dispute, Germany, Denmark and 
the Netherlands were of the view that the matter required legal clarification and therefore 
favoured international judgment over a political solution.45 The idea of “dispute and context” 
highlights the fact that institutions are issue-specific and that states trade more than one good 
simultaneously. As a result, a dispute in one particular area does not mean that states do not 
continue to cooperate in other critical areas. Having the institution as a mediation forum, 
however, would allow the states to continue their relationship in other areas while the institution 
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41 See for example, “Understanding the WTO: A Unique Contribution.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm   
42 Ibid 
43 Dana D. Fischer. “Decisions to Use the International Court of Justice: Four Recent Cases.” International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 258. 
44 Ibid 
45 Ibid, 259 
 
	  
	   	  
33 
deliberates over the vexing issue. Additionally, seeking legal clarification on matters could be 
similar to what Busch argues in that the Court’s ruling would set a precedent for future cases 
involving similar issues. This would have greater traction and apply to a much broader audience 
than would have happened if the grievance were to be settled bilaterally or regionally. Arguably, 
however, states may choose not to litigate fearing that a precedent would affect a different 
dispute it has with another party. In other words, the interdependence of outcomes and payoffs 
may dissuade use of an institution in a given context. 
Fischer surmises that one of the most important reasons that an applicant state would 
consider the International Court of Justice is the probability of winning/losing. Since litigation 
places a huge financial, technical and legal burden on the states involved, then it makes sense 
that countries would calculate their chances of winning before applying and also responding to a 
case. For the applicant state, losing is even more expensive because there are reputational costs 
as well. For the respondent state, it too would be better off if it capitulates at the onset rather than 
pursuing the litigation knowing what the odds are and then losing. Conversely, some states may 
view acquiesce as a form of weakness and would prefer to have the matter settled in Court. 
Another counterargument is that some states actually want to go before the Court and lose 
because they may be opposed to the groups that pressure them to file, but want the institutional 
support to say no. This coincides with the “political cover” argument that Allee and Huth raise. 
 There are, however, challenges in enforcing decisions made by international institutions 
since many lack the capability to do so. In this regard, enforcement costs may be a critical 
consideration for states that decide not to pursue recourse in multilateral institutions. In all the 
cases that Fischer explores, for example, “all of the respondents refused to accept the jurisdiction 
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of the Court.”46 Since participation in the Court is voluntary, none of the parties could be coerced 
to comply with its rulings. There are, however, other strategic reasons that countries would 
choose to use an international institution, even if its enforcement mechanism is weak. In the 
nuclear tests, for instance, New Zealand and Australia were not surprised by France’s refusal to 
avoid the Court.47 They saw, however, application to the Court as one means by which they 
could get France to stop the tests and opted for that strategy.48 Where the fisheries jurisdiction 
cases are concerned, the United Kingdom and Germany used the Court to signal their position to 
Iceland and the observing world.49 In doing so, the Court became strategic as an international 
bargaining tool. This is similar to what Fang and Busch assert. In essence, even if respondents do 
not accept the rulings of the international institutions, applicant states can still use them to 
leverage their positions and also to bring international pressure on the noncompliant state. On 
looking countries that foresee this potential institutional clout may therefore choose not to use 
the institution in certain instances. How then, does this relate to the WTO specifically? 
Enforcement and Litigation Costs 
The extent to which the WTO has any enforcement capacity is the subject of many 
scholarly debates.50 While academics are divided on the issue, one puzzle remains: why would 
states bother to litigate in a multilateral institution that has no real power to bind disputants to its 
findings? Indeed, why would countries not only file, but also invest so much money, time and 
legal and technical expertise to increase their chances of winning? One argument is that while 
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48 Ibid 
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50 See for example, Michael M. Bechtel and Thomas Sattler. “What is Litigation in the World Trade Organization 
Worth?” International Organization, (2015), Volume 69, pp. 375 – 403, Giovanni Maggi. “The Role of Multilateral 
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the Dispute Settlement Body by itself may be limited in its enforcement capacity, norms of 
compliance have solidified in this institution and so members see the results of deliberations as 
their legal obligations, even if they delay and modify the extent to which they do so. Conversely, 
it could also be that the institution is designed in such a way that it is difficult for parties simply 
not to adhere to its provisions. This could be because the repercussions are just too costly. This 
section therefore examines the extent to which the WTO’s enforcement mechanisms work, and 
consequently whether their lack of efficacy may explain why members sometimes do not avail 
themselves of the DSB.  
 Pauwelyn explicates the different ways in which the WTO executes its enforcement 
function. All WTO rules fall under the ambit of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).51 Through this mechanism, all Members can seek 
redress for trade violations. For example, if the established panel finds that a WTO provision has 
been breached, pursuant to Article 19.1, the DSB will recommend that the culpable state bring 
that measure into conformity.52 The panel and Appellate Body also have the right to make 
suggestions on how the wayward Member can implement their recommendations.53As Article 
21.1 of the DSB stipulates, the expectation is that rulings and recommendations should be 
implemented immediately.54 
There is, however, allowance for the losing party to have a “reasonable period of time” to 
make the proposed adjustments if it is unable to institute them promptly.55 If this time expires, 
the rule is that it should provide compensation to both the winning party and all Members by 
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lifting trade barriers.56 In the absence of an agreement of what this compensation should look 
like, the DSB can authorize bilateral countermeasures that are equivalent in nature to the first 
offence.57 Additionally, in order to elicit compliance, the implementation process is continuously 
monitored by the DSB.58 Based on the terms of Article 21.5 of the DSU, litigants can ask the 
original panel to determine if compliance of its rulings has occurred.59 Lastly, in accordance with 
Article 22.6 of the DSU, arbitration can be used to mediate between parties that disagree on 
countermeasures or similar issues.60 Generally, these regulations are in place to eliminate 
uncertainty when trade disputes arise, and also to facilitate implementation after panels have 
deliberated. What then might be some of the problems regarding enforcement at the WTO? 
While Pauwelyn identifies the many efforts that the legal framework of the WTO has 
made to improve from its predecessor the GATT, he highlights some inherent weaknesses in the 
DSU which complicate its enforcement efforts and consequently, why states would forego their 
recourse there. One of his criticisms of the legalized nature of dispute settlement is the fact that 
weaker states sometimes have to grapple with the repercussions of seeking recourse against their 
more powerful, noncompliant trading partners. For him, this can ignite power politics which can 
make negotiations regarding compensation and countermeasures difficult.61 Additionally, any 
implementation of countermeasures could cause the more powerful state to retaliate in other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ibid 
57 Ibid, See the Articles of the Dispute Settlement Unit for more details: “Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes.” Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement. 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm  
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areas such as foreign aid and make the weaker state worse off.62 This point hints at two insights. 
First, by insisting on countermeasures, the WTO puts weaker states in a precarious position 
because they may not have the wherewithal to do so, or their response may not sufficiently 
punish the guilty state. Secondly, because of the overlap of state relations, a vulnerably 
interdependent state may have little bargaining power when negotiating compensation as it fears 
retaliation in other areas. In this way, enforcement in principle works, but in practice, it does not 
consider power dynamics, or the fact that some states may simply be unable to implement 
countermeasures, even if they are authorized. These considerations can catalyze nonparticipation 
in the DSB, even in cases where states have legitimate cases.  
In furtherance to the point about countermeasures, Pauwelyn delineates another issue 
with enforcement in the WTO. Based on the DSU’s rules, compensation only happens if the 
“reasonable period of time” has elapsed and the losing party has not brought its measures into 
compliance. Pauwelyn, however, is of the view that with this system in place, the WTO 
overlooks “the remedy of cessation” whereby there is no recompense to the affected party for 
losses suffered in the past.63 To fix this, he opines that the obligation to compensate should 
persist, “even during the period when countermeasures are imposed.” Without this adjustment, 
Pauwelyn argues that the violating state can end up better off for breaking the rules than 
upholding them.64 This observation is valid. If violating states pay only after they lose at the 
DSB and do not have to make restitution for the harm caused to the other party, then countries 
that can afford to suffer losses temporarily, may deliberately cheat, with a view of changing their 
trading policy when brought before the DSB. Additionally, if after losing they face 
countermeasures as the only penalty without having to compensate the aggrieved member, then 
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again, the structure of the DSB may make it too easy for capable states to manipulate its 
provisions without being critically affected. With this in mind, states that stand to lose more may 
simply opt not to use the DSB, while those that expect to benefit even with culpability, may still 
decide to use the institution. 
A final observation that Pauwelyn makes about the inefficacy of WTO enforcement 
strategies is the fact that only the winning complaining party is authorized to impose 
countermeasures against the violating state.65This means that the complainant faces double costs 
by using the DSB because it has to pay the litigation costs as well those associated with the 
countermeasures.66 Pauwelyn posits that a more efficient form of punishment would be for the 
DSB to suspend some of the obligations that benefit the culpable state as well as to allow other 
Members to suspend some of the concessions equitable to the damage that the aggrieved state 
faced.67 By doing this, collective enforcement could help weaker states that are simply unable to 
impose countermeasures on a bilateral basis.68 These are sage suggestions because they would 
take the burden of filing and retaliating from one state that may not have the capacity to 
adequately punish the defector. Importantly, if states knew that the entire membership could take 
action against violators, then this could temper the extent to which provisions are breached and 
also increase use of the DSB.  
Brewster also identifies some challenges with enforcement at the WTO subsequent to a 
DSB ruling. While like Pauwelyn she is concerned about countermeasures, her focus is on the 
duration of dispute settlement and the damage that is done to the complaining state before it gets 
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redress. She laments, for example, that recourse at the DSB is “conditional and prospective” 
because it is only after completion that there is any relief.69 In her estimation, this delay creates a 
“de facto escape clause” by allowing “states to violate WTO law without providing any way for 
injured states to respond by suspending trade concessions.”70 Based on Brewster’s assertions, 
there are two other negative implications for the lengthy delay that is associated with dispute 
settlement at the WTO. In regards to the culpable state, she shows that because nothing can be 
done to it until the panel has ruled, it has little incentive to settle in the pretrial consultations.71 
This is because doing so would shorten the time that it has to continue cheating and 
consequently, unless it gets some form of compensation, it might be unwilling to settle.72 When 
this point is combined with the one that Pauwelyn makes about no penalty for losses incurred up 
to adjudication, then litigating and waiting for due process has advantages for the violating state. 
For the aggrieved party that is aware of the losses that it can continue to suffer as it waits on the 
dispute settlement process, Brewster reasons that this could be the impetus for it to avoid the 
DSB and retaliate outside.73This, in essence, is a case for non-participatory membership. 
 Brewster’s arguments offer two rival hypotheses to mine about how states strategically 
choose to use or avoid the DSB. For the complaining state, I argue that if litigation costs are 
reasonably affordable, it will use the multilateral institution for recourse. Brewster shows, 
however, that if the state anticipates that it will be seriously affected by the delays in the process, 
it will forego that alternative. In the case of the defendant, my hypothesis is that if it can afford 
the process, or finds it more lucrative than defecting, it will litigate. If not, it will acquiesce. If, 
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however, costs are too high, it will continue cheating and engage in tit-for-tat strategies outside 
the DSB. With the prospect of a long settlement, Brewster raises a trenchant argument. She 
contends that the violating state may use the procedure to its advantage by allowing itself to be 
sued, but continuing to keep its restrictive measures in place until the panel rules against it. To 
prevent this type of manipulation, Brewster suggests that there should be an allowance for 
complainants to seek preliminary injunctions against the respondents.74 This should be done 
based on the merit of the plaintiff’s case. If it is likely to win, the panel should give the guilty 
state a reasonable time period to remove its trade barriers or to be retaliated against if it fails to 
do so.75 This, she believes, can promote greater compliance and conversely, more participation in 
the dispute settlement process. 
Reinhardt also has some thoughts about the GATT and the choice to litigate even when 
its enforcement is weak.  Basing his work on Carr’s thinking that “adjudication under anarchy is 
unenforceable,” Reinhardt uses a game of incomplete information to show why states bother 
with legal procedures whose results they can “spurn with impunity.” In his model, the plaintiff 
seeks to alter some policy in the defendant’s state, but has the option of worsening the situation 
by responding unilaterally, or seeking redress through adjudication.76 The caveat is that both 
states face uncertainty. In the case of the defendant, it does not know what the plaintiff’s 
retaliation costs are. It is therefore not clear whether the plaintiff prefers to retaliate or to accept 
the status quo.77 The plaintiff in turn does not know what the defendant’s costs for 
noncompliance of an unfavourable ruling are. In essence, the defendant faces one set of costs if it 
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is indifferent towards an unfavourable ruling, and another if it does not adhere to the judgment.78 
Reinhardt’s findings are that with uncertainty, an early settlement can be induced, even for 
defendants that will not be worse off if they do not comply with the court’s decisions. This is to 
avoid retaliation.79 Additionally, he finds that if a defendant will suffer noncompliance costs, this 
can promote more compromise than in cases that it would not.80 The plaintiff can therefore 
maintain its stance, while the defendant in anticipation of an adverse ruling, will concede.81 
 Reinhardt’s work is different from Brewster’s and Pauwelyn’s in that the states in 
question are more concerned with manipulating each other rather than the institution. His work is 
important because it shows the irrelevance of strong enforcement to the choices that states make 
to adjudicate. Incidentally, this is also the position that my study takes where institutional 
capacity does not figure significantly in the tactics that states use. What Reinhardt’s project 
highlights is that the multilateral structure provides a forum that is necessary and sufficient to 
induce settlement. This is because although there is incomplete information about the resulting 
costs, it is within the institutional framework that the states choose adjudication. Additionally, 
once the institution is evoked, uncertainty about what each side will have to pay after a ruling is 
what catalyzes the equilibrium solutions. In this regard, Reinhardt argues for participation 
irrespective of the enforcement costs and not against it.  
Interdependent Payoffs  
States sometimes use multilateral institutions because they are concerned about 
interdependent payoffs. Countries, for example, may wish to signal their intent to others, get a 
bargaining advantage for future cases, as well as to strategize based on perceptions about power 
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asymmetry. In this section, I will therefore discuss how calculations about interdependent 
payoffs can affect participation in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. 
Signaling to Others, Bargaining and Reputational Costs 
 A threat to use the DSB often precedes the actual filing. Legitimacy plays a great role in 
the extent to which these threats are perceived as credible. Pelc addresses this issue by examining 
U.S. trade policy measures from 1975 to 2000. He finds that state threats that are disseminated 
multilaterally are more likely to be seen as legitimate, while those issued “in the presence of a 
multilateral option are not.”82 States have therefore resorted to use multilateral institutions to 
make their threats more legitimate,83 and by doing this, help us to understand why some states 
choose to use these mechanisms while some do not. To test his hypothesis, Pelc analyzes how 
“the legitimacy of threats” affected how the targeted states responded to the United States. He 
does this by examining Section 301 which authorizes the U.S. to retaliate against foreign 
measures that affect its interests or violates extant agreements and the dispute settlement 
procedures in the GATT/WTO.84 He finds that the perceived legitimacy of the threat influences 
the extent to which the target makes concessions. Since those states that acquiesce to illegitimate 
threats suffer reputational losses, targets tend to resist those ones and surrender only to legal 
ones.85 In the case of the sender states, they prefer to coerce targets without the constraints of the 
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multilateral structure, but will opt to use it if past actions show that material power is insufficient 
to cajole targets.86 
 Pelc’s study has implications not only for the immediate, strategic use of the DSB, but 
also for future bargaining between states. One of the highlights of his work is that there are high 
payoffs for resisting illegitimate threats. For example, if the targets believed that U.S. trade 
threats were illegitimate, this perception reduced the probability that they would concede by 34 
percent.87 Additionally, for countries that did not surrender to these illegitimate, unilateral 
measures, this reduced the likelihood that they would face similar actions over the next five years 
by 25 percent.88 What this shows is that the U.S. cannot afford to make threats that are ignored 
because this reduces its credibility and reputation in the international system. To avoid this 
possibility, the United States would be more inclined to use the DSB rather than act alone. For 
the targets of such threats, they too would be incentivized not to acquiesce to the United States 
outside of the multilateral option because doing so could give them some reputational advantages 
for resisting. If taken before the DSB, however, it is a different ball game. Use of the DSB shows 
that even great economic powers struggle with issues of legitimacy and therefore prefer to use 
this alternative simultaneously to signal their resolve and to protect their reputation and future 
bargaining power.89In this case, reputational and signaling costs90 could induce participation in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Ibid 
87 Ibid, 65 
88 Ibid 
89 See also Andrew T. Guzman in “The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution.” 
The Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 31, Number 2 (June, 2002), pp. 303 – 326. He argues that because 
reputational costs are so high when countries negotiate, they are more likely to be found in multilateral rather than 
bilateral agreements. Additionally, because of the losses incurred, states calculate the benefits of credibility and 
compliance against the punishments for violations. Because of this, many states include dispute settlement clauses in 
their agreements, only when the penalty for violation is small. Evoking multilateral recourse would therefore signal 
potential great reputational losses for the culpable state, and this would make the threat to use it credible. See also 
Susanne Lohmann. “Why Do Institutions Matter? An Audience Cost Theory of Institutional Commitment.” 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 16, No. 1, (January, 2003) pp. 
95–110. She argues that audience costs make the threat to use international institutions more credible, but that 
institutions have sufficient flexibility clauses to cover for unforeseen circumstances. 
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the DSB, while states that are less concerned about these or unable to afford the procedure would 
avoid it. 
Audience Costs 
Guisinger and Smith have a different perspective on reputation and how it might affect 
threat credibility. For them, credibility has less to do with resolve, power and strength, and more 
to do with “the expectation of future, continued gains from retaining an honest record.”91 Hence, 
it is the diplomatic record that a country has for doing what it says it will do that determines its 
credibility, and not measures of its capability.92 Guisinger and Smith challenge Fearon’s 1997 
work on why domestic audiences punish leaders. For Fearon, citizens punish governments if they 
overcommit to attack or resist in an effort to get a greater payoff for the state and then do the 
opposite.93 Guisinger and Smith contend that for Fearon’s postulations to hold, then nationals 
should expect their leaders to bluff to get better deals and therefore not vote them out of office. 
Their thinking is that domestic audiences react stronger against leaders that mislead their 
bargaining partners because they damage the country’s honest record.94 This, they believe, 
jeopardizes the future benefits that the state might have to communicate its position in other 
international crises.95 It is unclear however, how these scholars think about first-time users in an 
international crisis or dispute. These users would not have established any record for resolve and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 See for example, James D. Morrow. “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Volume 38 (June, 1994), pp. 270 – 297 and James D. Fearon. “Signaling Policy Interests: Tying Hands 
versus Sinking Costs.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 41, Number 1, New Games: Modeling 
Domestic-International Linkages (February, 1997), pp. 68 – 90. 
91 Alexandra Guisinger and Alastair Smith. “Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political 
Institutions in International Crises.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 46, Number 2 (April, 2000), pp. 175. 
92 Ibid, 177 
93 Ibid, 179 and James D. Fearon. “Signaling Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Volume 41, Number 1, New Games: Modeling Domestic-International Linkages (February, 
1997), pp. 68 – 90. 
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may need other trappings to convince targets that that they will follow through with their 
promises or threats. 
By showing how reputation can be maintained in the international system, Guisinger and 
Smith also highlight the fact that democratic countries may be better able to signal their resolve 
to act than autocracies are able to do.96 Since governments feel that their political career is at 
stake if they do not keep their word or their state’s reputation, then they will think carefully 
before making commitments and not easily renege on their promises. This means that we should 
see more democracies using the DSB than autocracies. While Guisinger and Smith deal with war 
specifically, their analysis can also be applied to the WTO’s dispute settlement process. If 
countries signal their intent to file and back down without getting comparable concessions from 
the violating state, then this damages their reputation and ultimately, their credibility. The 
observing constituents which may also have vested interests in the case will move to punish the 
non-credible state both for not acting on their behalf, and also for lessening the chances that 
future threats will be credible. In this sense, while a country’s power and strength add to its 
credibility, making a threat and not executing it also affects its reputation.97 
Power Asymmetry  
In thinking about power asymmetry and how this affects DSB usage, Kim highlights the 
increased legalization of the WTO as potentially inhibiting factor. Kim argues, for example, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Ibid, 198 
97 See also Lisa L. Martin. “Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions.” World 
Politics, Volume 45, Number 3 (April, 1993), pp. 406 – 432. Martin argues that audience costs can affect credibility 
is that they make it too costly for senders to renege on the commitments that they make. In her estimation, 
governments have to go through great lengths to convince the legislature and executive branches to impose the 
initial sanctions. Because some of these come at great political costs, it is difficult for the senders to backslide of 
these commitments without facing significant backlash. Additionally, sender states increase the audience costs of 
reneging if they make their threats or promises within an institution. In this way, by appealing to domestic as well as 
international audiences, senders make their threats more credible because the costs to default are too high. With this 
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whereas legalization promotes clarity within the institution, it simultaneously imposes costs on 
Member states by making procedures more complex and difficult to use.98For him, only the 
countries that have the administrative capacity to manoeuvre these intricacies benefit. 
Consequently, when the GATT and WTO eras are compared, countries that are endowed with 
greater capacities such as advanced nations, are more frequent users of the mechanism than 
developing countries are.99  In this case, relative economic capability can affect participation in 
the DSB. 
Sattler and Bernauer contemplate the disparity in DSB usage subsequent to increased 
legalization and come to different conclusions than Kim does. Using the findings of all WTO 
initiated disputes across member state dyads from 1995 – 2003, they posit that it is a 
gravitational issue rather than a discriminatory one.100Based on their thinking, countries that have 
larger economies are more appealing to potential litigants. Additionally, these countries, just by 
the share size of their markets, trade more and have more diversified economies. The 
consequence is that they are more likely to be involved in trade disputes than countries with 
smaller, less diversified markets.101 Sattler and Bernauer highlight a serious implication of this 
finding. In their minds, there is a resulting “preponderance effect” whereby dyads that include a 
more power litigant either as a complainant or defendant or more likely to have settlement 
outside the WTO than within it. 
Sattler and Bernauer’s arguments are noteworthy because they show that market size and 
diversification matter in the volume and frequency of trade litigation within the WTO. An 
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interesting application of their findings would be that countries that are less powerful will be 
more inclined to settle their grievance outside the institution and forego their alternative there.102 
This could mean that they are less able to afford the process, or fear repercussions from the more 
powerful state. Both are possible explanations for non-participatory membership. However, since 
the more capable states also use the DSB more, then this could also mean that states that have 
comparable economic size may prefer to litigate, but once there are stark differentials 
incapability, the DSB choice may not be pursued. 
Shaffer and Nordstrom add their thoughts to this discussion. They argue that since trade 
disputes are about the commercial value of the good, small states may find it too costly to litigate 
since their claims would be about “small stakes.”103 This view is corroborated by Kokko, 
Tingvall and Videnord who postulate that an upper middle-income country is the typical WTO 
complainant, with challenges against a high-income country over unfair protection.104 In 
relationship to the power asymmetry thesis, this means that smaller states may have legitimate 
cases, but may be unable to use the DSB because they would be filing against their more 
powerful trading partners in a process where the costs of litigating maybe more than the claims 
that they are making. If, however, the country is middle-income, it would recognize the power 
disparities, but would be in a better position to afford the costs of the institution. While these 
arguments are valid, they do not account for the small states that manage to file in spite of the 
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against their more powerful counterparts. At the same time though, cases that were filed by developing countries, or 
those from large economies against developing countries, were more likely to continue indefinitely in the DSB than 
others against high income countries. “Why Are So Many WTO Disputes Abandoned?” p. 11. 
http://fs2.american.edu/reynolds/www/Consultations.pdf 
103 Hakan Nordstrom, Hakan and Gregory Shaffer. 2008. “Access to Justice in the World Trade Organization: A 
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costs and power differentials. Other variables may therefore inform state participation in the 
DSB. 
The extent to which costs can affect participation in the DSB can also be seen in the 
settlement or discontinuance of a dispute after initiation. Pervez tackles this issue. For him, 
complainants may opt not to continue with cases because of an onslaught of countersuits from 
the respondent. This has the effect of making the dispute settlement process more costly, and 
hence the plaintiff succumbs to the pressure.105 If Pervez’s arguments are valid, then power 
dynamics are also at play in these countersuits. Filings are expensive. Only countries that have 
substantial economic might and adequate trade with the complaining country could therefore 
afford to bring so many cases before the DSB. The discontinuation of the initial cases would also 
mean that the complaining country is the lesser power or it stands to lose more by keeping the 
case than withdrawing. Power asymmetry in this regard, could therefore explain limited 
participation in the Dispute Settlement Body.  
Legal capacity is another way in which power asymmetry manifests itself in WTO 
dispute settlement. Perceptions about a country’s legal capacity can affect the extent to which a 
country’s threat to sue is seen as credible. This is because disputes require that parties firstly 
understand the provisions and the breaches to make their case. It is also this capability that helps 
countries not to succumb to bullying and offers of side payments at the consultations and press 
forward to formal litigation. Disparities in legal capacity can therefore help some countries to be 
taken seriously and force concessions, or lead both to the DSB. While this may be a function of 
the countries’ economic strength, legal capacity when examined discretely is an important part of 
the credibility of threats to litigate or suffer from trade violations, which essentially is about 
(non) participation in the DSB. 
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Busch, Reinhardt and Shaffer write about this phenomenon based on their survey on 
WTO members. While they articulate the view that legal capacity is important, they opine that 
previously used proxies like per capita GDP do not adequately represent the concept. Their 
conceptualization of “legal capacity” is therefore based on members’ responses to questions 
about five critical areas. These include “professional staff, bureaucratic organization at home, 
bureaucratic organization in Geneva, experience handling general WTO matters, and 
involvement in WTO litigation.”106 Their study shows that WTO members generally, and 
developing countries specifically, identify legal capacity or its lack thereof, as the chief 
inhibiting factor of formal dispute settlement. 
 There are, however, some possible challenges to these arguments and Busch, Reinhardt 
and Shaffer identify and respond to them. They show, for example, that private lawyers and the 
Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) are available for countries that may need help 
understanding the legal and technical provisions of the organization.107 Their respondents say, 
however, that competent legal capacity is needed in the first place to avail themselves of these 
resources, and that there is often no continuity in the capacity that is built up.108 This is important 
because while countries may have help available to them, they still need some minimum 
competencies and financial resources to avail themselves of that assistance.  
One potent argument that Busch et al. raise is the possible endogeneity of legal 
capacity.109  This means that the more experience that a country has with the DSB, the more 
legal capacity it will have. This argument is meritorious. There are, however, limitations to how 
these authors measure legal capacity in the first place. If, for example, experience, personnel at 
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home and in Geneva are indicators of legal capacity, then countries with no experience at the 
DSB may still struggle when a dispute arises. This is true up to a point. While the DSB remains 
the main training ground for building legal capacity, countries can build these skills in other 
ways. For example, the WTO has negotiation groups that feature collective bargaining on 
common interests. Countries can use these avenues to become more familiar with the WTO 
provisions and how they can articulate their cases. Similarly, while not all skills are transferable, 
countries can use their involvement in other international and regional dispute settlement 
organizations to build their legal competencies. Importantly, Busch et al. measure legal capacity 
by looking at the countries’ overall capability to litigate. A state’s circumstances, however, 
change over time. It is therefore more appropriate to ascertain what this capacity looked like at 
the point of the dispute. This can be done by examining experience at the DSB, as well as history 
with the WTO provision domestically. 
Asymmetric Information 
States need information to litigate in the DSB. For any state to successfully bring a case, 
it must be firstly cognizant of the WTO provisions, and secondly, be able to articulate how its 
trading partner’s practices breach those regulations. This implies that trading partners must be 
able to observe each other with some amount of certainty and bring supporting evidence to the 
DSB. In other words, there is a direct relationship between the amount of information a 
complainant state has and the extent to which it will participate in the dispute settlement process. 
Since the WTO has certain norms and obligations for the availability of information, this section 
will therefore discuss the monitoring and surveillance roles and how these can lead to 
asymmetric information. This has consequences for DSB usage.  
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Transparency is a GATT obligation.110 The stipulation is that all Members should meet 
the domestic and national requirements regarding a plethora of notifications, publications and 
transparency.111 Most of the WTO’s monitoring and surveillance are conducted through 
“standing committees, reviews of notifications, examination of individual policies against the 
relevant WTO Agreements, and other procedures of control.”112 It therefore follows that for 
these to be done, Members first have to meet their obligations, publish their measures 
domestically, and then notify the WTO of what measures are in place. Failing that, monitoring 
and surveillance can be impeded because the information is not readily available for Members 
that may request it. If this information is not available, then countries have little substantiating 
evidence to bring their cases before the DSB and this can limit its usage. 
In addition to the right that all Members have to request information from others, some 
agreements have explicit stipulations whereby Members can ask for clarity on “any trade-related 
law, regulation or measure in place domestically.” Some of these include the Agreement on 
Trade-Related-Investment Measures (TRIMS) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS).113 These are important features of the WTO because they allow for monitoring and 
surveillance at the organizational level through the committees that are set up, and also for 
Members to do their own transparency and compliance checks on each other. Of course, with 
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Members having to do some of these transparency checks on their trading partners, some may 
find the process too cumbersome and opt not to participate in the institution. Additionally, if the 
requested information is not forthcoming, Members can appeal to the institution for compliance 
from the requested state, but that state cannot be compelled to comply; it can only be encouraged 
to do so. This makes asymmetric information a vexing issue for WTO Members, especially 
because it can stymie potential cases.  
Collins-Williams and Wolfe also highlight the challenges of asymmetric information in 
the WTO. In their estimation, the WTO’s provisions on transparency are disproportionately 
cloudy. For them, monitoring and surveillance work well in some areas, but in others, they are 
disappointingly opaque.114 They challenge, for example, the “right to know” privilege that all 
WTO Members have. They are dubious about how information gathering can actually change 
behaviour. In their minds, a mere acquisition of knowledge of a country’s policies does not deter 
non-compliance.115 Moreover, countries may not be aware of what they need to find out before 
they have the information; neither might they know what to make of the information that they 
have until it is discussed.116In this way, though the right to request information can promote 
transparency (and litigation), the requested state may not readily or accurately provide the 
information in the first place. In the second place, it does not necessarily follow that since 
countries have this right that they will seek information; without it they may not know that there 
are problems to begin with. Having the right as the antecedent to information therefore does not 
necessarily translate to greater transparency nor increased participation.  
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        In regards to monitoring and surveillance, there is one WTO body that is worth 
mentioning. This is the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM)117 that came out of the 
Uruguay Round. The Trade Policy Review Mechanism is strategic in that the frequency in which 
Members are reviewed is based on their economic might in the global political economy. This is 
in an effort to increase the availability of information on these economies and their trading 
practices. As a result, the world’s four largest economies—the European Union, the United 
States, Japan and China—are reviewed every two years.118 The next 16 biggest holders of world 
trade in goods and services are examined every four years.119 The other countries, which are 
mainly developing countries and economies in transition, are reviewed every six years.120 
Collins-Williams and Wolfe assert, however, that there are some fundamental flaws with the 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism.   They show, for example, that it simply provides a 
commentary on countries’ practices and does not in any way interpret the rules.121 Here again, 
they challenge the assumption that more information can induce changes in behavior. While it is 
true that information by itself is useless in eliciting change, countries do rely on their “good 
name” in the international political economy. Having a reputation for violating agreements can 
negatively affect trading partnerships and future bargaining. Conversely, a country that has a 
reputation for trading fairly can promote trustworthiness and new partnerships. Since the 
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findings of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism are public knowledge, to the extent that the 
information is available, current and accurate, it is a useful tool for monitoring and surveillance 
and also for those countries that want to proceed with litigation.  
 Hoekman and Mavroidis echo similar sentiments about the transparency function of the 
WTO. While they laud the attempts to improve monitoring and surveillance such as the TPRM, 
they believe that more needs to be done to enhance the process. In their view, greater efforts are 
needed to allow developing countries to take advantage of the provisions that are available to 
them and to enforce their market access rights.122 Some of this can be done by revising the 
dispute settlement process.123 In terms of monitoring, some developing countries do not have the 
resources to make their notifications in a timely manner; neither are they fully conversant with 
WTO provisions to make requests for information from potentially violating trading partners.124 
These could be inhibiting factors for developing country participation in the DSB. Hoekman and 
Mavroidis also opine that independent regulatory bodies should be set up for surveillance 
purposes. While these should be parallel to the WTO, they could involve the private sector and 
nongovernmental organizations.125 One of the concerns they have is that only governments have 
legal standing before the WTO. This can complicate the dispute settlement process since private 
groups usually are the ones most affected by WTO provisions and the measures that countries 
put in place.126 Hoekman and Mavroidis are of the view that independent bodies with vested 
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126 Ibid. For a discussion on how private firms are affected and can influence trade policies, see Helen V. Milner and 
David B. Yoffie. “Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate 
Demands.” International Organization, Volume 43, Number 2. (Spring, 1989), pp. 240. 
 
	  
	   	  
55 
interests in the WTO’s agreements can examine not just the surveillance function, but also how 
alternative methods compare in terms of costs and benefits. In their estimation, if this 
information about the possible economic effects of implementing other policies and rules 
becomes available, this could facilitate increased relevance and members’ stakes in the WTO’s 
provisions.127This could also help to increase participation in the DSB. 
Complainant Versus Respondent Utilities 
One of the ironies about dispute settlement in any type of organization is that there are 
costs and benefits to both the plaintiff and defendant state. As a result, the choice to litigate or to 
allow oneself to be sued has far reaching applications beyond a win or loss. Consequently, 
countries engaged in a formal trade dispute calculate how they expect to far at each step of the 
process and this helps to determine their level of participation. This section will therefore discuss 
the advantages and disadvantages to complainants and respondents and how these may induce 
participation in dispute settlement. 
 Leal-Arcas uses the WTO and NAFTA Chapter 20 to argue that there are advantages for 
both the complainant and defendant in regional and multilateral institutions. This in turn 
determines which forum is used. Here, in like manner as Fischer argues and contrary to what 
Busch posits, Leal-Arcas contends that whenever forum shopping is possible, states are going to 
choose the venue where they are most likely to win.128 What then are the advantages and 
disadvantages to litigants in these settings?  
Under NAFTA Chapter 20, losing respondents and complainants alike experience 
frustrations and benefits from losing and winning. For the losing respondent, it gains from such a 
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ruling in that though it is bound by the “arbitral panel with regard to nullification and 
impairment, it is not bound by a recommendation to bring its measures into conformity.”129 
Additionally, the panel gives it thirty days to implement the recommendations in good faith. This 
losing state, however, even in showing progress in doing so, theoretically can take as long as it 
wants.130 This in turn can exasperate the winning state that is waiting on the culpable party to 
come into compliance. This consideration could therefore precipitate non-participation in 
NAFTA’s dispute settlement procedures, especially if a winning state expects to get immediate 
relief. 
Another advantage that a country in NAFTA has even if it loses, is that the institution’s 
punitive capacity is limited based on overlaps with WTO obligations.131 Consequently, WTO 
tariff rules or other obligations cannot be breached by a complainant that seeks “compensation 
for a ruling under a NAFTA panel.”132 Essentially, even in seeking reprieve, the applicant state 
has to be mindful of its commitments under the WTO because this may limit the extent to which 
NAFTA can be used to punish the wayward state. With this is mind, it is easy to see why some 
NAFTA countries would forego their recourse there if they have concurrent membership in the 
WTO. In this sense, the institutional overlap can help to explain non-participatory membership in 
NAFTA’s dispute settlement. One disadvantage of losing, however, is that once this happens, a 
country cannot appeal the decision that was made.133 All it can do is exhaust the diplomatic 
channels at its disposal, with a view of getting some mitigation of the panel’s findings.134The 
WTO allows for an appeal of panel determinations. These points make it likely that reprieve in 
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NAFTA could be overlooked in favor of recourse at the WTO. If, however, NAFTA procedures 
are used, they highlight the fact that this alternative could be pursued because of the utilities that 
even losing states expect to get. 
A winning respondent has a similar fate under NAFTA Chapter 20 in that it gains and 
suffers setbacks from having the panel rule in its favour. One benefit, for example, is the fact that 
it can use diplomacy to come to a quicker solution that it would otherwise have achieved.135 
Hence, whereas it is possible for the losing state to stall implementation, if diplomatic channels 
are used effectively, this can be averted. Additionally, since NAFTA is a trilateral relationship 
with the United States, Canada and Mexico, the closeness of the partnerships that has been 
fostered over the years can promote swifter implementation and fewer delays.136 This is more 
difficult to achieve in a larger institution. This reality could induce participation in NAFTA and 
not the WTO; especially if the country expects to win. 
One of the drawbacks to NAFTA, however, is the fact that its rules are less detailed when 
compared with the WTO.137 This presents challenges for the winning state to bring a dispute to 
resolution since the guidelines are not very explicitly stated.138 Importantly, since NAFTA so 
heavily emphasizes diplomacy, changes in the diplomatic climate may affect the extent to which 
resolution can be made.139 The choice to use a regional institution like NAFTA would therefore 
pivot on whether a state prefers settlement by diplomatic means, with less stringent rules for the 
timing and implementation of rulings, or if the countries simply feel that the matter at hand does 
not warrant multilateral attention. 
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The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding functions in similar and distinct ways 
from NAFTA Chapter 20. These factors inform the calculated decisions that states make as they 
contemplate the options that they have in regional and multilateral arrangements. As with 
NAFTA, however, both complainants and respondents gain as well as experience delays whether 
they win or lose. In the case of the losing defendant, one advantage is that the institution is 
designed in such a way that there are numerous possibilities to delay compliance.140 This comes 
into play especially when more developed countries litigate among themselves or against lesser 
developed countries. The more advanced states are normally very highly cognizant of WTO 
stipulations and can use many tactics to stymie full implementation of rulings when they lose. 
This would explain why a country would allow itself to be sued, even in the face of losing. 
Additionally, sometimes the dollar amount of the DSB’s sanction for retaliation is negligible.141 
From an economic standpoint, this can benefit the losing party because it does not have to pay 
much. It may also be able to afford compensation to its domestic producers that may be affected 
by such a ruling.142 Leal-Arcas is also of the view that by complying with the WTO’s rulings, the 
losing party has the opportunity to reinforce the credibility of the institution, and also set an 
international example for its future involvement.143In these ways, a state gains even in losing at 
the WTO, thereby making a case for its participation in the DSB. 
The winning and losing complainant faces potential wins and losses just like the 
responding state does. If it wins, for example, international pressure as well as the rules of the 
system ensures that it gets some form of recompense.144 This benefit works even for weaker 
states which outside of the multilateral structure, would have been incapable of getting redress 
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from their more powerful trading partners.145 This makes it important for weaker states to firstly 
join the WTO, and to use it when they have legitimate cases. Importantly, DSB rulings help the 
winning state by publicly vindicating it and providing material that it can use to file against other 
states in the future.146 This makes participation in the dispute settlement process even more 
necessary. Even in winning however, a complainant cannot get any redress for as long as the 
respondent stalls its compliance.147 Indeed, other states can put pressure on the losing litigant to 
bring its measures into compliance, but since there are so many ways that it can be delayed, until 
it actually happens the winning state has to wait even though it may have the psychological and 
reputational gains from winning.148 These considerations therefore allow for use and avoidance 
of the DSB, which as the above arguments show, has advantages and disadvantages whether 
states win or lose.   
Conclusion 
In the final analysis, the decision to join multilateral institutions does not necessarily 
mean that member states will use them whenever trade disputes arise. This chapter therefore 
examined this conundrum by discussing the possible reasons for non-participatory. While it 
acknowledges that a myriad of reasons could explain the strategic use, underuse and on use of 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, six of these are most relevant to this study. These include 
the availability of alternative forums, preference for the status quo ante, expected utility, 
interdependent payoffs, asymmetric information, and complainant versus respondent utilities. 
In regards to the availability of alternative forums, the chapter argues that states are 
utility maximizing, and will therefore choose the one that serves their best interests at that 
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particular time. States, for example, may need the multilateral institution to set a precedent, to 
increase their bargaining power, or for political cover. On the other hand, states that are 
concurrently in efficacious bilateral or regional institutions, may at times find multilateral 
recourse to be too time consuming and costly. In those instances, these states may use their 
alternative forums and not the multilateral structure. 
Some states join multilateral institutions because they fear exclusion costs. Scholars like 
Gruber therefore posit that such membership does not negate the fact that some countries prefer 
the pre institutional status quo. Non-participatory membership may therefore be one way in 
which states join these institutions, but demonstrate their preference for the ex ante state. In other 
words, states may reduce their exclusion costs, but not take advantage of their inclusion benefits 
through litigation if they have legitimate cases. Some features of the institution such as escape 
clauses also help states to have membership, but express an affinity for the status quo ante. 
States decide to litigate based on how much they expect to gain compared with the 
potential losses. In this regard, expected utility is a serious calculation by states. This 
consideration includes the costs for litigation, as well as those for enforcement. This is because 
there is a huge burden to litigate and the WTO sanctions countermeasures, but leaves the onus on 
the complainant to impose them. Countries therefore have to determine whether it is worthwhile 
to adjudicate. In addition to the expected utility strategies, there are interdependent payoffs that 
countries also consider. There are, for example, reputational and audience costs, as well as 
possible retaliation in other areas. These all factor in the decision to participate or not in the 
dispute settlement process. 
States litigate in the DSB relative to the amount of information that they have. Some 
countries are therefore better able to observe their trading partners’ practices than others. 
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Asymmetric information is therefore a determinant of participation in the DSB because countries 
need information to substantiate and respond to filing claims. Additionally, all countries win and 
lose regardless of the outcome of a trade dispute. This explains why a country, even in the face 
of losing, will allow itself to be sued, or why a state that wins encounters frustrations to get 
redress. Knowledge of these realities inform participation in dispute settlement. 
Most of the literature on non-participatory membership explores the disparities between 
developing and developed countries. There is a gap, however, in explaining how dyads of 
developed and developing countries strategize relative to costs. This research intends to address 
this by examining how the costs associated with dispute settlement affect all types of countries, 








There are many modes of social enquiry, with each lending itself to advantages and 
limitations. The method used is therefore based on the particular question at hand and the 
researcher’s judgment of how that technique investigates and illuminates what he or she hopes to 
find out.1 The main question of this study is, why do states choose to litigate within the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body? The WTO is one of the world’s largest multilateral organizations. 
Participation in it therefore facilitates wide scale reification of norms, principles and beliefs 
through its provisions, obligations and rulings. When it comes on to disputes however, even 
though all its Members are regulated by the same guiding principles, the dynamics of such are 
played out between the two states that are involved in the particular case at hand. Modeling this 
type of interaction through an extensive form game of complete and perfect information 
therefore highlights the strategic decision- making that underpins state behaviour.  
Game theoretic models are a parsimonious and efficient way of summarizing reality. 
Parsimony however, can sometimes oversimplify intricate relationships. In order to compensate 
for this possible lacuna in the formal analysis, this study supplements the research design by 
incorporating comparative case studies. The discussion that ensues is an explanation of, and 
justification for the use of quantitative and qualitative methods at separate sections in the study, 
but how each by itself is inadequate in elucidating the complexity of trade litigation. The nexus 
of these two templates that inform the mixed methods approach is therefore advanced. The 
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research question is probed from different angles, with the strengths of each method overlapping 
and compensating for the weaknesses of the other.  
Mixed Methods Approach: The Need for Complementarity 
In the words of Creswell and Plano Clark, mixed methods research design has 
philosophical assumptions as well as methods of inquiry. They postulate that, “as a methodology, 
it involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of the collection and analysis of 
data and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches in the research process.”2They 
further posit that, “as a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative 
data in a single study or series of studies.”3 They contend that the central premise of the mixed 
methods technique is that, “the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination 
provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone.”4 Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie add their voice to the debate. In their estimation, mixed methods research is “a 
class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research 
techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study.”5 Creswell and Plano 
Clark clarify their assertions however, by arguing that, “a study that includes both quantitative 
and qualitative methods without explicitly mixing the data from each is simply a collection of 
multiple methods.”6 In their view, “a rigorous and strong mixed methods design addresses the 
decision of how to mix the data, in addition to timing and weighting.”7 Since this project uses the 
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findings from the formal models to guide case selection, which are then probed through the 
information theory approach, then it is not simply “a collection of multiple methods,” but a 
mixed methods study in its purest sense. 
There is, however, a counter argument for the use of multiple methods, which some 
authors use as a synonym for mixed methods. Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom, for instance, caution 
that employing multiple methods “does not guarantee methodological superior social science 
research.”8 They use the work of several authors to assert the view that there are concerns about 
“the extent to which formal, qualitative, and quantitative research methods are actually 
complementary.”9 This is based on the thinking that different methods have varied assumptions 
about the nature of causality and this poses ontological as well as feasibility challenges.10 While 
it may be true that different methods have diverging approaches for studying phenomena, 
defining from the onset what is meant by a “mixed methods” study helps to refute some of the 
claims advanced by Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom. For the purposes of this study, mixed methods 
is distinguishable from “multiple methods,” or even “a collection of multiple methods” as 
Creswell and Plano Clark insinuate. “Multiple methods” suggests a possibly disjointed ad hoc 
use of various methods within a research project. This is not what this study purports to do. 
Indeed, while it is cognizant of the ways in which formal, qualitative and quantitative methods 
are fundamentally distinct, they can in fact complement and inform each other in a single study 
and even promote an active research agenda.  
By using a mixed methods approach, this project is therefore not suggesting 
methodological superiority. Instead, it recognizes the limitations of each of the methods 
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identified, and intends to use the strengths of each to compensate for those weaknesses. Each 
method will therefore be conversant with the other so as to interweave a continuous analysis of 
why aggrieved Member countries may choose not to use the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. 
This, of course, underscores the need for strong theoretical underpinnings about the nature of 
institutions and state behaviour within them. In what ways, then, do qualitative and quantitative 
methods differ? 
Quantitative and qualitative researches are often distinguished by the types of questions 
that they can answer.11 Qualitative questions for example, are often exploratory in nature, while 
quantitative questions are confirmatory.12 With this thought in mind, quantitative research has 
historically been used for “theory verification,” while qualitative studies have been used for 
“theory generation.”13 Punch, however, warns that this dichotomization is not a fixed divide. On 
the contrary, theory generation and verification can also be derived from quantitative and 
qualitative research, albeit in different ways.14 While the stereotype of what each method can be 
used for persists in academia, Tashakkori and Teddlie advance the utility of mixed methods 
research. For them, “a major advantage of mixed methods research is that it enables the 
researcher to simultaneously answer confirmatory and exploratory questions, and therefore 
verify and generate theory in the same study.15 In essence, while one goal may be achieved by 
using either method, combining both ensures that a research project is maximized by answering 
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different types of questions and consequently, test and create theories concurrently. This study 
therefore intends to achieve both outcomes. By starting at the widely used institutionalist 
literature, it hopes to confirm the neoliberal institutionalist summations about membership. The 
study intends however, to make its own contribution to the literature by examining the fact that 
membership is not synonymous to participation. Examining non-participatory membership can 
therefore generate theories about why and when reprieve in robust institutions is used versus 
when it is avoided.  
In thinking about this research and the appropriate methods to use, I find the thoughts of 
Katzenstein and Okawara very useful. While their reflections are specifically about paradigmatic 
debates, their arguments are also applicable here. These authors reason that instead of an 
“approach-driven analysis,” research should be “problem-driven.”16 This gives rise to analytical 
eclecticism, which broadens our view of world dynamics by illuminating puzzles, and 
concurrently eliminates the often fundamentally rancorous and inconclusive results of the contest 
for paradigmatic supremacy.17 In their view, “Such debates detract scholars and graduate 
students from the primary task at hand: recognizing interesting questions and testing alternative 
explanations.18 I see this project in the same way. While the research question under examination 
can be examined through several different research methods, it is the question itself that has 
given risen rise to the methods used and not the other way around. I also believe that why states 
choose to use institutions generally and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body specifically is a 
very intriguing and apposite question that can lead to many fecund explanations. Merging several 
tools for analysis through a mixed methods approach therefore enrich an already intriguing 
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question. This can make a meaningful contribution to the extant literature on the strategic 
interaction between trading states and their subsequent calculated use of institutions for reprieve.  
In general, the choice to use a combination of a formal model and case studies that are 
comparatively assed offsets the rigid bifurcation of quantitative versus qualitative methods. 
Instead, it promotes a rich blend of the two forms of social science enquiry. Emanating from this 
discussion is also the fact that there are four major concerns that a researcher must address and 
prioritize if he or she hopes to have a robust project. Combining research methods, however, 
helps to bridge the divide and promote a more comprehensive and rigorous examination of the 
data.  
Some of the considerations when choosing a research method include: 
1. Specificity vs. generality – Here, qualitative studies seem to better analyze the 
specificity of particular cases, while quantitative research has more potential for 
general application. A mixed methods approach would address this divergence since 
formal and statistical methods can be used to derive conclusions about state behaviour 
within institutions. Case studies can then probe these findings to see how well they 
hold across cases. General postulations can therefore be assessed in light of their 
application in specific instances.  
 
2. Explanation vs. prediction – Qualitative research methods are very efficient in 
explaining social phenomena. Since however, cases are often unique relative to their 
context, timing and other endemic factors, it is difficult to use the results of these 
studies to make predictions about other situations. Quantitative studies on the other 
hand, are parsimonious, with the conditions for outcomes well defined. While some 
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quantitative methods can be misused and lead to spurious relationships as well as 
Type I19 and Type II errors,20 they are good techniques for prediction. This is not to 
say however, that qualitative studies cannot be used for prediction or that quantitative 
methods have little explanatory function. The point is that even in situations where 
qualitative studies forecast what we should expect in similar scenarios, the reference 
case is often so historically and contextually distinct that replication is problematic. 
Conversely, quantitative studies can explain to some extent, the puzzle that the 
researcher is trying to probe. Usually however, the data is parsed to numerical and 
mathematical logic which abstracts away from the context in which the figures occur. 
Consequently, there is much scope to do robust checks, validate and replicate findings 
and make projections about similar cases. What is missing is an in depth 
understanding of the relationship between the variables and how they affect each 
other and other things in the environment. Qualitative studies would better address 
this. In essence, the researcher has to be clear whether he or she wants to explain or 
predict an outcome, or if achieving both is desirable. This in turn will affect the 
choice of research method and the specific role that it will play in the project. 
3. Theory testing vs. theory building – Different research methods have varied functions. 
Since theory is the foundation upon which all studies are built, it is therefore 
important to ascertain which method better lends itself to theory testing and / building 
and how these meet the researcher’s goals. As aforementioned, qualitative methods as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 A Type I error is a false rejection of the null hypothesis. See for example, Jim Granato and Frank Scioli. “Puzzles, 
Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and Social Significance of Empirical Implications of Theoretical 
Models.” Symposium. Two Paths to a Science of Politics. Perspectives on Politics. Volume 2, Number 2. June 
2004: pp. 316. 
20 A Type II error is a false acceptance of the null hypothesis. See for example, Jim Granato and Frank Scioli. 
“Puzzles, Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and Social Significance of Empirical Implications of 
Theoretical Models.” Symposium. Two Paths to a Science of Politics. Perspectives on Politics. Volume 2, Number 
2. June 2004: pp. 316. 
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exemplified by case studies, are useful for verifying theory. Poteete, Janssen and 
Ostrom support this thinking by arguing that a case study “puts complex relationships 
under a magnifying glass so that the closely interwoven strands can be teased 
apart.”21 This function, however, can also be carried out by quantitative studies. 
Formal models and statistical analyses for example, are potent ways of testing if and 
under what circumstances the assumptions of a theory hold. 
Traditionally, quantitative research methods have been more successful in both testing 
and developing new theories. Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom opine that in principle, case studies 
should be able to do the same. They concede however, that “a lack of synthesis of findings 
across case studies limits their theoretical contributions.”22  This study recognizes the strengths 
and limitations that both types of research methods have for theory verification and generation. 
The first intention is to therefore test the conjectures about non-participatory membership in 
international institutions. All the techniques used will be to meet that objective. In order to make 
a meaningful contribution to the literature however, it is also anticipated that some new theories 
will be created about how states use the Dispute Settlement Body, and as a result, the patterns 
that we can expect if countries interact with free traders and protectionists. 
4. External validity vs. internal validity – Understanding how quantitative and 
qualitative studies work makes it imperative that there is not an overdependence on 
one without considering the value of the other. Qualitative research methods for 
instance, are weak on external validity. This is due to the fact that it is challenging to 
replicate findings across time and populations. On the other hand, though internal 
validity refers largely to experimentation with distinction between the treatment and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Amy R. Poteete, Marco A Janssen and Elinor Ostrom. Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and 
Multiple Methods in Practice. (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 35. 
22 Ibid, 38. 
 
	  
	   	  
70 
control variables, qualitative methods have many useful procedures which can 
validate their findings. Quantitative methods by comparison, can be strong in both 
external and internal validity if executed properly. This is an important point because 
it is easy for one to use sophisticated techniques which can be “reliable and valid,” 
but which overlook the theoretical assumptions of the research or make false claims 
about the relationships being tested. Whatever method being used must therefore 
address the theoretical concerns, be rigorously tested and make credible conclusions 
about the phenomenon being probed. 
In sum, the different concerns that a researcher has to contemplate and address when 
embarking on a project are many. Some of these challenges can be mitigated if the social 
scientist is aware of the potential pitfalls and guard against them. For me, this makes it all the 
more necessary to use a mixed methods approach for this study. This will help to make the 
project both reliable and valid, present specific as well as general claims, explain and predict, 
and verify and generate theory. These are ambitious goals. It is hoped, however, that by having 
formal models and case studies informing each other throughout the study, that these objectives 
will be realized.  
Let us now discuss the different methods that are used, the advantages and disadvantages 
of using them, and as a result, the need for a mixed methods approach. 
Quantitative Methods: Strengths and Limitations 
“Quantitative methods emphasize objective measurements and the statistical, 
mathematical, or numerical analysis of data collected through polls, questionnaires, and surveys, 
or by manipulating pre-existing statistical data using computational techniques.”23 While several 
options are available to the researcher who wants to use these methods, this project employs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research. 12th ed. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Cengage, 2010 
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computational techniques in Excel to determine factors that have the most information scores on 
the variables in the cases under examination.  
Game theory “is a theory of interdependent decisions – when the decisions of two or 
more individuals jointly determine the outcome of a situation.”24 As a branch of the rational 
choice approach, it argues that individuals are rational actors, that they have preferences, and that 
these preferences are ranked in order of utility. While it cannot tell where these preferences come 
from, they are taken as given, with the choices made seen as an indication of those that provide 
the highest utility for the chooser.25 Additionally, game theory “cannot tell us whether certain 
theories are accurate descriptions of the world.”26  It can however, “tell us what behaviour we 
should expect as a consequence of those theories.”27This project is largely about the inclination 
of states to cheat to maximize their interests, even within institutional frameworks that 
supposedly foster cooperation. Hence, while the models used do not explain why countries 
exhibit this type of behaviour, they exemplify what we can expect from two states with those 
propensities.  
Morrow outlines some of the advantages of using models in research. For him, the 
fundamental benefit of modeling is that doing so requires rigour and precision of arguments.28 
The modeler must therefore clearly articulate his or her argument and also what the assumptions 
of that argument are.29 With that being done, “formal models allow us to see exactly why the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 1. 
25 See for example, Barbara Geddes in Paradigms and Sandcastles: Theory Building and Research Design in 
Comparative Politics. (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 206 and Gary W. Cox in “Lies, Damned 
Lies, and Rational Choice Analyses” in Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 167 – 184. 
26 Ibid 
27 Ibid 
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conclusions of a model follow from its assumptions.”30 This in turn provides a logical structure 
upon which other models can be built and also for a determination about consequences that 
emanate from our arguments.31 These advantages of modeling are especially useful for this 
study. With trade disputes being largely between two countries, they allow the researcher to 
succinctly represent the strategic interaction of these states with Prisoner’s Dilemma-like 
payoffs. These payoffs reflect the assumptions that “cheat, cheat,” “cheat, cooperate,” 
“cooperate, cheat,” and “cooperate, cooperate” are all possible outcomes, with different payoffs 
for each. Since the WTO allows for the affected party to impose counter measures, the models 
also take this into account and this is seen in the payoff scale. Instantiations of the model can 
also probe the validity of findings as some of the assumptions are relaxed.  
 While the study uses modeling generally, extensive form games are the main mechanisms 
utilized. This is done to reflect the fact that trade disputes are sequential. What then is an 
extensive form game? 
In the words of Morrow, “an n-person game in extensive form is: 
1. A finite game tree composed of nodes and branches where each node of the tree is one 
move of the game or an endpoint of the game and the branches connect the nodes; 
2. A division of the nodes over the players, Chance, and the endpoints of the game, with one 
and only one player, Chance, or an endpoint assigned to each node (this division is called 
a partition of the nodes); 
3. A probability distribution for each chance move; 
4. A refinement of the partition of the nodes into the player sets into information sets for 
each player; 
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5. A set of outcomes and an assignment of those outcomes to each endpoint of the tree so 
that each endpoint has one and only one outcome; and 
6. A set of utility functions such that each player i has a utility function, ui, over the 
outcomes.”32 
The assumption, however, is that all of the above is common knowledge to all players.33 
The models that are used in this study have both common and private information, as 
well as perfect and imperfect information. This is done to aptly represent the uncertainties that 
sometimes characterize trading relations and disputes. Most of this is accommodated by 
information sets which signify that the players have incomplete and imperfect information.  
Notwithstanding the many uses of game theory, there are also limitations. This makes an 
overreliance on it imprudent and analytically insufficient. Geddes, for instance, opines that, “A 
shortcoming of many theoretic studies is that, because of the great complexity of interactions 
among strategic players, they are heavy on mathematical theorizing and short on credible 
empirical results.”34 Additionally, some rational choice models have been dismissed on the 
grounds that, “they simplify reality to such a degree that the model bears no resemblance at all to 
the real world.”35 In essence, they “can easily cross the line from simple to simplistic.”36  
While “credible empirical results” and expectations can be garnered from the models that are 
used in this study, formal models remain abstractions of reality. The strategic interactions are 
parsed to highlight what happens in a dyadic relationship, but in the real world, trade is far more 
multilayered, with third parties making potent contributions to the disputes. Complicating this is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 58-59. 
33 Ibid, 59. 
34 Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sandcastles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics. 
(Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 204. 
35 Ibid, 206. 
36 Ibid. See also Jim Granato and Frank Scioli in  “Puzzles, Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and 
Social Significance of Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models.” Symposium. Two Paths to a Science of 
Politics. Perspectives on Politics. Volume 2, Number 2. June 2004: pp. 313 – 323. 
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the fact that multiple goods and services are traded between parties at any given time. It is 
therefore difficult to represent the tussling over one commodity when others may be 
simultaneously affecting the trading relationship. The models also make general projections 
about what will happen in sequence when there is a trade violation. While these provide fodder 
for analysis, what happens in the real world is dependent on the states in question and what their 
needs are. Formal analyses in isolation therefore do not fully represent the scope and dynamics 
of trade disputes. To cover this short coming, qualitative methods are also incorporated.  
Qualitative Methods: Strengths and Limitations 
The qualitative template is one of the methodologies that this study uses. “Qualitative 
researchers deploy a wide range of interconnected interpretive practices, hoping always to get a 
better understanding of the subject matter at hand.”37 The rationale for the inclusion of 
qualitative methods is therefore that greater understanding is needed of the unique interactions 
between states that are locked in a trade dispute. Formal and statistical studies by their very 
nature cannot provide this. 
Case study is one of the five main traditions of the qualitative methodology. Creswell 
articulates the view that “a case study is an exploration of a bounded system, or a case / multiple 
cases over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of 
information rich in context.”38 The case study method can also be seen as “a research strategy of 
focusing intensively on individual cases to draw insights about causal relationships in a broader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds. The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, 4th ed. (Sage 
Publications: London, 2005), 4. See also Uwe Flick in An Introduction to Qualitative Research, 3rd ed. (Sage 
Publications: London, 2006), 30. 
38 John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among the Five Traditions.(Sage 
Publications: London, 1998), 61. See also Linda Mabry’s chapter, “Case Study in Social Research” in The SAGE 
Handbook of Social Research Methods. (Sage Publications: London, 2008), 214-227.  
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population of cases.”39 This method is reputed to be very useful because it helps “to develop 
concepts and theory, identify the limits of general relationships and disprove deterministic 
hypotheses, control for confounding effects through within-case comparisons, and disentangle 
causal processes.”40 
The United States, China, Guatemala, Mexico and Jamaica have all used the DSB with 
varying levels of frequency.  Examining their trade disputes on a case by case basis is therefore 
appropriate for this research design because they fall within a particular period of time and meet 
the empirical expectations derived from the formal models. They also allow for detailed analysis 
through the use of the documents that are available. Each country’s annual trade reports, their 
Semi-Annual reports on Article 16.4, case materials, WTO Panel and Appellate Body reports, 
books, journals and scholarly articles are therefore used to examine these trade disputes and the 
deliberations that inform their actions. Process-tracing as well as litigation patterns can be 
gleaned through this method. All of these therefore provide a comprehensive understanding of 
trade violations and the strategic use or avoidance of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. 
There are, however, potential challenges in relying solely on case studies. For example, 
though they “provide detailed information about the steps by which events occur,” “they 
sometimes focus too much on the idiosyncratic details of rare and influential events.”41 This has 
implications for how much generalization, and consequently, theory formation can be done from 
these observations. Additionally, case studies have limited external validity,42 indeterminacy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Amy R. Poteete, Marco A Janssen and Elinor Ostrom. Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and 
Multiple Methods in Practice. (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 33. 
40 Ibid 
41 Jim Granato and Frank Scioli. “Puzzles, Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and Social Significance of 
Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models.” Symposium. Two Paths to a Science of Politics. Perspectives on 
Politics. Volume 2, Number 2. June 2004: pp. 314. 
42 “External validity refers to the generalizability of findings from a study, or the extent to which conclusions can be 
applied across different populations or situations.” Internal validity on the other hand, is “the extent to which an 
experimenter can be confident that his or her findings result from experimental manipulations.” The intention is 
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problems, and are difficult to replicate.43 This study hopes to mitigate these potential problems 
by examining the information theory comparative approach to see how each variable affects 
DSB usage and avoidance.  
The information theory approach was proposed by Drozdova and Gaubatz. It is a 
mechanism that allows for the comparative assessment of case studies. It does this by 
“quantifying the qualitative” so that case study findings can be represented and analyzed in a 
precise and parsimonious way.44 This is done in a four-step guide whereby a data matrix is set up 
to represent binary outcomes of the independent variables, which are then counted and calculated 
for their joint probabilities. These uncertainty measures are then calculated, with emphasis on the 
direction of the relationship. These results allow for comparison to see how the information 
scores hold against each other.45  
 The information theory method is very useful for this study. While the cases selected will 
help to test the empirical implications of the model, the addition of this method provides a 
“systematic and rigorous way to identify the most and least informative factors”46 that include 
DSB participation. Importantly, case studies are often not replicable and therefore have 
generality problems. This method therefore allows for this study to be replicated elsewhere. This 
adds to its impact because the findings can be easily verified, and potentially improved upon. 
In sum, no single method can adequately probe the complex world trading system. This 
study recognizes this challenge and attempts to address the main research question by combining 
an extensive form game, its empirical results and cases that include aspects of participation and 
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43 Amy R. Poteete, Marco A Janssen and Elinor Ostrom. Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and 
Multiple Methods in Practice. (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 33. 
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non-participation at the DSB. WTO reports, case materials, books, scholarly articles and country 
reports are used to evaluate how these countries made their decision. These variables are then 
comparatively assessed by using the information theory approach. This provides a parsimonious 
evaluation of which variables have greater information scores on participation in the DSB. 
Importantly, these findings can be easily checked and replicated in other studies, thereby adding 
to the transparency and value of the study. 
Hypotheses 
There are some a priori expectations that this study has. These are informed by the 
anarchical nature of the world trading system, costs to pursue a case at the World Trade 
Organization and the assumptions of Prisoner’s Dilemma. The different methods will investigate 
the extent to which they are true and if so, the degree to which they hold across cases. 
Main Research Question: 
Why do aggrieved Member countries choose not to participate in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Body? 
Independent Variable: Cost of litigation (this includes all the legal, financial, reputational, 
audience, expected utilities and interdependent payoffs associated with the process). 
Dependent Variable: The choice to litigate (use the DSB as a complainant or respondent) 
Hypothesis 1 – the lower the litigation costs, the more credible is the threat to use the DSB when 
a dispute arises. 
The expectation is that a country’s response to its trading partner’s threat to sue it is based on the 
extent that it believes the trading partner will truly act. Here, the postulation is that if litigation 
costs are too expensive, it is difficult to convince others about pursuing dispute settlement in the 
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DSB. If, however, litigation costs are relatively affordable, this can potently signal a country’s 
resolve to use the DSB. 
Hypothesis 2 – the higher the litigation costs, the less likely it is that states will use the DSB 
when a trade dispute arises. 
This hypothesis addresses feasibility and expected utilities. It projects that as litigation costs 
increase, countries will find the DSB process prohibitively expensive and not pursue recourse 
there. This will be based on their calculations of the benefits of using the institution versus 
staying outside. The expectation is that with high litigation costs, states will be less incentivized 
to use the DSB. 
Hypothesis 3 – the higher the litigation costs, the less likely it is that trading partners will engage 
in free trade. 
The WTO aims to promote free trade. Countries, however, decide the extent to which they will 
adhere to the governance functions of the institution. This hypothesis anticipates that if litigation 
costs are moderate, states will be more willing to use the DSB, which can punish guilty trading 
partners. As dispute settlement costs increase, however, this lessens the likelihood of pursuing 
recourse in the DSB. The consequent effect is that countries will be less threatened by an 
institution that is inaccessible, and simply engage in more protectionism outside. 
Hypothesis 4 – the more confident a state is that it has observed a trade violation, the more 
likely it is that it will use the DSB when a trade dispute emerges. 
States act relative to the amount of information that they have. The projection is therefore that 
the better able states are to observe their trading partners and identify specific breaches of the 
WTO’s provisions, the greater are the chances that they will litigate. Conversely, even if 
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countries suspect that trading partners are cheating in some regard, the extent to which they are 
certain about what they perceive will determine whether they go through with adjudication. 
Hypothesis 5 – countries that expect to lose will not litigate. 
There are high reputational costs to go before the DSB and lose. The postulation is 
therefore that states that anticipate adverse rulings will stay outside the institution, while those 
that expect a favorable judgment will litigate. 
Hypothesis 6 – countries with membership in other dispute settlement organizations are more 
likely to use the DSB when a trade dispute arises. 
As expounded in the literature review, legal capacity can be built in other institutions that 
provide opportunities for competency building. The conjecture is therefore that the more 
organizations like these that a country is in, the more likely it is that they will litigate  
Hypothesis 7 – countries with experience at the DSB are more likely to participate as a 
complainant or respondent when a trade dispute emerges. 
This hypothesis projects that legal capacity skills are gathered during litigation. The expectation 
is therefore that the more a country participates, the more it will continue to participate in the 
DSB. 
Hypothesis 8 – countries with experience with the specific WTO provision are more likely to 
participate as a complainant or respondent when that provision is evoked. 
Cases at the DSB are specific to provisions. The conjecture is therefore that history of using the 
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CHAPTER IV 
DOES THE WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY TEMPER DEFECTION 
BETWEEN TRADING PARTNERS WITH ASYMMETRIC INTERESTS? 
This chapter examines the WTO to test how, if at all, its Dispute Settlement Body serves 
the needs of its members. In an ideal world, all trading partners avoid protectionism and engage 
in free trade. In reality however, this is not always true. Countries frequently flout the principles 
and provisions to which they have agreed to be bound. Some affected parties are able to 
unilaterally retaliate, others find recourse through bilateral and regional arrangements, while 
some find reprieve through case settlement at the WTO. Since the WTO seeks to promote and 
facilitate free trade, it is therefore useful to explore if the presence of a Dispute Settlement Body 
inhibits states’ inclination to cheat. For the purposes of this research, delta (Δ), the costs 
associated with litigation is the independent variable, while the choice to litigate (either as a 
complainant or respondent) is the dependent variable.  
The test whether the DSB’s presence mitigates protectionist tendencies, this chapter uses 
an extensive form game with complete and perfect information, costs for litigation and Prisoner’s 
Dilemma-like payoffs. These investigate and elucidate the complex deliberations that occur as 
states contemplate when and why they should cheat or cooperate, use the DSB or avoid it, 
litigate or acquiesce. Consequently, each version of the model employed highlights situations in 
which global welfare is maximized by cooperation at free trade, but with individual states having 
incentives to cheat. The conditions affect the sequential moves that players make and the 
consequent equilibria that are formed. Prisoner’s Dilemma is therefore the starting place for this 
model, but since trade relations are sequential and not static, the same logic is used to develop 
iterations of a stage game.  
 
	  
	   	  
81 
The chapter is divided into three sections. Part One outlines the main underpinnings of 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. These include the players, their strategic choices and payoffs, as well as the 
Nash Equilibrium. This serves as the foundation for all subsequent versions of the model that 
probe the research question. Part Two considers a world in which all trading partners have 
complete and perfect information about each other’s trading practices. The costs of litigation, 
designated delta are modulated to see if variations in DSB litigation costs affect the choices that 
a state makes if it is the victim of a trade violation. There are iterations with both states having 
the same delta, or a greater cost for either country. The key result of all the instantiations is that 
the states oscillate between playing free trade and protectionism, evoking the DSB or avoiding it 
and litigating or acquiescing. These cases with information symmetry show that litigation costs 
do not inhibit DSB usage, provided the costs do not exceed the potential gains from trade. This 
happens even in cases where the aggrieved party has a more exorbitant cost. In all instances, 
trade is transparent, with the culpable state correctly identified and punished at the multilateral 
level. Since in equilibrium the guilty state admits to wrongdoing and abandons protectionism 
when brought before the DSB, then in situations where there no symmetrical information, even 
with different costs to litigate, the DSB curtails the propensity to cheat and is used by trading 
partners to ensure that free trade outcomes are achieved. 
There have been cases, however, where the procedural costs for dispute settlement are 
prohibitively expensive, at least for one party. Part Three therefore examines how extremely high 
costs can made the institution irrelevant, or susceptible to manipulation from countries that pay 
less. If for example, both players find the cost to go before the DSB too high, they will choose to 
protectionists and stay outside the institution. If however, one player has a very high cost when 
compared with the other player, the one with the lower cost will find playing protectionism a 
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more attractive strategy. The other player, because of the expensive filing costs, will find it 
prudent to choose free trade and avoid the DSB. If however, the State with the higher DSB costs 
responds with protectionism, the other player will take it to the DSB, with the only feasible 
option being to not pursue full scale litigation. This shows that beyond a certain limit, high costs 
will lock countries out of protecting themselves through protectionism, or make them suffer at 
the hands of more capable states if the institution is evoked. 
The Premise of Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is a classic “two – person, non-zero-sum game.”1 In this scenario, both 
players have options of cooperating (C) or defecting (D).2 Additionally, “the payoffs are T, for 
temptation, R, for Reward, P, for punishment, and S, for sucker.3 The premise of this game is 
that: 
T  >  R  >  P >  S 
and 




Table 4 -1: General Prisoner’s Dilemma5 
Player 2 






(R    ,   R) (S   ,   T) 
Defect (D) 
 
(T   ,   S) (P   ,  P) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See for example James D. Morrow in Game Theory for Political Scientists. (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), 78 for a discussion on Prisoner’s Dilemma. The name of the game comes from one story told to 
describe its strategies and payoffs, narrative involving two detained criminals. Without the opportunity to consult 
with each other, their choices and outcomes are contingent upon the other’s response. The uncertainty of what the 
other might do makes cheating the dominant strategy.  
2 James D. Morrow in Game Theory for Political Scientists. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 263. 
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
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For this game, the dominant strategy equilibrium6 is (D;d), which is Pareto dominated7 by (C;c).8 
 
Table 4-2: The Strategic Interaction of a Free Trade and a Protectionist State 
(Adaptation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma) 
State B 






1    ,   1 -1   ,   2 
Protectionism 
 
2   ,   -1 0   ,  0 
 
Payoff Scale: 2Best   1Good   0Bad  -1Worst 
 
The game theoretic model allows for an exploration of the different strategies and payoffs 
that are available to both states. This section therefore discusses the different choices that each 
state has and the corresponding payoffs for those strategic options vis-à-vis how the other player 
simultaneously selects.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A strategy S1 is said to “strongly or strictly dominate another strategy S2 for Player 1 iff M1 (S1; sj ) > M1 (S2 ; sj) for 
all sj.” If however, S1 strongly dominates all other strategies Si, then S1 is classified as a dominant strategy. The 
dominant strategy equilibrium is the result when both players have dominant strategies. See James D. Morrow. 
Game Theory for Political Scientists. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 77 and Nolan McCarthy and 
Adam Meirowitz  in Political Game Theory: An Introduction. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 94 – 
100. 
7 “An outcome x Pareto dominates an outcome y iff for all players i, ui (x)>  ui (y) and for some player j, uj (x) >uj 
(y). Outcome x strictly Pareto dominates outcome y iff for all players i, ui (x) > ui (y).” See James D. Morrow 1994. 
Game Theory for Political Scientists. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 95. 
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Table 4-3: Breakdown of Choices and Outcomes for States A and B 
State A’s Choices  State B’s Choices State A’s Payoffs State B’s Payoffs 
Free Trade Free Trade (1)     Good       (1)    Good 
Protectionism Free Trade         (2)     Best       (-1)   Worst 
Free Trade  Protectionism         (-1)    Worst       (2)   Best 
Protectionism Protectionism         (0)    Bad       (0)  Bad 
 
States A and B have the possibility for both to engage in free trade, yielding a payoff of 
(1, 1). As depicted in the matrix above, if this results, then the payoff would be mutually 
beneficial. This however, does not produce the highest individual outcome. Its likelihood though, 
is something that both would welcome in abstract terms since with some concessions, both can 
have the assurance of free trade in a world where there are worse payoffs.  
State A could choose to be protectionist while State B is a free trader (2, -1). This could 
mean that State B would have little or no barriers to trade and not engage in other unfair trading 
practices, with the expectation that State A would follow suit. State A however, could flout these 
expectations, imposing high tariffs on imports from State A, and also dump “like products” into 
the State B’s markets, thereby threatening or causing “material injury” to State B’s domestic 
producers or running them out of business altogether.9 State A could also engage in state-
sponsored industrial espionage to steal trade secrets from firms in State B, manipulate currency 
values to make production costs in one country artificially high and costs in the other artificially 
low, impose non-tariff barriers that unreasonably restrict access to its market. The result would 
be a best case scenario for State A, but the worst possible outcome for State B. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See for example, the WTO’s provision on dumping. 
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State B, as a rational player, could opt to be protectionist while State A trades fairly, (-1, 
2). This would countenance the reverse situation whereby State B would obtain its best possible 
outcome, while State A would get its worst. This has the potential of leading State A into balance 
of payment deficits, loss of comparative advantage, or other losses, with State B benefiting from 
gains from trade.  
Prisoner’s Dilemma also allows for both sides to cheat, which means that they 
simultaneously act as protectionists. (0, 0). This, however, would precipitate a bad payoff for 
both sides. According to the game theory matrix, this is not the worst possible individual 
outcome. They could however, be better off if they choose to concurrently engage in free trade. 
Why then is this often the result? Let us now discuss the question of to protect or not to protect. 
Here, we will see that despite the range of possibilities available to each player, the Nash 
equilibrium often becomes the deciding factor in how they proceed.  
In game matrices where there are two players and the game is not iterated, everyone tries 
to avoid the “sucker” situation. This is where one party chooses to cooperate, but the other 
defects from the assurances made. The anarchic nature of the international trading system makes 
it difficult for any state to trust the other completely. In a world where there is no regulatory 
body for international trade, as this model assumes, there is therefore no recourse if a state is 
cheated.  
In accordance with realism’s tenets, the self- help nature of international politics 
therefore prompts each state to arm itself in order to ensure its survival. Since economic might is 
a key determinant in power dynamics,10 it is therefore more prudent in state craft to cheat rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Proponents of power transition theory postulate that, “national power is a function of population, economic 
productivity, and the political capacity to extract resources from society and transform them into national power.” 
For these thinkers, “national power = population* GDP/capita*political capability.” See for example, Jack S. Levy, 
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than to cooperate. This offsets the possibility of the next trading state becoming wealthier and 
more prosperous, and consequently, increasing its clout relative to the next. The cheater / 
protectionist state in contemplation of this outcome, therefore takes a chance at getting the best 
possible result by wagering that the other state cooperates / free trades while it cheats. With both 
players opting for this strategy, the outcome is “protectionism; protectionism.”  
 
Table 4-4: The Nash Equilibrium of Strategic Interaction Between a Free Trade and 
Protectionist State 
State B 






1    ,   1 -1   ,   2 
Protectionism 
 
2   ,   -1 0   ,  0 
 
Payoff Scale: 2Best   1Good   0Bad  -1Worst 
 
A Nash equilibrium is “the result when two players make best replies to each other and 
none has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from that strategy.”11 This, however, does not mean 
that it is the best possible outcome for either player. It is instead, “a minimal condition for a 
solution to a game if the players can correctly anticipate each other’s strategies.”12 In this game, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China, ed., Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2008), 18. 
11 See for example, James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists. (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), 80 – 81. Here, Morrow explicates the fact that “a pair of strategies Si and Sj forms a Nash equilibrium 
iff the strategies are best replies to each other.” He also demonstrates that “a pair of strategies forms a Nash 
equilibrium iff M1 (Si ; sj) > Mi (S; sj) for all S /= Si and M2 (Si ; sj) > M2 (Si ; s) for all s /= sj. 
12 Ibid. See also and Nolan McCarthy and Adam Meirowitz in Political Game Theory: An Introduction. (New York: 
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both states are better off playing “free trade, free trade.” This however, is not a stable 
equilibrium since state A has an incentive to play protectionism in that row, while state B can be 
lured to follow suit in its column. In essence, “free trade, free trade” is strictly dominated by 
“protectionism, protectionism.” Since no strictly dominated strategy can be a part of a Nash 
equilibrium, both countries will play their dominant strategy which is to protect. These options 
however, obtain in a world where there is no mechanism for dispute settlement. Let us now 
consider a world where the DSB exists and moves are sequential, to see if the strategies, payoffs 
and outcomes change, if any at all. 
A Model of Trade and Dispute Resolution 
This game builds on the common model of trade as a Prisoner’s Dilemma13 and adds the 
complex interplay of trade at the WTO / DSB. Using an extensive form game, there are two main 
branches which outline all the possibilities and payoffs that player B must contemplate as it 
interacts with either a free trading or protectionist State A.  
In both branches, State B moves in sequence after State A and decides if it will engage in 
free trade or protectionism. State A, whose turn it is to move, chooses between filing a case in 
the Dispute Settlement Body and foregoing that choice. If State A proceeds with the DSB 
alternative, State B, selects between acquiescence and litigation. If, however, State A does not 
pursue a case, State B may opt to file or avoid doing so. If the DSB is chosen, State A now 
selects between acquiescing and litigating. These options are consistent for both free trade and 
protectionism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See for example, Meredith Kolsky Lewis in "The Prisoners' Dilemma Posed by Free Trade Agreements: Can 
Open Access Provisions Provide an Escape?" Chicago Journal of International Law. 2011. Volume 11, Number 2, 
Article 24. Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol11/iss2/24 for a discussion on the paradoxical 
nature of trade. Here, she reasons that trade liberalization would lead to mutual benefits, but defecting remains the 
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There are twenty possible payoffs, which all fall under mutual cooperation, mutual 
defection and “sucker” situations. There are two additional dynamics, however, to this game. 
Upon successful litigation, the WTO allows the complainant to impose countermeasures.14 This 
is accommodated in the game by making it synonymous to “cheat, cheat.” The thinking is that if 
a country is protectionist, then the free trader now has the WTO’s permission to also protect its 
trading entities. There are costs, however, for all filing. As a result, a penalty, delta, is used to 
capture all the costs associated with the dispute settlement process. Here, delta is treated as a 
composite cost, with all the included variables disaggregated in Chapter Seven. In this chapter, it 
simply refers to the quantitative and qualitative burdens that states when they initiate or respond 
to a dispute. 
 It should be noted, however, that delta may not be the same for both parties. Some 
scholars also contend that it is the initial cost for filing that is cumbersome, but this often 
becomes negligible once a culture of litigation has been formed.15  It is therefore possible for 
States A and B to be regular DSB users and this may make delta less of an inhibiting factor. 
Exploring delta could therefore illuminate how the DSB functions. In essence, this model probes 
how the different costs of filing regardless of what the other state pays affects the tendency to 
use the DSB versus engaging in tit-for- tat strategies. It is hoped that deductions from variations 
of this game can answer the broader question of whether (and when) the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Body tempers defection between trading partners with asymmetric interests.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See for example, Lisa L. Martin in  “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism.” International Organization. Volume 
46, Number 4. (Autumn 1992) pp. 765 – 792.  
15 See for example, Christina L. Davis and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo in “Who Files? Developing Country 
Participation in GATT/ WTO Adjudication.” The Journal of Politics. 2009. Volume 71, Number 3: 1033 – 1049 
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Figure 4-1: A Model of Trade and Dispute Resolution 
Proposition 1: In a game with symmetric information and the same delta (δ), the presence of the 
DSB will mitigate the tendency to defect if δ<1, but the state that moves first has an advantage. 
Proof: 
In an extensive form game, the	  sequence of operations can be garnered through backward 
induction.  There are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies, one in which the 
DSB is never used, and another in which the DSB is used regularly by State B.  
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 “Protect, No DSB, Acquiesce; Free Trade, DSB, Acquiesce”16 is a possible 
equilibrium.17 This would give a payoff of 1 , 1-δ.18 What this equilibrium shows is that State A 
is more inclined to be protectionist. Remarkably, in response to a trade violation by State A, 
State B’s strategy is to still be a free trader. It does, however, seek reprieve at the DSB. Once it 
reaches that stage, State A acquiesces and both end up better off even with the delta that State B 
pays for initiating the litigation. 
 The DSB institution eliminates the mutual-protectionism equilibrium. “Protect, No DSB; 
Protect, No DSB” is not an equilibrium if δ ≤ 1. The payoff for choosing this route is 0 , 0.  
However, after State A has selected “protect,” State B can do better by choosing “free trade” and 
then bringing a DSB case.  As discussed above, the payoff for State B from that strategy is 1-δ.  
Therefore, if delta is less than 1, the mutual protection equilibrium is no longer viable.  
 The second equilibrium enables State A to be a free trader and for State B to reciprocate 
accordingly: “Free Trade, No DSB; Free Trade, No DSB.” The payoffs for this strategy are 1 , 1. 
This is a stable equilibrium because neither has an incentive to deviate from this strategy. If State 
B for example deduces that State A is inclined to be a free trader and avoid using the DSB, then 
State B could change its strategy from free trade to protectionism. State A however, would take 
State B to the DSB where B would acquiesce because the payoffs for acquiescence are greater 
than those for litigation. The resulting outcome would be “Free Trade, DSB, Acquiesce; Protect, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For purposes of interpretation, State A’s strategies are listed first and State B’s follow. 
17 A A Nash equilibrium is the result when two players make best replies to each other and none has an incentive to 
unilaterally deviate from that strategy. This however, does not mean that it is the best possible outcome for either 
player. It is instead, “a minimal condition for a solution to a game if the players can correctly anticipate each other’s 
strategies.”   See for example, James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists. (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 80 – 81. Here, Morrow explicates the fact that “a pair of strategies Si and Sj forms a Nash 
equilibrium iff the strategies are best replies to each other.” He also demonstrates that “a pair of strategies forms a 
Nash equilibrium iff M1 (Si ; sj) > Mi (S; sj) for all S /= Si and M2 (Si ; sj) > M2 (Si ; s) for all s /= sj. See also and 
Nolan McCarthy and Adam Meirowitz in Political Game Theory: An Introduction. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 107 – 112. 
18 In all payoffs, State A’s are listed first.  
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DSB, Acquiesce.” This would provide payoffs of .95 , 1 for States A and B respectively, so B 
would be no better off selecting Protect, and hence has no incentive to deviate. Moreover, if 
State A perceives that State B will be protectionist, then it will also play protectionism in the first 
instance. This would force State B to choose between free trade and protectionism, both of which 
provide outcomes that are less than the 1 , 1 payoffs. 
This, in principle, is how the DSB and all other dispute resolution mechanisms aim to 
function.  The DSB’s presence constrains defection if litigation costs are small. Regardless of 
what delta is, provided it is less than 1 for both parties, an aggrieved party will seek reprieve at 
the DSB and that the guilty party will surrender. Proposition 1 showed that with δ ≤ 1 violators 
are clearly identified and recourse at the DSB is sought accordingly. Culpable states in turn 
acquiesce when brought to trial.  The equilibrium at mutual protectionism is eliminated, and the 
remaining equilibria provide both states with payoffs associated with relatively free global trade.  
 In the context of trade therefore and with Prisoner’s Dilemma-like situations very 
possible and probable, the DSB is a sufficient arrangement for inducing participation and 
mitigating unfair trading practices. This however, occurs only when costs are not prohibitively 
expensive. It is therefore prudent to examine how the strategies, payoffs and outcomes change 
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Proposition 2: If dispute settlement costs become too expensive (δ ≥ 1), countries will avoid the 
DSB and engage in protectionism outside the institution. 
Proof: 
Suppose that A has selected Protect.  In this context, the best response by B is to select 
Protect as well.  If B selects protect, the payoff for both players is 0.  If B selects Free Trade and 
then files with the DSB, A will acquiesce, but since δ ≥ 1, the payoff for B in this scenario of 1-δ 
is less than the payoff (0) from simply selecting Protect. Hence, B will not use the DSB.  A will 
also never select Free Trade with δ ≥ 1.  If A has chosen free trade, and B has then chosen 
protect, A could choose DSB which would induce B to acquiesce, but the cost of bringing the 
case to the DSB render this option unappealing.  Because δ ≥ 1, the payoff 1-δ that A receives is 
worse than the payoff of 0 associated with selecting Protect initially.  
The only subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is “Protect, No DSB; Protect, No DSB.” 
This gives a payoff of 0 , 0. A consideration is for the states to play “Free Trade, No DSB; Free 
Trade, No DSB.” This would give both countries a payoff of 1 , 1  . This however, is not a stable 
equilibrium.    This is because if State B knows that State A will choose free trade, as the second 
mover, it can quickly opt for protectionism. This would result in the “sucker” situation whereby 
State A would get -1   and State B would get the much larger payoff of   2   . To avoid this 
possibility, both players will avoid the institution and use tit-for-tat strategies. This case of a 
prohibitively expensive DSB therefore shows that when dispute settlement costs are too high for 
both states, the presence of the WTO is irrelevant. This is because neither state is willing to bear 
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Proposition 3: In cases where Player A has a significantly lower cost (δA ≤ 1) than Player B 
(δB ≥ 2) to use the DSB, Player A will use protectionism to simultaneously force concessions 
from Player B and make it worse off than it would be in a world where the DSB does not 
exist.  
Proof: 
There are two equilibria, both of which place B at a substantial disadvantage.  One 
equilibrium is “Protect, No DSB; Free Trade, No DSB.” In the first scenario where State B 
responds to State A’s protectionism with free trade, the equilibrium path shows that both states 
will avoid the DSB. This would lead to an equilibrium of “Protect, No DSB; Free Trade, No 
DSB.” The payoffs for this strategy are for 2 for State A and for -1. State B. This equilibrium is 
noteworthy because though State A is the culpable party, State B, because of its cumbersome 
litigation costs, avoids the institution and ends up worse than State A. This is a case of double 
exploitation by State A in that it firstly trades unfairly with State B. Secondly, since State B finds 
the DSB process too expensive, it ends up with a payoff that is far worse than State A’s.  B will 
not defect from this equilibrium by filing with the DSB because even though A will acquiesce, 
yielding B a payoff of 1-δ, since δ ≥ 2, this payoff is worse than the sucker payoff of -1.  
A second equilibrium has state B retaliate with protectionism, only to have that retaliation 
curtailed by the DSB.   On the equilibrium path the moves selected by each state are “Protect, 
DSB; Protect, Acquiesce.” State B’s retaliation with protectionism ultimately comes to nothing. 
What we see here is that State A, as a frequent user of the DSB, or a country with greater 
resources, would simply take State B before the DSB because it can afford to do so. State B is 
now forced to choose between litigation which gives it a payoff of  -δ  and acquiesce, which 
yields  -1. Since δ > 1 for state B, litigation provides worse utility than acquiescing and receiving 
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a payoff of -1. This equilibrium highlights some of the shenanigans that State A can use to 
exploit the trading relationship that it has with State B. Notice for example that, because State B 
cannot access the DSB but State A can, A can exploit that institution to deny B the recourse to a 
protect-protect equilibrium.  What this means is that in the case where B has an exorbitant cost to 
go to the DSB, the inclusion of the institution in the trading dynamics makes B worse off than B 
would be in the absence of the WTO/DSB.  
Empirical Implications of the Model 
This chapter has utilized several iterations of a stage game to probe whether the presence 
of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body tempers the tendency to cheat if trading partners have 
asymmetric interests. These were done under conditions of certainty as well as uncertainty, with 
variations in litigation costs. The following are some empirical implications that have held 
constant across the models. These will inform case study selection as well as statistical analyses 
for the rest of the study. 
1. Countries consider the cost of litigation when determining whether to utilize the DSB 
mechanism. 
All countries that face a trade dispute have several alternatives. A vulnerably 
interdependent state, for example, may choose to ignore the grievance because it is either unable 
to retaliate, or seeking recourse may make it worse off ex ante.  A state with a relatively 
comparable economy, however, may consider two possible options. One may be to engage in tit-
for-tat strategies outside the DSB, or to pursue its case formally. Since there is a cost attached to 
filing, countries will weigh the costs and benefits of litigation versus unilateral retaliation and 
will act accordingly. 
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2. Sufficiently high costs can lock a country out of enjoying the benefits of the international 
institution.  
The World Trade Organization is a multilateral institution.  Most countries accede to it 
because of the perceived benefit. If however, there are costs to litigation, some of which being 
prohibitively expensive, then Members will be unable to access the very provisions that they 
hope to evoke in need of need. If costs are too high as demonstrated by delta, then limited 
participation when catalyzed by procedural costs would mean that not all countries can freely 
access the institution. In this way, sufficiently high costs can impede some countries from 
enjoying the benefits of the institution.  
3. Lower costs make the threat to utilize the DSB more credible.  Hence countries with 
lower costs will be more likely to successfully resolve disputes they initiated prior to full 
DSB consideration. 	  
Since countries are more likely to pursue the DSB is the filing costs are moderate, then it 
is also follows that lower costs would make the threat to use the institution more credible. 
Consequently, a culpable state that is threatened with DSB litigation would be more likely to 
settle with the aggrieved party. This is because with no foreseen barrier to the DSB in terms of 
costs, filing would be sufficient to signal the affected country’s intent to get recourse. Since 
based on the models employed the guilty party is exposed and counter protectionism sanctioned, 
lower costs would make the threat of DSB usage credible and could propel settlement prior to 
full engagement in the dispute settlement process. 
4. Lower costs make litigation more available.  Hence, countries with high costs will be 
more likely to settle disputes initiated by trading partners prior to full DSB consideration. 
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Whenever the DSB is evoked, the defendant has the opportunity to litigate or acquiesce. 
With lower costs, a respondent, especially a free trader, would be more likely to pursue the case 
to the fullest extent and get redress. If however, the litigation costs are too high, then continuing 
would become more expensive than “protect, protect” and would leave both states worse off. 
Additionally, litigation would mean that both countries have to pay some cost and not just the 
party that initiates the process. With these considerations, only lower costs would make litigation 
attractive and countries knowing that they face great expenses to engage the DSB, could be 
induced to settle and not go through the whole process.  
5. Free trade with no recourse to the DSB will only occur when uncertainty is low. This 
suggests that variables which reduce uncertainty (e.g. both democracies, common 
language, geographical proximity or contiguity, etc.) should diminish the recourse to the 
DSB. 
The iterations of the model show that there are two subgame perfect Nash Equilibria. 
These are “Free Trade, No DSB; Free Trade, No DSB” and “Protect, No DSB; Protect No DSB.” 
With common knowledge and anticipated moves, both countries therefore correctly identify what 
type of state they are interacting with and act accordingly. However, in the instantiations of the 
model where there are information sets, things are a little different. “Protect, No DSB; Protect 
No DSB” remains a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium. The next possibility is “Free Trade, 
DSB, Litigate; Free Trade, DSB, Litigate.” The stiff constraints under which free trade occurs 
under uncertainty at the DSB makes it counterproductive. This is because with opacity in place, 
both countries can only force each other to be free traders by going to the DSB. Also, delta has to 
be so negligible that it is almost equal to zero for states to consider this alternative. Since the role 
of the DSB is adjudicate unfair trading practices, having two free traders appearing before it 
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belies that purpose. Additionally, with more information sets in place, the dominant strategy is 
always to protect. This suggests that with any amount of uncertainty and absence of reprieve at 
the DSB, chances of playing free trade are low. 
6. With certainty, the presence of the institution prevents full-scale litigation because the 
guilty party acquiesces. 
The iterations of the model show that the presence of the DSB is sufficient to curtail 
unfair trading practices. This happens regardless of the costs associated with dispute settlement. 
These instantiations highlight how transparency affects state behaviour. Since it is obvious who 
is a free trader and who is not, the guilty party acknowledges culpability and does not pursue any 
litigation. Both states therefore have all the information they need to converge around 
equilibrium paths of joint free trade or joint protectionism.  
7. Under certainty, the presence of the institution is sufficient to generate an equilibrium 
with both sides playing free trade, even though the full process is never utilized.  
Prisoner’s Dilemma is the game from which this model is generated. Based on its 
premises, moves are simultaneous and cheating is the dominant strategy. In an extensive for 
game version however, moves are sequential and the players have complete and perfect 
information about each other’s strategies and payoffs. Since concurrently playing free trade both 
a greater payoff than joint protectionism, we see that the presence of the institution serves as a 
credible monitor of state behavior. Here, while the process is never fully utilized, both states 
being fully cognizant of the mechanism and their choices still form an equilibrium with free 
trade and avoid full litigation. 
8. At the goods level, goods for which the cost differential between the free trade and sucker 
payoffs are larger will typically have a smaller delta relative to potential gains from trade.   
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Not all goods are the same. This becomes apparent when one considers the fact that some 
goods are more frequently contested than others at the DSB. Much of this is due to the integral 
role that certain goods play in the domestic economies of countries and the potential gains from 
trade in the global political economy. Some types of clothing for example, may not attract the 
same type of attention in the United States trade litigation sphere than agricultural produce and 
military arsenal would. This implies that it would cost more to pursue a case that has little 
economic prospects than it would for a good that is expected to generate more capital and clout. 
This obtains regardless of whether the country in question is a free trader or feels it has been 
violated. Delta then, is to some extent hinged upon how much the state feels it has to gain from 
the good versus how much it stands to lose. Filing and litigating therefore depends on the 
potential of the good and not only whether the state feels it has a case to pursue. In essence, 
many more incidences of trade violation occur than are observed in the cases brought before the 
DSB. What occurs at the DSB are those cases over which there are large prospects or 
demonstrations of gains from trade. This factor affects states’ consideration of what to actively 
pursue and what to ignore. 
Conclusion 
In the final analysis, this chapter sought to test whether the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Body mitigates defection between trading partners with varied interests. This question forms part 
of the larger debate in international politics about the efficacy of institutions. In an attempt to 
answer the research question, several instantiations of a formal model are used, each of which 
has the players moving sequentially, both with certainty and uncertainty. Each version has 
Prisoner’s Dilemma-like payoffs and the inclusion of delta, the cost for litigation, which varies 
across the iterations.  
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In order to lay the foundation for analysis, the chapter begins with an outline of the main 
assumptions of Prisoner’s Dilemma. These include the players, their strategic choices and 
payoffs, as well as the Nash Equilibrium that is formed. Part Two then examines how 
information symmetry and sequential moves affect the strategies and outcomes of the game.  
Delta is varied so that there are instances when it is the same, or either state alternately has a 
higher cost. Implicit in these iterations is also the fact that the states deliberate between playing 
free trade and protectionism, using the DSB or avoiding it, and litigating or acquiescing. These 
cases are important because they demonstrate that delta has little effect on the decision to use the 
DSB. This happens even for cases where the affected country pays more. Instead, trade relations 
are straight forward whereby each player is able to see where it is in the game, where the other 
player is and also the consequences of each move. This makes it easy to determine if one party is 
in breach of a WTO provision. The guilty state in turn acknowledges its guilt and accepts 
punitive countermeasures.  
Part Three analyzes how extremely high costs can made the institution irrelevant, or 
susceptible to manipulation from countries that pay less. If for example, both players find the 
cost to go before the DSB too high, they will opt to protectionists and avoid the institution. If 
however, one player has an extremely high cost in relation to the other player, the player with the 
lesser cost is incentivized to be play protectionism. The other player, because of the expensive 
filing costs, will continue to choose free trade and avoid the DSB. If however, the State with the 
higher DSB costs retaliates with protectionism, the other player will take it to the DSB, with the 
only feasible option being to not pursue full scale litigation. This shows that beyond a certain 
limit, high costs will lock countries out of protecting themselves through protectionism, or make 
them suffer at the hands of more capable states if the institution is evoked. 
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There are, however, limitations to these findings. The first is that the model has complete 
and perfect information. In the real world, this does not obtain. Versions of the model with 
asymmetric information may therefore provide information on not just how cost calculations 
affect DSB usage, but inequitable amounts of information as well. Additionally, in some cases, a 
developing country that wins a dispute may be unable to initiate WTO sanctioned 
countermeasures because of inequitable volumes of trade flow. The outcome would be that 
resources are spent filing the dispute, but the complainant loses in the end if it is unable to truly 
singly punish the defector. These possibilities make the decision to litigate a serious matter, 
which many countries pursue, only if they believe the odds of winning and punishing are very 
high. Those that are unable to secure these outcomes may choose to respond outside the DSB, or 
do not act at all.  
In general, however, the employment of these extensive form games with complete and 
perfect information are useful in analyzing the strategies, outcomes and payoffs that are available 
to countries as they alternate between states of free trade and protectionism. If the variations hold 
across cases, they therefore can feature in the debate about non-participatory membership; that 
is, if and under what conditions do institutions matter and especially, what makes states use them 
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CHAPTER V 
TO FILE OR NOT TO FILE? THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT AND ORDINARY 
PORTLAND GREY CEMENT 
Introduction  
Participation in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body is a conundrum. The most capable 
states sometimes do not litigate, or pursue litigation vociferously; while less capable states often 
endure unfair trading practices or wrangle over goods that are critical to their economy. What 
explains this divergence in DSB usage? Moreover, if participation by itself is so strategic and 
methodical, how might we observe and make summations about its absence?  This chapter aims 
to do this by examining four trade disputes that involve Ordinary Portland Grey cement and the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement. These cases are China – Ordinary Portland Grey Cement1 (hereafter 
referred to as China – Cement2), Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland 
Cement from Mexico (hereafter referred to as Guatemala – Cement I), Guatemala – Definitive 
Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (hereafter referred to as 
Guatemala - Cement II), and United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement from Mexico 
(hereafter referred to as United States – Cement3). 
Justification for the Cases Selected 
As at June 2017, 525 disputes have been brought before the WTO.4 Below is an outline 
of the status of these cases. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In all WTO cases, the respondent is listed first in the case name. 
2 The designation, China – Cement is the author’s, not the WTO’s. 
3 The designation, United States – Cement is the author’s, not the WTO’s. 
4 See “Current Status of Disputes.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm 
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Table 5-1: Status of Cases Brought Before the WTO 
Number of Cases Status 
156 In consultations 
28 Panel established, but not yet composed 
21 Panel composed 
0 Panel report circulated 
5 Panel report under appeal 
0 Appellate Body report circulated 
29 Report(s) adopted, no further action needed 
42 Report(s) adopted, with recommendation to 
bring measure(s) into conformity 
89 Implementation notified by respondent 
23 Mutually acceptable solution on 
implementation notified 
7 Compliance proceedings ongoing 
2 Compliance proceedings completed without 
finding on non-compliance 
6 Compliance proceedings completed with 
findings of non-compliance 
Source: “Current Status of Disputes.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm 
 
Specifically in the area of goods, six cases have been filed at the DSB. These are DS60, 
between Guatemala and Mexico; DS156, also between Guatemala and Mexico; DS182 and 191, 
both between Ecuador and Mexico; DS281, between the United States and Mexico, and DS500, 
between South Africa and Pakistan.5 Of these cases, the ones featuring Ecuador and Mexico, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See “Index of Disputes Issues.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm 
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well as South Africa and Pakistan are still in consultations.6 The study therefore examines the 
three cases that were litigated, as well as a similar cement case that did not progress to the DSB, 
to see how they these disputes help to explain non-participatory membership. How then do these 
cases overlap and diverge? 
China – Cement features a trade dispute between China and Jamaica. Jamaica imposed an 
antidumping duty on the importation of Ordinary Portland Grey Cement made in or originating 
from China. China objected to this finding, but the case did not proceed to the WTO.7 In 
Guatemala – Cement I, Mexico complained to the WTO about Guatemala’s imposition of an 
anti-dumping duty on its Portland Grey Cement. Guatemala won on technicalities.8 In the case of 
Guatemala – Cement II, Mexico revisited the antidumping duty that Guatemala levied and won9. 
In the final case, United States – Cement, the United States imposed an antidumping duty on 
cement from Mexico. This case was filed under GATT, NAFTA and later WTO. The countries 
came to a mutually agreed solution whereby the duty was withdrawn and other concessions were 
made10. In all of these cases, the product contested is Ordinary Portland Grey Cement, and the 
WTO provision evoked for reprieve is the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Importantly, however, 
three of the cases end up at the DSB, while one does not. Additionally, of the DSB adjudicated 
cases, one results in victory for the complainant and respondent respectively, while the last one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid 
7 See Appendix I (a) for a full discussion on the facts about this case.  
8 See Appendix I (b) for a full discussion on the facts about this case. See also, “DS60: Guatemala - Anti-Dumping 
Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds60_e.htm   
9 See Appendix I (c) for a full discussion on the facts about this case. See also, “DS156: Guatemala - Definitive 
Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico” 
  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds156_e.htm   
10 See Appendix I (d) for a full discussion on the facts about this case at the WTO. See also, “DS281: United States 
- Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement from Mexico.” 
  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds281_e.htm  
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results in a mutually agreed solution. Three of these cases also feature third parties that calculate 
the extent to which they will participate in the proceedings.  
The dependent variable that this study probes is the choice to litigate at the DSB. This 
includes formally complaining or defending. These cases therefore reflect variation in the 
dependent variable since some disputants take their case to the international forum, while some 
do not. When this is coupled with the controls for type of good contested and the WTO provision 
evoked, it provides ample fodder for a discussion on the factors that may inform non-
participatory membership in the DSB, even when countries have legitimate cases. An important 
consideration for the cases selected is that they also reflect diverse power disparities and the 
outcomes are not ones that such power based dynamics would predict. In the case of Jamaica and 
China, for example, Jamaica accuses its more powerful trading partner of a violation and 
imposes the duty, but China does not retaliate nor pursue litigation though it has the capacity to 
do so. In Guatemala – Cement I, Guatemala believes that its industries are being harmed by 
Mexico’s dumping of cement and imposes an antidumping duty. Mexico, the more powerful 
state, takes Guatemala to the DSB, but Guatemala wins; albeit on technicalities since the 
Appellate Body overturns the ruling of the Panel. In Guatemala – Cement II, Guatemala keeps 
the antidumping duty against Mexican Portland Grey Cement in place and Mexico again takes it 
to the DSB. This time, Mexico wins. In United States – Cement, Mexico takes the United States 
to the DSB and both come up with a solution and then inform the institution. In the Guatemala 
cases, we see a weaker state trying to protect itself with the available WTO provisions, but being 
challenged by a more capable state. The expectation would be that Guatemala would back down, 
but it litigates and wins in one instance and loses in the next. In the case with the United States 
and Mexico, Mexico seeks institutional succour after years of facing this levy. In this instance, 
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with both countries having relatively comparable capabilities, they could have engaged in tit-for-
tat strategies outside of the DSB. They evoke the institution and then decide to settle after years 
of deliberations. These cases, therefore, can provide insight into the decision making behind 
filing or avoidance of the DSB whenever a trade dispute arises. 
The Contested Good: Ordinary Portland Grey Cement 
 Before an assessment can be made of the cases, it is important for there to be a discussion 
of the good that is being contested. Portland cement is the main ingredient in concrete.11 It is 
made from a combination of calcium, silicon, aluminum, iron, and other chemicals.12 Clinker, a 
by-product of the manufacturing process, is also used in construction.13 The American Society 
for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International divides Portland cement into five categories, 
Types I – V. This is based on their concentration of carbon and aluminum, how quickly they 
hydrate and their resistivity to sulphates.14 Type I is used in general construction, II on structures 
that have been exposed to sulphate ions, III for cold weather and rapid construction, IV on large 
structures such as dams, and  V on surfaces that have high sulphate ions exposure.15 “Ordinary 
Portland cement,” or OPC is the term that is used for these types of cement, which is basically 
normal cement. In addition to these categories that are grey in colour, there is also White 
Portland cement, which is used for decorative purposes.16 
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Figure 5-1: 2015 Top Cement Exporting Countries 
 
Source: “Top Cement Exporting Countries.” http://www.worldstopexports.com/top-cement-exporting-countries/  
 
Figure 5-1 illustrates the countries that exported the most cement in 2015. Of this set, 
China had the largest market share which generated US$776.2 million. This constituted 8% of 
the world’s total exported cement.17 Thailand’s global market share was 6.8%, followed by the 
United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Germany with 6.7%, 5.7% and 5.2% respectively.18 Canada’s 
US$367.4 million made up 3.8%, while the United States’ $249.4 million was 2.6%.19 Since 
cement is involved in almost all areas of construction, the expectation is that countries that both 
export and import it will want to ensure that their markets are being protected. Understanding 
why some of these cases were litigated and others not, is therefore a puzzle. 
In order to probe these cases and highlight the factors that promote participation or its 
opposite at the DSB, this chapter will briefly discuss dumping as an unfair trading practice. This 
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will be followed by an examination of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and how it works. After 
this, a discussion will ensue on the rather ambiguous and contentious aspects of the Agreement. 
This is in order to highlight the fact that with sufficient legal capacity and financial resources, 
countries can have reasonable cause to pursue anti-dumping litigations at the DSB. When they 
choose not to, then the reasons for non-participatory membership are instructive. Chapters 6 and 
7 will continue the analysis by examining the four cases from each country’s perspective. This 
will be done by using the independent variables outlined in the literature review. Since this part 
of the study is largely qualitative, the information theory approach as proposed by Drozdova and 
Gaubatz will be used to represent the arguments quantitatively.20 This is in order to succinctly 
tabulate the findings for quick and parsimonious discussions on which variables promote non-
participatory membership in the DSB. 
Dumping as a Trading Strategy 
There are many writings on the ways in which dumping can occur. Generally, however, 
there is consensus that dumping is done to maximize profits in an industry. For scholars 
Matsushita et al., dumping can take place in two main ways. These include sales below cost and 
international price discrimination. Sales below cost is sometimes selected as a firm’s operational 
strategy if there is strong competition in the market. This sometimes results when there is more 
than one company vying for dominance of the product’s market shares.21 The best way to attract 
the buyers would therefore be to lower the prices. One specific way in which sales below cost 
can occur is through forward pricing. Here, early in the product’s life cycle, companies price the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Katya Drozdova and Kurt Taylor Gaubatz. Quantifying the Qualitative: Information Theory for Comparative 
Case Analysis. (London: Sage Publications, 2017). 
21 Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Petros C. Mavroidis and Michael Hahn.  The World Trade 
Organization: Law, Practice and Policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 303. 
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goods below cost in order to maximize profitability over the full life cycle.22  This strategy can 
be used to explain the market strategies of many firms from when they enter the market to their 
behavioural patterns over the long term. In regards to the trade disputes at hand, this can be used 
to describe, for example, the entrance of Chinese cement into the Jamaican markets in a bid to 
compete with the domestic producer, Caribbean Cement Company Limited (CCCL). The 
allegation was that the entrance price of the Chinese good was far below that of the Jamaican 
competitor. With adequate market shares, this product could gain profitability in the long run. 
Sales below cost can also occur through predatory pricing. This, according to Matsushita 
et al., is done to gain monopolistic control of the market.23 Weisman opines that traditionally, 
predatory pricing works in two stages. In the first instance, the product is priced below some 
measure of economic cost by the predator to drive out the prey from the market. In the second 
stage, prices are readjusted in the absence of the competitor to recover the losses incurred.24 
Whatever the strategy, for Jamaica, Guatemala and the United States, all felt that their trading 
partners were selling their cement with a view of creating a niche market in their domestic 
territories. This had the potential to drive their domestic producers out of business. 
Dumping can also be categorized as a form of international price discrimination. This 
occurs when a company “sells the same product at different prices in different areas or to 
different customers.”25 In some cases, international price discrimination happens when the 
markets of the exporting country and the importing country are not closely linked.26 “High 
tariffs, quotas, private restrictive business practices such as exclusive dealing arrangements, tie-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid 
23 Ibid 
24 Dennis L. Weisman. “Notes on Predatory Pricing.” 2006. United States of America: Kansas State University. 
http://www.k-state.edu/economics/staff/websites/weisman/courses/815/homework/Notes%20On%20Predation.pdf  
25 Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Petros C. Mavroidis and Michael Hahn.  The World Trade 
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in contracts, boycotts or other forms of anti-competitive practices” are some of the ways in 
which this can occur.27 Variation in the elasticity of demand between countries can also give rise 
to international price discrimination.28 Brander and Krugman support this thinking by arguing 
that dumping arises for systematic reasons associated with oligopolistic behaviour. They posit 
that, “if a profit maximizing firm believes it faces a higher elasticity of demand abroad than at 
home, and it is able to discriminate between foreign and domestic markets, then it will charge a 
lower price abroad than at home.”29  If the international price discrimination theory were to be 
validated by the facts of the cases at hand, then it would mean that China and Mexico were able 
to distinguish between their foreign and domestic markets and as a result, varied their cement 
prices for local and international consumers. All of the affected countries responded with an 
investigation and later imposition of antidumping duties. It is therefore useful to now outline 
why dumping is seen as an unfair trading practice at the WTO and the provisions that are in 
place for Members to respond if they feel they have been violated.  
Dumping at the World Trade Organization 
Dumping, broadly speaking, is a violation of WTO principles. Members of the WTO can 
therefore take steps to address this dumping if it can be determined to have occurred and is 
harming, or threatening to harm a domestic industry, or the establishment of one.30 But, was it 
always like this? When did dumping become a problem? Antidumping regulation has its origin 
in Canada in 1904 as it tried to protect its steel industry.31 Soon after Canada’s antidumping laws 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid 
28 Ibid 
29 James Brander and Paul Krugman. 1983. A ‘Reciprocal Dumping’ Model of International Trade. Journal of 
International Economics, Volume 15, p. 313. 
30 See the WTO Analytical Index: The Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/anti_dumping_e.htm  
31 J. M. Finger and Nellie T. Artis. Antidumping: How It Works and Who Gets Hurt. (Michigan: University of 
Michigan Press, 1993), 15. 
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were instituted, Australia, and New Zealand also passed theirs. By 1921, other countries 
including the United States, France, Great Britain and most of the British Commonwealth had 
dumping laws in place.32 Prior to this time, dumping was not a new issue.  The implementation 
of antidumping laws by Canada, however, was an innovative way of doing things, and that this 
provided the political will for many other countries to follow.33 
In the first two decades of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is 
the predecessor of the WTO, dumping was a minor issue.34 This changed in 1958 when 
antidumping laws were effectuated in thirty-seven GATT countries.35 Scholars like Jackson 
contend that it is the Article VI provision that was made for dumping cases when the GATT was 
being negotiated in 1947 that opened the door to antidumping litigations.36 By the time of the 
Kennedy Round of 1964 - 1967, antidumping became a significant issue.37 From then onwards, 
the antidumping provisions have been negotiated, renegotiated and modified to Codes, and 
finally to the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI, or as it is more commonly called, 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.38 The high level of interest that has been placed on antidumping 
regulation under the GATT / WTO shows that it is a controversial, yet widely used mechanism 
to combat unfair trade39. The use of this procedure by developing countries40,41 also shows that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid, 16. 
33 Ibid, 16 -17. 
34 Ibid, 25. 
35 Examples include Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, India and Sri Lanka, Canada, New Zealand and France. 
36 John Jackson. The World Trade System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations. 2nd ed. (Boston: 
The MIT Press, 1997), 225. 
37 See for example, John Jackson. The World Trade System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations. 
2nd ed. (Boston: The MIT Press, 1997), 226 and J. Michael Finger and Nellie T. Artis. Antidumping: How It Works 
and Who Gets Hurt. (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 26. 
38 See for example, “Anti-Dumping: Technical Information.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm 
39 Vandenbussche and Zanardi for instance, write that between 1980 and 2003, the number of countries with an 
Anti-Dumping Law increased from thirty six to ninety seven. See “What Explains the Proliferation of Antidumping 
Laws?” Core Discussion Paper 2007/66. Universite Catholique de Lovain and Tilburg University and CentER.  
40 For example, Finger and Zlate argue that since the Uruguay Round, the trade remedies have been increasingly 
used by developing countries more than developed ones. See “WTO Rules that Allow New Trade Restrictions: The 
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this is a provision that many countries can afford and one that they feel offers them a level of 
protection from predatory market practices. Consequently, the focus of this study is on dyadic 
relationships and not on country type generally. 
According to Hoekman, “GATT principles apply only insofar as the option is invoked.” 
The implication of this statement is that whereas the GATT / WTO provides the regulatory 
framework for world trade governance, the onus is on the individual countries to become 
cognizant of these provisions, skilled in understanding them and applying them correctly in the 
event of a trade violation. In the cases at hand, it is the invocation of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement that gives us some indication of an ongoing trade dispute. This does not mean that 
countries that do not invoke it have no grievances. Indeed, the non-invocation of these principles, 
especially at the international level, is the fundamental puzzle of this research. Since 
antidumping is a trade remedy that can be instituted domestically, its usage highlights some 
measures that an affected country uses to protect itself. The extent to which it is contested and 
exacerbates to a formal dispute at the DSB is therefore a quantifiable assessment of participation 
in the DSB. Examining what happens domestically and the extent to which it is pursued therefore 
provides insight into the strategic use of the DSB generally, and non-participatory membership 
specifically. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Public Interest is a Bastard Child.” UN Millennium Project Task Force on Trade. 
http://fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/acit/TopicsDocuments/Finger030421.pdf  
41 Examples of the use of antidumping measures by developing countries include Trinidad and Tobago which at 
June 30, 2010 had measures imposed against air conditioning equipment from China and Portland Grey Cement 
from Thailand; South Africa, which at June 30, 2010 had imposed measures against imports from Brazil, China, 
France, Germany, India, Korea, Malaysia, Sweden, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and United 
States; and Malaysia, which at June 30, 2016, had measures against imports from China, Indonesia, Korea, Chinese 
Taipei, Thailand and Viet Nam. See “Semi-Annual Reports under Article 16.4 of the Agreement - Trinidad and 
Tobago.” G/ADP/N/202/TTO. 9 July 2010. World Trade Organization, “Semi-Annual Reports under Article 16.4 of 
the Agreement - South Africa.” G/ADP/N/202/ZAF. 12 July 2010. World Trade Organization “Semi-Annual 
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The Anti-Dumping Agreement and Its Ambiguities 
The WTO provides guidelines on how member countries can legally respond to dumping. 
Article VI of the GATT and the Anti-Dumping Agreement are therefore the benchmarks for how 
affected members should proceed.42 Without these stipulations in place, antidumping duties 
would contravene the fundamental GATT principles of non-discrimination43 and tariff 
binding.44,45All WTO Members are required to notify the Anti-Dumping Committee about any 
new and existing procedures that relate to their anti-dumping investigations or reviews. This is in 
pursuance to Article 18.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as well as a Committee decision that 
was made in February 1995.46 Members that have no legislation or regulations in place are also 
expected to report that to the Committee.47 These reports are usually made through semi-annual 
reports as stipulated by Article 16.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
In accordance with Article 17 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), 
antidumping disputes can be brought before the DSB where they are “subject to binding dispute 
settlement.”48 Here, Members have the opportunity contest preliminary and definitive anti-
dumping duties that are imposed, as well as compliance with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42See “Understanding the WTO: The Agreements. Anti-dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, etc.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm  and “Anti-Dumping: Technical Information.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm 
43 The principle of nondiscrimination means that WTO members should equally accord most-favoured-nation (MFN 
status) to all its trading partners. There should also be no discrimination between a country’s products, services or 
nationals. These should all be given what the WTO calls, “national treatment.” See Understanding the WTO: 
Principles of the Trading System. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm#bind 
44 The principle of “binding” a commitment refers to the ceilings on customs tariff rates that countries agree to for 
their goods and services. The WTO reports that in many developing countries, tax imports are usually lower than the 
bound rates. In developed countries, however, tax imports are usually applied at the same rate as the bound 
commitments. The bound rates can also be changed after negotiations with trading partners, some of whom usually 
request compensation for trade losses. See Understanding the WTO: Principles of the Trading System. 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm#bind 
45 “Understanding the WTO: The Agreements. Anti-dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, etc.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm 
46 “Report (2016) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices.” G/L/1158. G/ADP/23. 1 November 2016. World 
Trade Organization.  
47 Ibid 
48 “Anti-Dumping: Technical Information.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm 
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Since the WTO allows for national governments to interpret these provisions and institute laws 
accordingly, anti-dumping trade disputes may also include reviews of how Members have 
applied these measures on their trading partners.49 The WTO reports that there has been a spike 
in the number of anti-dumping measures that are being used. For example, in the April 27, 2017 
WTO’s Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Japan highlighted the high number of new anti-
dumping investigations for 2014 and 2015, zoning in on the fact that the first half of 2016 
featured 154 new investigations.50 This, Japan attributed to countries’ response to overcapacity in 
steel and other sectors from emerging market producers.51 The Committee corroborated this 
assertion by revealing in its November 1, 2016 report that between mid-2015 and 2016, the new 
anti-dumping investigations reached 267, and were initiated by 45 WTO countries.52 Of this 
number, India topped the list with 66, followed by the United States with 51, Pakistan with 21 
and Australia with 18.53 For the same period, 151 definitive anti-dumping duties were levied. 
Here, the top users were India, the United States, Mexico and the European Union, with 38, 19, 
15 and 10 measures respectively.54 
The increase in anti-dumping investigations and the fact that it is already the most 
frequently used trade remedy necessitate a discussion on some of the often contested aspects of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Scholars like Bown, for instance, decry its prevalence and misuse 
by countries.55 This section, however, concentrates on attempts to correctly use the Agreement, 
and highlights how its complexity and ambiguity can frustrate WTO Members that seek 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid 
50 Anti-Dumping: WTO Members Exchange Views on Rise in Anti-Dumping Actions.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/anti_10may17_e.htm 
51 Ibid 
52 Ibid. See also, “Report (2016) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices.” G/L/1158. G/ADP/23. 1 November 
2016. World Trade Organization.  
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 
55 Chad P. Bown. “Antidumping Against the Backdrop of Disputes in the GATT/WTO System.” Journal of Economic 
Literature. 2002. No. F13. http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/papers/ad_theory.pdf  
 
	  
	   	  
116 
recourse. The chapter therefore analyzes the provisions on like products, determination of 
dumping, material injury, causation and domestic industry. This will demonstrate how the 
abstruse nature of the Agreement can promote trade disputes, and consequently, why those 
countries that are more adroit with these provisions may be more frequent litigants than those 
that are not. By doing this, the study turns attention to how the specific Agreement for reprieve 
can inhibit participation in the DSB and not just the WTO guidelines for dispute settlement 
generally. 
Like Products: How Alike Should They Be? 
Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement stipulates that: 
a product is to be considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of 
another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported 
from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of 
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.56 
The requirement, however, is that countries must first determine what a like product is 
under the chapeau of the Agreement. This is clarified by Article 2.6 which states that: 
Throughout this Agreement the term "like product" ("produit similaire") shall be 
interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product 
under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although 
not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under 
consideration.57 
Pursuant to Article 2.6, a like product is firstly distinguishable by the fact that it is “alike 
in all respects to the product under consideration.” This would mean that when the alleged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 The Legal Texts. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  (Geneva: The World 
Trade Organization Secretariat, 2002), 147. 
57 Ibid, 150. 
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product is being compared with the one from the supposedly affected domestic industry, then 
every possible feature that would be used as criterion should consistently reflect the same level 
of similarity. This requirement, prima facie, seems to be a comprehensive one as it speaks to the 
compared product being completely identical to the “product under consideration.” This clause, 
however, is misleading. This is due to the fact that at face value it seems to cover everything that 
should be considered when determining how alike a product should be. Upon examination, 
however, it becomes evident that Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not delineate 
in anyway, the exact aspects that should be assessed when seeking to make a judgment. Does 
this, for example, include size, shape, colour or intended purpose? And if so, what if one of the 
characteristics such as size should be dissimilar, would that in accordance with the provisions of 
the Agreement make it unidentical and therefore not “alike in all respects?” This seemingly very 
broad stipulation therefore needs to be more specific as to what characteristics should be used so 
that determinations of a like product can be replicated when done by external parties. Scholars 
like Matsushita et al. believe that the like product definition in Article 2.6 seems to be designed 
to allow for variation in application and to allow national antidumping authorities to utilize their 
discretion.58 This ambiguity, however, can also be a potential source of conflict since the two 
parties may not agree on the conclusion of likeness.  
Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that in the absence of an identical 
product, a like product can be determined by “another product which, although not alike in all 
respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.”59 
Arguably, the negotiators of this Agreement felt based on their experience with trade laws that 
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the mechanism though stringent, should also be worded to allow for unique circumstances in 
each Member’s domestic industry. This, however, gives rise to other pertinent questions and 
controversies. Does the Article, for instance, suggest by making this allowance, that “being 
identical to” and “having a close resemblance of” can be equated and used interchangeably? 
Moreover, how many characteristics should this other product have that “closely resembles the 
product under consideration?” Should the fact that it says “characteristics” mean that since it is a 
plural word, as long as it has more than one then it has met the standard for being a like product? 
In addition, how does one quantify “closely resembling” and use it as a standard? The provisions 
for determining a like product are therefore ambiguous and can lead to controversial findings 
among Members of the WTO. How then has the WTO/ DSB in its own deliberations determined 
what a like product should be interpreted as in accordance with the stipulations of Article 2.6? 
In US – Lumber V,60 the Panel held that Article 2.6 has to be the premise upon which the 
“like product” under consideration is determined.61  The US Department of Commerce had used 
“narrative description and tariff classification” to define the softwood lumber products.62 The 
decision of the Panel was that this approach by the US Department of Commerce was not 
inconsistent with Article 2.6.63 Significantly, however, the Panel ruled that whereas Article 2.6 is 
the bench mark from which like products are to be determined, it also found that this Article 
“does not provide any guidance on the way in which the “product under investigation” is to be 
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2, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 18 of the Antidumping Agreement were used to determine the case. The measure at issue was US 
final anti-dumping duties. See “DS264: United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from 
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61 “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).” Paragraph 151. 
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found.”64 This ruling by the Panel reveals another issue with Article 2.6 and that is, its failure to 
express to Members of the WTO, how “the product under consideration” is to be found. Since 
this product is the one that is to be compared with the “like product,” then it points to the fact 
that other provisions within the WTO, if they exist, will have to be identified as based on the 
communication from the Panel, no guidance could be found within the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement that speaks to it. Generally, however, in addition to the precedent set in US – Lumber 
V and countries can also use the judgments of EC- Salmon (Norway)65 and EC – Fasteners 
(China)66 to help them determine if they have a “like product” to compare with the “product 
under investigation.” Given the ambiguities highlighted in Article 2.6, the onus is therefore on 
national governments to be systematic and transparent in their application of this Article, and to 
bring supporting evidence when challenged. Complainants, on the other hand, will also need to 
be vigilant and meticulous when articulating their positions before the DSB. Importantly, the 
level of complexity involved in determining a like product may simply deter some countries 
from using the DSB. 
Article 2.1 to 2.5 outline how dumping is to be determined. This section, however, will 
focus on the determination of the normal value and how such relates to finding the export price 
and making a “fair comparison” between them. All of these technical stipulations can lead to 
variation in country findings, and consequently, legal wrangling at the DSB. 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).” Paragraph 151. 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/anti_dumping_01_e.htm#general 
65 “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).” Paragraph 152. 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/anti_dumping_01_e.htm#general 
66 In this case, the Panel rejected the reasoning that in accordance with Articles 2.1 and 2.6, only products that are 
“like” as outlined in Article 2.6 should be included in defining the product under consideration. In the Panel’s view, 
the purpose of Article 2.6 is to define a “like product” within the context of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and not to 
lead to the problematic nuanced treatment of different categories of the same product as potentially separate like 
products. See “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
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The normal value is conceived of as, “the price of the product at issue, in the ordinary 
course of trade, when destined for consumption in the exporting country market.”67  Countries 
must therefore determine whether sales are made “in the ordinary course of trade,”68 or to use 
other calculations if there are insufficient volumes of sales.69 The framers of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement recognized, however, that it may not be possible to determine the normal value of the 
product, especially when there are no sales in the domestic market. Some alternative methods are 
provided to circumvent this problem.70 For example, Members may use “the price at which the 
product is sold to a third country,” or the product’s “constructed value,” which includes an 
evaluation of production costs, expenses relating to the selling, general and administrative 
procedures, as well as the profits.71 In situations where the product comes from an intermediate 
country and not where the product is manufactured, countries should use the price of the product 
in the country of origin to calculate the normal value and not the exporting country’s price.72 
Additionally, since non-market economies make it difficult for an assessment to made of the 
home market prices compared with the price at which the importing country is being sold the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 “Anti-Dumping: Technical Information.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm 
68 To determine is sales are made “within the ordinary course of trade,” “sales must be made at prices that are below 
per unit fixed and variable costs plus administrative, selling and general costs, they must be made within an 
extended period of time (normally one year, but in no case less than six months), and they must be made in 
substantial quantities.” These sales are considered to be in “substantial quantities if, “(a) the weighted average 
selling price is below the weighted average cost; of (b) 20% of the sales by volume were below cost.” When 
determining the “normal value,” countries may disregard sales that are below cost if “they do not allow for recovery 
of costs within a reasonable period of time.”  Additionally, for those sales that are “above the weighted average cost 
over the period of investigation,” but fall below cost, Members should “allow for recovery of costs within a 
reasonable period of time.” See “Finding the Normal Value.” “Anti-Dumping: Technical Information.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm 
69 The Anti-Dumping Agreement acknowledges the fact that insufficient volumes of sales can prevent an accurate 
comparison between “home market and export prices.” In those cases, market sales in the home market are deemed 
“sufficient if home market sales constitute 5 per cent or more of the export sales in the country conducting the 
investigation, provided that a lower ratio ‘should’ be accepted if the volume of domestic sales nevertheless is ‘of 
sufficient magnitude’ to provide for a fair comparison.” See “Insufficient Volume of Sales.” “Anti-Dumping: 
Technical Information.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm 
70 “Anti-Dumping: Technical Information.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm 
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product, importing countries have broad allowance to determine the normal value of the 
investigated product.73 The many proposed methods to find the normal value make it difficult to 
say definitely what the procedure is. While it is clear that the method used will depend on the 
case at hand, the fact that there are so many alternatives also increases the likelihood that 
affected countries will challenge the particular method that is chosen. What guidance, then, 
might we find in the WTO’s deliberations? 
Article 2.1 outlines four conditions which must be met for sales transactions to be used to 
calculate the normal value.74 These are outlined in the US – Hot-Rolled Steel75 to be: 
1. “The sale must be ‘in the ordinary course of trade’ 
2. Of the ‘like product’ 
3. Destined for consumption in the exporting country 
4. The price must be comparable.”76 
What then does “in the ordinary course of trade” mean as purported by Article 2.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement? There is no definition for this term in the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This 
thinking is supported by the Appellate Body in US — Hot-Rolled Steel. This suggests that the 
provision is limited to national interpretations, thereby creating future obscurity. How then 
should WTO Members treat this deficiency in the Article? In US – Hot-Rolled Steel, the 
definition presented by the US was that generally, “sales are in the ordinary course of trade if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ibid 
74 The Legal Texts. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  (Geneva: The World 
Trade Organization Secretariat, 2002), 147. 
75 The determination for US – Hot-Rolled Steel (DS184), was adopted on August 23, 2001. The complainant was 
Japan and the respondent, the United States of America, with the products at issue being the imports of certain hot – 
rolled steel products from Japan. The articles from the Anti-Dumping Agreement that were used to determine the 
case are articles 2, 3, 6 and 9. The measure at issue was US definitive anti-dumping duties. See “DS184: United 
States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds184_e.htm  
76 “United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan.” WT/DS184/R. 28 
February 2001. Paragraph 7.113. 
 
	  
	   	  
122 
made under conditions and practices that, for a reasonable period of time prior to the date of sale 
of the subject merchandise, have been normal for sales of the foreign like product.”77 Japan, the 
complainant, agreed with this definition and the Appellate expressed its contentment with it, 
based on the purpose of the appeal.78 Based on the premise set by the Appellate Body in this 
case, it can be inferred that whereas the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not outline what “in the 
ordinary course of trade means,” a mutually agreed definition by the complainant and respondent 
does not seem to be a contravention of the anti-dumping provisions. The implication is therefore 
that once litigants use a definition that reflects the spirit and practice of the WTO, they may not 
take their dispute to the international level. If, however, they fail to agree on the interpretation 
and application of this stipulation, challenges may be made at the multilateral level. 
Determining the Dumping Margin 
Determining the dumping margin is another point of contention when using the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. To calculate the dumping margin, the Agreement provides that “a fair 
comparison” should be made between the export price and the normal value.79 Members, 
however, sometimes find this provision abstruse. In Egypt – Steel Rebar80, the Panel held that, 
“Article 2.4 in its entirety, including its burden of proof requirement, has to do with ensuring a 
fair comparison, through various adjustments as appropriate, of export price and normal value.”81 
This “fairness” is to be judged by considering “the level of trade and timing of sales on both the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).” Paragraph 27. 
78 Ibid 
79 The Legal Texts. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  (Geneva: The World 
Trade Organization Secretariat, 2002), 149. 
80 In Egypt – Steel Rebar (DS211), the complainant was Turkey and the respondent Egypt, with the product at issue 
being steel rebar imported from Turkey.  The measure at issue was Egypt’s definitive antidumping measures. The 
findings were adopted on October 1, 2002 with articles 2, 3, 6 of the Anti – Dumping Agreement used to make a 
determination. See “DS211: Egypt – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds211_e.htm  
81 “Egypt – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey.” WT/DS211/R. 8 August 2002. 
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normal value and export price sides of the dumping margin equation,” and also all the other 
issues that may affect price comparability.82, 83 
Article 2.4 also outlines mechanisms that are available for the conversion of currencies 
for the “fair comparison” to be made and other calculations for determining the dumping margin. 
Following the dictates of Article 2.4, the fair comparison feature seems to be an intricate one. 
The procedures to be implemented are so vast and technical that one wonders if they can be 
manipulated by trade experts to their own advantage. If this is the case, then the expected 
outcome of fairness might not be so readily challenged by respondents to an antidumping 
dispute, who because of the technicalities involved, may be uncertain of how the findings were 
determined but accept them nevertheless.  
Another point that can be raised is that, based on the many procedures that are available, 
it seems almost inevitable that a dumping margin can always be established from the figures that 
are available, thus leading to a dumping final determination. Suffice it to say, however, that even 
with the complicated conditions attached to finding the normal value, the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement provides that a dumping margin can be established by finding both the normal value 
and the export price based on transactions done mainly in the ordinary course of trade. The 
consequence is probable squabbling over what national governments do in pursuance of this 
provision, for trading partners to simply not bother with the dispute settlement process. 
Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has guidelines on how injury should be 
determined within the context of the WTO. This is what Article 3.1 says: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).” Paragraph 80. 
83 One factor that may affect price comparability is a difference in physical characteristics. In Argentina – Ceramic 
Tiles, however, the Panel held that, “due allowance (should be made) in each case on its merit for differences in 
physical characteristics affecting price comparability.” See “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement).” Paragraph 88. 
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A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on 
positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the 
dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market 
for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers 
of such products.84  
There are many emanating issues to be discussed when one closely examines the provisions of 
Article 3.1. The clause requires, for instance, clarification on what exactly ‘injury’ should be 
taken to mean. Footnote 9 of the Article attempts to explain its intentions. It declares: 
Under this Agreement the term “injury” shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to 
mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic 
industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article.85  
Following the dictates of the footnote, injury under the purview of Article 3 can therefore be 
interpreted as: 
1. Material injury to a domestic industry 
2. Threat of material injury to a domestic industry, or 
3. Material retardation of the establishment of such an industry. 
The conditions given seem to give adequate room for an injury determination. This is 
affected by the fact that the type of injury is qualified three times by the use of the adjective, 
“material.” What then should “material” be interpreted as? The first hint that the footnote gives is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 The Legal Texts. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  (Geneva: The World 
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that injury should be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Article.86 Since Article 
3 is the overarching and fundamental stipulation for the determination of injury, it would be 
helpful to ascertain whether the meaning and mention of “material” occurs elsewhere in the 
Article. It does reoccur. No meaning, however, is given for it. Can “tangible” or “significant” 
therefore be used as substitutes? Since the proposition is that the interpretation should be made in 
accordance with the provisions of the Article then it would be useful to examine as contained in 
Article 3, other terms such as “positive evidence,” “objective examination,” “significant 
increase” and “all relevant economic factors” as they when examined, could give an 
understanding of what this “material” determination of injury is. They key point, however, is that 
there is a steep learning curve for new users of this Agreement, and even for regular users, there 
remains multiple sources of vagueness which can precipitate trade disputes. The result is 
therefore apathy or active participation in the DSB, depending on the country’s capability. 
Article 3.1 explicates that a determination of injury should be based on “positive 
evidence,” in accordance with the principles of the GATT Article VI.87  Since the word 
“evidence” is illuminated by the adjective, “positive,” then it stands to reason that this is a 
deliberate inclusion by the Article’s composers so that it has a specific meaning. In Thailand – 
H-Beams,88 the Appellate Body in addressing the scope of “positive evidence” held that since 
“antidumping investigation involves the commercial behaviour of firms,” then the investigating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Czako et al. agree with this reasoning. For them, material injury must be understood within the context of the 
factors listed in Articles 3.4 and 3.7. See Judith Czako, Johann Human and Jorge Miranda. 2003. A Handbook on 
Anti- Dumping Investigations. (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 275. 
87 The Legal Texts. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  (Geneva: The World 
Trade Organization Secretariat, 2002), 150. 
88 In Thailand – H-Beams (DS122), the complainant was Poland and the respondent being Thailand, with the 
product at issue being H-Beams from Poland. The measure at issue was Thailand’s definitive anti-dumping 
determination. The findings were adopted on April 5, 2001, with Articles 2, 3, 5 and 17. 6 of the Anti – Dumping 
Agreement used to determine the outcome of the case. See “DS122: Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, 
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authorities should collect and assess “both confidential and non-confidential information.”89 This 
should include not just those that are “disclosed to, or discernible by the parties to the 
investigation.”90 In the Appellate Body’s estimation, Articles 3.7 provides contextual support for 
this interpretation of Article 3.1.91 Here, Article 3.7 elucidates that a threat of material injury 
must be “based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility.”92 This is 
buttressed by Article 5.2 which outlines that, “an application for initiation of an anti-dumping 
investigation may not be based on simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence.”93 It is 
very important for there to be a distinct explanation for what “positive evidence” should be 
interpreted as, especially in the absence of an explicit definition for “material injury.” This 
therefore sets the stage for an examination of the cases at hand and why some countries did not 
bother to pursue the DSB alternative, while others did.  
Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement stipulates that the determination of injury 
“should involve an objective examination of both (a), the volume of the dumped imports and the 
effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b), the 
consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products.”94 Here the phrase, 
“objective examination” comes to the fore as a matter for consideration in the material injury 
debate. In US – Hot-Rolled Steel, the Appellate Body found that that the term relates specifically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).” Paragraph 185. 
90 Ibid 
91 Ibid, paragraph 186. 
92 The Legal Texts. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  (Geneva: The World 
Trade Organization Secretariat, 2002), 151. See also, “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement 
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).” 
Paragraph 186.  
93 Ibid, 153. “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).” Paragraph 186. 
94 The Legal Texts. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  (Geneva: The World 
Trade Organization Secretariat, 2002), 150. 
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to the investigative process95 and not with the supporting facts used to determine injury.96 
“Objective examination” therefore requires the impartial investigation of the domestic industry 
and how it has been affected by the dumped products. This should be done without bias to any 
party or parties that may have an interest in the investigation.97 The guidelines set forth by the 
Appellate Body in determining “objective examination” are important for all WTO Members of 
the WTO. This, if done well, promotes replicability when calculating material injury. 
Disagreement on the procedures and the extent of objectivity, however, can give rise to trade 
disputes, or dissuade usage based on the level of complexity.  
Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement continues on the premise set by Article 3.1 
by outlining what changes should be analyzed when determining injury vis-a-vis a like product.  
The word “significant” is used repeatedly to refer to the increase in dumped products and also of 
price undercutting by the dumped products.98 How then does the WTO interpret this provision? 
In Thailand – H-Beams, the Panel postulates that “Article 3.2 does not require that the term 
“significant” be used to characterize a subject increase in imports in the determination of an 
investigating authority.”99 This reasoning is based on the Panel’s analysis of the Article which 
states that, “with regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating authorities shall 
consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports…”100 The Panel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 This includes the gathering, inquiry and evaluation of the case. See “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-
Dumping Agreement).” Paragraph 193. 
96 “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).” Paragraph 193. 
97 Ibid 
98 The Legal Texts. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  (Geneva: The World 
Trade Organization Secretariat, 2002), 150 -151. 
99 “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).” Paragraph 224. 
100 The Legal Texts. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  (Geneva: The World 
Trade Organization Secretariat, 2002), 150 -151. See also, “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement).” Paragraph 224. 
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concluded that Article 3.2’s use of the “consider” is not a requirement for there to be “an explicit 
finding or determination by the investigating authorities.”101 Instead, it held that it obliges that in 
order to reach a decision, authorities should “give attention to,” “reckon with,” or “take into 
account” whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports.102 This 
“consideration” however, should be included in the relevant documents.103 
Pursuant to the findings of Thailand – H-Beams, it can be argued that investigating 
authorities are not duly obligated in their anti-dumping proceedings to make a determination 
about whether the increase in dumped imports is significant, as such a characterization is outside 
the scope of the provisions. Instead, in accordance with the stipulations of Article 3.2, 
investigating authorities are required de jure to make a de facto statement in their documentation 
of the case on whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute 
or relative terms. This ruling by the Panel is an important one as it focuses the intention of the 
Article by outlining that where an increase in dumped imports is concerned, the onus is on the 
investigating authorities is to simply make deliberations on whether there has been a significant 
increase of such, and not to make a judgment on the extent of significance. This nuanced 
approach is again, a potential source for conflict between trading partners.  
There are, however, provisions in Article 3.2 for the investigating authorities to make a 
determination on the significance of price undercutting. This view is supported by the Panel in 
EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings.104 This is so, as even with the use of the same word “consider,” the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ibid 
102 “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).” Paragraph 224. 
103 Ibid 
104 In EC- Tube or Pipe Fittings (DS219), the complainant was Brazil and the respondent, European Communities, 
with the product at issue being malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings imported from Brazil. The measure at issue 
was EC Regulation imposing anti-dumping duties on certain imports. The findings were adopted on August 18, 
2003, with articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement used to make final judgments for the case. See 
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Article goes on to say that a comparison should be made with “the price of a like product of the 
importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a 
significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a 
significant degree.”105 What the Panel found, however, was that the scope of Article 3.2 is 
limited in that whereas it “requires the investigating authorities to consider whether price 
undercutting is “significant,” it does not set out any specific requirement relating to the 
calculation of a margin of undercutting, or provide a particular methodology to be followed in 
this consideration.”106 By implication, the non-existence of a specific requirement for the margin 
of undercutting to be calculated means that governments may develop their own standards. This 
may result in differences in practice among Members. In addition, with there being no set 
formula to calculate the margin of undercutting, dubious mechanisms may develop whose 
legality others may not be able to challenge, since the Article in question though recommending 
that one be found, does not delineate how it should be done and what variables should be used. 
Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement gives a very detailed account of how the 
impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry should be examined. It indicates that 
there should be an “evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on 
the state of the industry.”107  EC – Bed Linen108 demonstrates that countries are legally bound to 
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use all the factors outlined in Article 3.4 as the list is mandatory and not illustrative.109 How 
therefore does one reconcile the fact that Article 3.4 closes by saying that, “this list is not 
exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give guidance?”110 The Panel 
addresses this issue by acknowledging that the Article makes allowance for the impact of other 
factors on the domestic industry to be also considered.111 It concludes its judgment in EC – Bed 
Linen, however, by stating that, “each of the fifteen factors listed in Article 3.4 of the AD 
Agreement must be evaluated by the investigating authorities in each case in examining the 
impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned.”112 Investigating authorities, 
however, are expected to both use the prescribed list and to record such in their judgment. This 
point is supported in Mexico – Corn Syrup113 where the Panel purported that, “the consideration 
of each of the Article 3.4 factors must be apparent in the final determination of the investigating 
authority.”114  What this means in particular reference to this research is that Article 3.4 can be a 
source for discontent among disputants, especially if anti-dumping determinations do not include 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
margin. The provisions that were used to make a determination are articles 2, 3, 5, 12 and 15 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement and article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. The findings were adopted on March 12, 2001. 
See “DS141: European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds141_e.htm  
109 “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
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110 The Legal Texts. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  (Geneva: The World 
Trade Organization Secretariat, 2002), 151. 
111 “European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India.” 
WT/DS141/R. 30 October 2000. Paragraph 6.156. See also, “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement).” Paragraph 253. 
112 Ibid, paragraph 6.159. 
113 In Mexico – Corn Syrup, the complainant was the United States of America, the respondent, Mexico, with the 
product at issue being high fructose corn syrup (“HFCS”) from the US. The measure at issue was Mexico’s 
definitive ant-dumping duty measure. The findings were adopted on February 24, 2000 based on the provisions of 
Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. See “DS132: Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of 
High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds132_e.htm  
114 “European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India.” 
WT/DS141/R. 30 October 2000. Paragraph 6.161. See also “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement).” Paragraph 248. 
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all the factors listed in the Article. For the uninitiated, however, these requirements may be 
insurmountable and hence a deterrent to filing at the DSB. 
Ironically, however, the Appellate Body in reporting on EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings 
revealed that there are certain discrepancies in the recommendations of Article 3.4. It found, for 
example, that while it mandates that all “relevant economic factors” should be evaluated for their 
impact on the dumped products, “it does not address the manner in which the results of this 
evaluation are to be set out, nor the type of evidence that may be produced before a panel for the 
purpose of demonstrating that this evaluation was indeed conducted.”115 This means that national 
governments can choose how they set out the results of their evaluation and cannot be compelled 
to present evidence in a particular way before a panel. This gap in the provisions of Article 3.4 
may very well allow countries to not be very thorough in their reports of injury determination, or 
may lead to a variety of documentation based on the many investigating authorities, and 
therefore non-uniformity in the WTO/DSB as a collective. 
The Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that in addition to countries finding that dumping 
is occurring within their domestic territories, they must also establish that this dumping is 
causing or threating to cause “material injury.” Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
speaks to the issue of causation and explains that there should be a demonstration that the 
“dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing 
injury within the meaning of [the] Agreement.”116 What Article 3.5 implies is the fact that 
dumping may be taking place in a domestic industry, but that the same dumping is not causing 
any “material” injury to that same industry. The establishment of causation is therefore very 
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116 The Legal Texts. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  (Geneva: The World 
Trade Organization Secretariat, 2002), 151. 
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important. The Article therefore recommends that all evidence before the authorities should be 
examined in order to demonstrate a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the 
injury to the domestic industry.117 Since it is possible that other factors other than the dumped 
imports may materially injure the domestic industry, Article 3.5 mandates that, “the authorities 
shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are 
injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be 
attributed to the dumped imports.”118  
It should be noted, however, that Article 3.5 does not place a burden on the countries 
involved to find all the other factors that may be causing injury to the domestic industry. This 
view is supported by the findings of the Panel in Thailand – H-Beams where it held that, “known 
factors” would include factors “clearly raised before the investigating authorities by interested 
parties in the course of an AD investigation” and that, “investigating authorities are not required 
to seek out such factors on their own initiative.”119 This information when placed in context 
means that anti-dumping litigations can only be pursued based on the facts that are presented at 
the time of the investigation. Other information, though pertinent to the case, if not submitted at 
that time, cannot be used as supporting arguments. This stipulation requires affected countries to 
be as thorough as possible when determining dumping, but also gives them the opportunity to 
declare that newly available facts were just not known to them at that time.   
For causation to be determined, the impact of “other factors” must be separated from the 
effects of the dumped imports on the domestic industry.120 This point is supported by the 
Appellate Body in US — Hot-Rolled Steel where it acknowledged the practical difficulty of 
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separating and distinguishing “the injurious effects of different causal factors,”121 but reiterated 
the fact that, “Article 3.5 requires investigating authorities to undertake the process of assessing 
appropriately, and separating and distinguishing, the injurious effects of dumped imports from 
those of other known causal factors.”122 This determination by the Appellate Body highlights the 
fact that all other anti-dumping proceedings must show a clear distinction between the injury 
caused by the dumped products on the domestic industry, and the injury caused by other “known 
factors.” Whether this in fact happens is cause for litigation in many countries. 
Threat of Material Injury 
Article 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement outlines how a determination of a threat of 
material injury should be made.  In Egypt — Steel Rebar, the Panel ruled that the text of 
Article 3.7 clearly shows that the central question in a threat of injury investigation is whether 
there will be a “change in circumstances” that would cause the dumping to begin to injure the 
domestic industry.123 This change is contextualized by Article 3.7 to be, that which is “clearly 
foreseen and imminent.”124 The Panel noted, however, that the factors listed in Article 3.7 are 
insufficient in determining the threat of material injury. This is because they deal with issues 
such as “the likelihood of increased imports,” “the effects of imports on future prices and likely 
future demand for imports, and inventories.”125 The Article does not, however, consider how the 
domestic industry is affected by the dumped products.126I n considering the requirements that 
investigating authorities must meet in the determination of a threat of material injury, the Panel 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).” Paragraph 291. 
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on Mexico – Corn Syrup therefore held that other factors other than those set out in Article 3.7 
should be considered. It recommends, for example, that the conditions outlined in Articles 3.1 
and 3.4 be used in conjunction with Article 3.7.127 This, it said would be necessary, in order to 
prove that in the absence of protective action, the dumped exports would wreak further damage 
on the domestic industry.128  
The provisions for the determination of injury all point to the fact that credible and 
tangible evidence must be presented to support the claims brought forward. These, of course, 
must follow a number of prescribed steps. Two things should be noted, however, as this section 
concludes. Firstly, Article 3’s footnote requires that injury should demonstrated by “material 
injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material 
retardation of the establishment of such an industry.”129 The overarching Article 3, however, 
goes on to explain what material injury to a domestic industry and the corresponding threat 
should be interpreted as, albeit without defining the word material, but does not in any way say 
how a determination of  “material retardation of the establishment of such an industry” should be 
made. Secondly, all the stipulated conditions for the determination of dumping are separated by 
the word “or” and not “and.” This is a very important observation as one seeks to examine 
dumping cases that have been concluded, for it could be inferred that the clause requires that just 
one condition must be met and not all. The Panel in its deliberation on in Thailand — H-Beams, 
determined that in guidelines such as Article 3.4, the obligation for the presence of all the factors 
listed is not obviated by the word, “or.”130 This adds to the complexity and obscurity of the Anti-
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Dumping Agreement, and helps to explain the incidences of non-participatory membership in the 
DSB. 
Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement mandates that within the context of the 
GATT/WTO, a domestic industry refers to “the domestic producers as a whole of the like 
products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major 
proportion of the total domestic production of those products.”131 It provides two exceptions, 
however. The first one applies to when producers are related to the exporters or importers,132 and 
secondly, to when the territory under consideration can be “divided into two or more competitive 
markets” and the producers in those markets can be evaluated “as a separate industry.”133All 
determinations of what a “domestic industry” is, however, must be in accordance with Article 
4.1.134 
A close inspection of Article 4.1 shows that the domestic industry is defined in the plural 
with the use of the words, “domestic producers,” or “those of them.” This suggests that pursuant 
to Article 4.1, only plural entities can be examined as the Article does not in any way make 
reference to a single firm. Can this argument, however, hold as a matter of law? In EC – Bed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 The Legal Texts. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  (Geneva: The World 
Trade Organization Secretariat, 2002), 152. 
132 “Related to the exporters or importers” in this instance means that “(a) one of them directly or indirectly controls 
the other; or (b) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; or (c) together they directly or 
indirectly control a third person, provided that there are grounds for believing or suspecting that the effect of the 
relationship is such as to cause the producer concerned to behave differently from non-related producers.” See 
footnote 11 of Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in The Legal Texts. The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  (Geneva: The World Trade Organization Secretariat, 2002), 152. 
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respect to which injury is considered and determined must be the domestic industry defined in accordance with 
Article 4.1.” See “WTO Analytical Index: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).” Paragraph 325. 
 
	  
	   	  
136 
Linen, the Panel acknowledged that the definition of the domestic industry according to Article 
4.1 was in the plural.135 It argued, however, that: 
Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement defines the domestic industry in terms of ‘domestic 
producers’ in the plural. Yet we consider it indisputable that a single domestic producer 
may constitute the domestic industry under the AD Agreement, and that the provisions 
concerning domestic industry under Article 4 continue to apply in such a factual 
situation.136 
The “indisputable” consideration by the Panel that a single domestic producer can be 
taken to embody the concept of the domestic industry is instructive, but not easily discernible 
from the wording of Article 4.1. Since the Articles have legal status and are usually interpreted 
literally, then measures should be put in place to have Article 4.1 reworded to include the fact 
that it can be considered in both a singular and plural sense. Ad interim, however, what this 
ruling has done is that it has a set a premise upon which any investigating authority which 
regards the domestic industry in a plural or singular manner cannot be said to have breached the 
provisions as outlined in Article 4.1. Undoubtedly, though, these stipulations which are open to 
discretion and interpretation can induce non-participation in the DSB. 
The Anti-Dumping Agreement frequently uses qualifying adjectives which themselves 
need to be clarified. One such example is the “collective output of the products” which Article 
4.1 says should constitute “a major proportion of the total domestic proportion of the total 
domestic production of those products…”137  The use of the word “major” in this sense can give 
rise to controversy. This is so as, where as it is usually understood in an abstract manner to mean 
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the most of something, in concrete terms it is still not clear. For example, would two thirds of the 
total domestic production of those products suffice? Would a 75% rating be allowed? What 
should a “major proportion” be taken to mean? In Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties138, 
the question was raised about “whether the phrase “a major proportion” implies that the 
“domestic industry” refers to domestic producers whose collective output constitutes the 
majority, that is, more than 50 per cent, of domestic total production.”139 The Panel held that, “an 
interpretation that defines the domestic industry in terms of domestic producers of an important, 
serious or significant proportion of total domestic production is permissible.”140 This 
determination therefore means that within the provisions of Article 4.1, the word “major” can be 
interchanged with the words “important,” “serious,” or “significant.” This clarification remains 
vague. This is so because these alternative words are qualitative terms that are subjective in their 
use. The Panel therefore in failing to put a quantitative measure to the interpretation of the word 
“major” has arguably left the users of the provision in doubt when executing anti-dumping cases. 
What this means in essence is that achieving consistency with the principles of the WTO is really 
for the legally and economically adroit countries. Those that fail to meet this mark may simply 
endure trade violations, often without being fully cognizant of the recourse that is available. 
Frequent users too, may find that the provisions are ambiguous and that navigating them is often 
confusing and frustrating.  
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Conclusion 
In sum, the imposition of anti-dumping laws continues to be a matter that is subject to 
much debate in the international system. The prevalence of anti-dumping lawsuits in spite of the 
many ambiguities in the WTO’s Anti-Dumping Agreement indicates that many countries still 
find it a very useful mechanism in protecting themselves from unfair trading practices. This 
section has evaluated the Anti-Dumping Agreement by analyzing the provisions on like 
products, determination of dumping, material injury, causation and domestic industry. The other 
Articles, of course, are also important. These, however, are the fundamental and most often 
contested portions of the Agreement. An evaluation of them reveal that the stipulations are often 
obscure, with even determinations from the Panel or Appellate Body doing little to clarify the 
ambiguities. Utilizing the Anti-Dumping Agreement therefore requires competent legal capacity. 
It does not, however, necessarily follow that all countries with strong legal capacity will be 
regular users of this WTO provision. At the same time, though, some legal capacity is the 
minimum threshold to use this mechanism. The strategic calculations of when to use and what to 
contest, are separate considerations. For this chapter, the main point is that the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement itself may be a hindrance to participation in the DSB. Let us now examine the four 
cases to see how legal capacity and other associated costs may have impeded or facilitated 
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CHAPTER VI 
ESTIMATED LEGAL CAPACITY AND ITS EFFECTS ON PARTICIPATION IN THE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY 
Introduction 
The issue of how legal capacity affects the tendency and ability of countries to participate 
in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body is widely studied. In previous studies, many scholars 
used GDP as a proxy or indication of a country’s capability to afford legal capacity.1 Other 
works have examined “capacity” more broadly to mean “the resources available to identify, 
analyze, pursue, and litigate a dispute.”2 These studies, however, do not adequately address legal 
capacity. GDP, for example, may be a good indication of the resources available for litigation, 
but it does not necessarily mean that all WTO Members that can afford this expertise do so. 
Additionally, having legal and technical experts in place does not always mean that they are the 
most trained and skilled. Numbers by themselves, therefore, are just a part of the consideration.  
Busch et al. agree with these postulations. As outlined in Chapter Two, their definition is 
based on survey responses to countries’ “professional staff, bureaucratic organization at home, 
bureaucratic organization in Geneva, experience handling general WTO matters, and 
involvement in WTO litigation.”3 While I find that Busch et al. provide a meticulous and direct 
method of ascertaining legal capacity through their survey, their work is a general assessment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See for example, Chad Bown in “Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties, and 
Free Riders.” The World Bank Economic Review. 2005. Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 287- 310. Here, Bown uses GDP as a 
proxy for a country’s ability to afford legal services. This, he argues, is also a determinant of a country’s willingness 
to be a complainant or third party in a trade dispute. 
2 Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons. “Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: the Selection of Defendants 
in World Trade Organization Disputes.” Journal of Legal Studies. 2005. Volume 34, Number 2: 557-598. Guzman 
and Simmons argue that poorer countries are incapacitated by low “financial, human and institutional resources,” 
and so they will file fewer cases at the WTO. See also, Thomas Sattler and Thomas Bernauer in “Gravitation or 
Discrimination? Determinants of Litigation in the World Trade Organisation.” European Journal of Political 
Research, 2011. 50: 143-167. 
3 Marc L. Busch, Eric Reinhardt and Gregory Shaffer. “Does Legal Capacity Matter? A Survey of WTO Members.” 
World Trade Review, 2009, Volume 8, Number 4, pp. 559.   
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this variable and not as it relates to specific cases. Consequently, legal capacity as measured 
reflects a country’s ability to file and respond to filings broadly speaking, but it does not capture 
particular timelines in the affected country’s trade trajectory and how prepared or underprepared 
it may have been to respond. I concur, however, with their sentiments that DSB experience 
matters. For this chapter, I therefore assess legal capacity by measuring it up to the point of the 
trade disputes’ initiation. Here, initiation is taken to mean when a country formally requests 
consultation for those cases that go to the DSB, or when a national investigating authority begins 
its consideration of the matter for those cases that remain domestic. Since other organizations 
that feature dispute settlement procedures can bolster a country’s legal capacity, I also take into 
consideration concurrent membership in other international and regional dispute resolution 
organizations, as well as membership in WTO negotiation groups.  
As a parallel to Busch et al.’s study, this research also evaluates each Member’s 
experience at the DSB as a complainant, respondent and third party. As a departure, however, 
these are tallied only up to the point of the dispute to determine the country’s level of 
preparedness to file or respond. Additionally, Davis and Blodgett Bermeo also concur that DSB 
experience can predict future tendencies to litigate. They do this by showing that participation in 
the DSB either as a complainant or respondent can help a country overcome the initial challenges 
of using the institution.4 However, whereas Davis and Blodgett Bermeo assess a country’s 
propensity to file and not whether it actually files,5 this study measures actual choices to formally 
complain or respond to the trade disputes that emerge. Davis and Blodgett Bermeo also do not 
evaluate how joining as a third-party can provide learning opportunities for countries to use the 
institution later. Conti’s arguments are also important here. He posits that, “More experienced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Christina L. Davis and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo in “Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/ 
WTO Adjudication.” The Journal of Politics. 2009. Volume 71, Number 3: 1033 – 1049. 
5 Ibid, 1040. 
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complainants tend to achieve settlements, while more experienced respondents tend to refuse 
conciliation.”6 His thinking is also that more experienced litigants are more unlikely to pursue 
cases that will end unfavourably.7 While this study investigates participation primarily, the cases 
have varied outcomes. It is therefore important in evaluating experience to see how the relative 
experience of the disputants affected their choice to litigate and also what resolution they agreed 
to. 
Legal capacity is also assessed by taking into account the involved country’s history of 
using the Anti-Dumping Agreement at the DSB and also domestically. This is because the Anti-
Dumping Agreement is the WTO provision that is evoked in all the four cases that this study 
probes. It is therefore useful to see if when the disputes began, the Members had any history of 
using these provisions. This therefore narrows the assessment of DSB experience to look at a 
state’s history with specific relevant provisions. The WTO provides legal assistance to countries 
through its Advisory Centre on World Trade Organization Law (ACWL). The study therefore 
probes whether these countries availed themselves of this legal aid as a means of bolstering their 
capabilities.  
The type of countries that join a trade dispute as a third-party matters. These nations, with 
their own legal competency, can enhance a case and affect the odds of a country winning or 
losing. The study therefore analyzes the Panel and Appellate Body Reports of each dispute to see 
whether the litigants were supported by third party summations, and how this aligns with the 
outcome of the case. While there is no definite and all-encompassing way to measure legal 
capacity, the intention is to see if these variables differ for the countries in the disputes that are 
examined, and if they produced diverging results as to participation and non-participation in in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Joseph A. Conti. “Learning to Dispute: Repeat Participation, Expertise, and Reputation at the World Trade 
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the DSB. Importantly, they add to the literature on legal capacity measurement by taking the 
focus off GDP and number of personnel and turns it to membership in groups that facilitate the 
building of legal capacity in different, but related forms, and to specific measures of experience 
to coincide with the timing of the disputes. This is not to say, however, that by checking off 
variables for each country that they all have equitable amounts of legal capacity. That is not the 
intention nor focus of this research. Some countries do have more sophisticated and numerically 
abundant sources of legal capacity. This study therefore measures the minimum levels that are 
expected to be in place to litigate at the DSB. How this varies across countries after they meet 
that standard is beyond this study. The emphasis is therefore on ascertaining how countries 
position themselves through membership and experience to meet the demands of DSB 
adjudication. Moreover, since this study is interested in the disconnection between membership 
and participation, these findings can illuminate how membership in legal competency building 
institutions may or may not induce active participation in the DSB.  
As mentioned in Chapter Five, five countries are included in this study. These are China, 
Jamaica, Guatemala, Mexico and the United States. These, however, are examined dyadically 
based on the cases. The cases at hand are China – Cement (initiated by the Jamaica Anti-
Dumping and Subsidies Commission on December 16, 2003) Guatemala – Cement I (initiated by 
Mexico at the DSB on October 17, 1996), Guatemala - Cement II (initiated by Mexico at the 
DSB on January 5, 1999), and United States – Cement (initiated by Mexico at the DSB on 
January 21, 2003). The conditions that precipitate each case are different for each country and 
also vary across cases. For example, the reasons that propelled Mexico to file against Guatemala 
in 1996 are different than the ones that catalyzed litigation in 1999. Hence, while it is the same 
two countries that are being analyzed, the factors that informed filing are different. The study 
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acknowledges these intricacies by looking at each dyad relative to the timing and context of the 
dispute. By doing this, the study probes how countries weigh their legal capacity as a measure of 
their ability to “afford” the dispute settlement process, and consequently, how this calculation 
informs their decision to participate or avoid the DSB when a trade dispute emerges. 
Membership in WTO Negotiation Groups 
China – Cement (December 16, 2003) 
China became a member of the WTO on December 11, 2001.8 It has since joined six 
negotiating groups that advocate collectively in WTO matters. These include Asian developing 
members,9 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC),10 Article XII Members,11 G-
20,12 G-3313 and “W52” sponsors.14,15  These groups negotiate general WTO issues, agriculture, 
intellectual property rights, as well as the market liberalization requirements for China. While the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 “Member Information: China and the WTO.” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm 
9 This has 21 members and was officially announced as a negotiating group on March 27, 2012. Bahrain, Kingdom 
of, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, 
Republic of, Kuwait, the State of, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Macao, China, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of, Singapore, 
Sri Lanka, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and  Viet Nam are the other members. See 
“Groups in the Negotiations.”  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b 
10 This group has 21 members. They include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, 
China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, 
Philippines, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, United States, Viet Nam and the Russian Federation. See “Groups 
in the Negotiations.”  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b  China 
became a member November 12 – 14, 1991. See “Member Economies.” Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. 
http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Economies   
11 These are “countries that negotiated and joined the WTO after 1995.” Since their membership agreements 
required extensive liberalization of their economies, they seek “lesser commitments in the negotiations.” This group 
does not include least-developed countries or the EU members. See “Groups in the Negotiations.”  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b   
12 This group focuses on agriculture and is different from the G-20 group that includes the world’s largest 
economies. Argentina, Bolivia, Plurinational State of, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of and Zimbabwe make up the list of its 23 members. See “Groups in the 
Negotiations.”  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b   
13 This is a 47 member group that is also called, “Friends of Special Products” in agriculture.  See “Groups in the 
Negotiations.”  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b   
14 This group has a membership of 109 members. It is interested in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS). See “Groups in the Negotiations.”  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b   
15 “Member Information: China and the WTO.” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm 
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WTO does not give a date for China’s membership in all of these organizations, it was at least a 
member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum before acceding to the WTO. This 
means that upon WTO membership, it would at least have some negotiation history in other 
organizations. 
Jamaica is the other party to the China - Cement dispute. It joined the WTO on March 9, 
1995.16 Prior to this, it was a member of the GATT since December 31, 1963.17 It therefore has 
had a much longer history in the WTO than China, though China has surpassed it in terms of 
litigation activity. In terms of WTO negotiation groups, Jamaica is a member of the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group;18 G-90;19 small, vulnerable economies (SVEs);20 and G-
33.21 While there are power differences between Jamaica and China, both are members of G-33. 
The variation in development between these countries highlights a problematic issue whereby the 
WTO does not classify countries, but instead, allows them upon accession to state what their 
status is.22 Suffice it to say, however, that the members of each group have shared interests and 
have benefited from participation in this group. In assessing legal capacity building in these 
groups, Jamaica and China would therefore have opportunities to become more familiar with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 “Member Information: Jamaica and the WTO.”  
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/jamaica_e.htm 
17 Ibid 
18 This group deals with agricultural preferences in the EU. It comprises 62 WTO Members, 8 WTO observers, and 
9 non-WTO Members and observers. See “Groups in the Negotiations.”  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b   
19 This groups deals with general WTO issues. It is made up of the African Group, ACP and least-developed 
countries. “Groups in the Negotiations.”  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b   
20 This group focuses on “flexibilities and enhanced special and differential treatment for small, vulnerable 
economies in the negotiations.” Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Plurinational State of, Cuba, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mauritania, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Samoa, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Tonga and Trinidad and Tobago are its members. Bahamas has observer status. See 
“Groups in the Negotiations.”  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b 
21 “Member Information: Jamaica and the WTO.”  
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/jamaica_e.htm 
22 “Who are the Developing Countries in the WTO?” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm     
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WTO provisions that are specific to their interests in these areas. This is necessary if they are to 
litigate around any of these issues later on. 
Guatemala – Cement I and II (October 17, 1996 and January 5, 1999) 
Guatemala acceded to the WTO on July 21, 1995.23 It also had membership in the GATT, 
dating back to October 10, 1991.24 It has since then become party to six negotiation groups. 
These include small, vulnerable economies (SVEs); Cairns group;25 Tropical products;26 G-20; 
G-33; and Joint proposal (in intellectual property).27 Mexico also has a history of involvement in 
WTO negotiation groups. Its accession to the WTO occurred on January 1, 1995 when the 
institution came into existence.28 Mexico, however, had been a contracting party to the GATT 
since August 24, 1986.29 Mexico’s involvement in negotiation groups include the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC); the G-20 (that focuses on agriculture); Friends of A-D 
Negotiations (FANs);30 and the Joint proposal.31 In this sense, Mexico has had a longer history in 
both the GATT and WTO than Guatemala. Since membership, however, both countries have 
availed themselves of the forums for discussing their interests with other countries. This can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 “Member Information: Guatemala and the WTO.”  
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/guatemala_e.htm      
24 Ibid 
25 This is a group of countries that export agriculture. They lobby for increased trade liberalization in this area. 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay and Viet Nam are its members. See 
“Groups in the Negotiations.”  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b 
26 This is a “coalition of developing countries seeking greater market access for tropical products.” Its members are 
Bolivia, Plurinational State of, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru. See 
“Groups in the Negotiations.”  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b 
27 This is a group of countries that is proposing a voluntary TRIPS GI Register. Its members are Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, 
Japan, Korea, Republic of, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, South Africa, Chinese Taipei and the 
United States. See “Groups in the Negotiations.”  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b 
28 “Member Information: Mexico and the WTO.” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/mexico_e.htm 
29 Ibid 
30 This is a “coalition seeking more disciplines on the use of anti-dumping measures.” Its members are Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, Israel, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, 
Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand and Turkey. See “Groups in the Negotiations.”  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b 
31 “Member Information: Mexico and the WTO.” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/mexico_e.htm 
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promote cohesion and sharing of legal capacity since countries negotiate collectively in these 
groups.32 
United States – Cement (January 31, 2003) 
The United States and Mexico are the parties involved in the United States – Cement 
case. Since the WTO does not report any Mexican withdrawal from the negotiation groups that it 
was involved in at the time of the Guatemalan cement disputes, this section will only outline the 
groups that the Unites States has been involved in. The United States is one of the founding 
figures of the organized world trading system. It became a member of the GATT on January 1, 
1948, and translated this to WTO membership on January 1, 1995.33 These include the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC); Friends of Ambition (NAMA)34; Friends of Fish 
(FoFs)35; and Joint proposal.36  
The types of negotiation groups that the countries are in overlap as well as diverge. They 
do, however, represent participants’ core interests. Working with different countries on specific 
issues can increase legal capacity since negotiations require ample knowledge of the WTO’s 
provisions in a bid to advocate for change. Importantly, these groups are indicative of key 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See “Groups in the Negotiations.”  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b 
33 “Member Information: United States of America and the WTO.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/usa_e.htm 
34 This is group that wants to “maximize tariff reductions and achieve real market access in [their] non-agricultural 
market access (NAMA) negotiations. Members include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Union (formerly EC), Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. See 
“Groups in the Negotiations.”  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b 
35 This is an informal 11 member group that works to significantly reduce the subsidies for fisheries. Its members 
are Argentina, Australia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru and the United 
States. See “Groups in the Negotiations.”  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm#grp002b 
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economic generators in the individual countries, and these goods are often the sources of 
disputes that may escalate to the DSB.  
 
Table 6-1: Summary of Membership in WTO Negotiation Groups 
Country WTO Negotiation Group 
 
China Asian developing members; Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC); 
Article XII Members; G-20 (that focuses on 
agriculture); G-33; and “W52” sponsors. 
Jamaica African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group; 
G-90; small, vulnerable economies (SVEs); 
and G-33. 
Guatemala Small, vulnerable economies (SVEs); Cairns 
group; Tropical products; G-20 (agriculture); 
G-33; and Joint proposal (in intellectual 
property) 
Mexico Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum 
(APEC); the G-20 (agriculture); Friends of A-
D Negotiations (FANs); and the Joint 
proposal. 
United States Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum 
(APEC); Friends of Ambition (NAMA); 
Friends of Fish (FoFs); and Joint proposal. 
 
 
Membership in Other International Dispute Resolution Organizations 
Countries can supplement their legal capacity through membership and participation in 
other international dispute settlement institutions other than the WTO. On a comparative level, 
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there are two other courts that are of similar magnitude and focus on inter-state disputes. These 
are the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS).37 It is therefore useful to see if the disputants in the cases under examination also have 
involvement in these courts. 
The International Court of Justice came into being in June 1945 through the Charter of 
the United Nations (UN).38 It is the UN’s main judicial organ and aims “to settle, in accordance 
with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on 
legal questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies.”39 
The Court hears “contentious cases,” which are inter-state legal disputes that the affected states 
submit to it; and “advisory proceedings,” which are requests from the United Nations and 
specialized agencies to provide its opinion on legal questions.40 The Court mandates, however, 
that for contentious cases, only “States Members of the United Nations and other States which 
have become parties to the Statute of the Court or which have accepted its jurisdiction under 
certain conditions may be parties.”41 Additionally, the Court will only hear these disputes if the 
affected states have accepted its jurisdiction.42 States can do this through at least one of the 
following options: 
1. “By entering into a special agreement to submit the dispute to the Court; 
2. By virtue of a jurisdictional clause, i.e., typically, when they are parties to a treaty 
containing a provision whereby, in the event of a dispute of a given type or disagreement 
over the interpretation or application of the treaty, one of them may refer the dispute to 
the Court; 
3. Through the reciprocal effect of declarations made by them under the Statute whereby 
each has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory in the event of a dispute 
with another State having made a similar declaration. A number of these declarations, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See Sean D. Murphy’s chapter, “International Judicial Bodies for Resolving Disputes Between States” in Oxford 
Handbook on International Adjudication. Cesare Romano et al. eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).  
38 “The Court.” International Court of Justice. http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1 
39 Ibid 
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which must be deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General, contain reservations 
excluding certain categories of dispute.”43 
All “Member States of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Court's Statute.”44 
China, Jamaica, Guatemala, Mexico and the United States have therefore by virtue of their 
membership in the United Nations, agreed to become parties to the Court’s Statute.45 All of these 
memberships predate their WTO disputes.46 In terms of contentious cases, “Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America)” is an example. In this instance, the 
Court found that “the United States of America [had] breached its obligations to Mr. Avena and 
50 other Mexican nationals and to Mexico under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations.”47 This therefore is an example of Mexico and the United States litigating in another 
forum, which points to legal capacity in other multilateral organizations. 
Although Jamaica has never had a contested case before the ICJ, its jurist, Patrick 
Robinson, was elected to a nine-year term at the Court, beginning in February 2015. He is the 
only Jamaican and second Caribbean national to have this appointment in the history of the 
Court.48 China has also had judges elected to the Court,49 while in 1955, the Court ruled against 
Liechtenstein in its case that it brought against Guatemala.50 All of these countries therefore have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ibid 
44 “Basic Documents.” International Court of Justice. http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4  
45 One important distinction is the fact that China has not submitted an ICJ jurisdiction declaration. See “CIA World 
Factbook: China.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html  
46 China joined the UN on October 24, 1945; Guatemala on November 21, 1945, Jamaica on September 18, 1962; 
Mexico on November 7, 1945 and the United States on October 24, 1945. See “Member States.” United Nations. 
http://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html    
47 “Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America)” Press Release 2004/16. 31 March 
2004. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=605&code=mus&p1=3&p2=3&p3=6& 
48 “Election of Judge Robinson to ICJ a Proud Moment for all Jamaicans.” The Jamaica Observer. 18 November 
2014. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/editorial/Election-of-Judge-Robinson-to-ICJ-a-proud-moment-for-all-
Jamaicans_17970036 
49 For example, on November 10, 2011, the United Nations General Assembly and Security reelected Chinese judge 
Xue Hanquin to the ICJ for a nine year term starting on February 6, 2012. See “United Nations General Assembly 
and Security Council Elect Four Members of the Court.” International Court of Justice. Press Release. Unofficial. 
No. 2011/34. 11 November 2011. http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/9/16769.pdf  
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some involvement with the Court, which though varied, provides a multilateral forum to develop 
and strengthen legal capacity.  
 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is the next international dispute 
settlement organization that has a similar size and authority to the WTO. It was established by 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It therefore adjudicates “disputes arising 
out of the interpretation and application of the Convention.”51 It was opened for signature in 
Montego Bay, Jamaica on December 10, 1982 and came into force on November 16, 1994.52 The 
Tribunal is available to “States and international organizations which are parties to the 
Convention.”53 State enterprises and private entities may also use the Tribunal as long as the 
cases are submitted in pursuance to its Statute, article 20.54  
Notably, the United States has not ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea.55 In the 
case of Jamaica, not only has it ratified the treaty, but it also serves as the headquarters for the 
International Seabed Authority.56 Evidence of participation by China and Mexico include their 
written statements in Case No. 17,57 and for Guatemala, its attendance at the Ninth Regional Law 
of the Sea Workshop in Mexico City.58 Assessing legal capacity here is two-fold. On the one 
hand, it can be argued that Jamaica, Guatemala and Mexico have used their membership in this 
organization to better understand their rights and responsibilities under the Law of the Sea 
Convention. Ironically, it is the United States’ understanding of the legal ramifications of signing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




55 Goodlander, Maggie. “Is the United States Ready to Approve the Law of the Sea Treaty?” Council on Foreign 
Relations. 19 July 2007.  https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/united-states-ready-approve-law-sea-treaty  
56 Ibid 
57 “Case No. 17.” International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. https://www.itlos.org/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-
17/  
58 “Ninth Regional Law of the Sea Workshop Held in Mexico City.” International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. 
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on to this Convention and especially how its industries may be affected why it has stayed 
outside. In this sense, participating in an institution can increase legal capacity, but 
understanding the issues at stake (through legal competencies) can make some countries avoid 
membership.  
 
Table 6-2: Summary of Membership in International Dispute Settlement 
Organizations at the Time of the Dispute 
Country International Court of 
Justice 
International Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 
China Yes Yes 
Jamaica Yes Yes 
Guatemala Yes Yes 
Mexico Yes Yes 
United States Yes No 
 
 
At the time of the respective disputes, most of the affected countries were involved in at 
least one regional dispute resolution organization. Prominently, the United States and Mexico 
have a history in the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), dating back to January 1, 
1994,59 and have recourse there for trade violations.60 In regards to Guatemala, it is an original 
signatory to the Central American Common Market (CACM), which was effectuated on June 3, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions. (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 122. 
60 Since 1994, Mexico and the United States have litigated at least twenty cases in NAFTA, contesting products such 
as Oil country tubular goods, porcelain-on-steel cookware, circular welded non-alloy steel pipe and tube, fresh cut 
flowers and Gray Portland cement and cement clinker. See “North America Free Trade Agreement |NAFTA.” 
Integrated Database of Trade Disputes for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
https://idatd.cepal.org/tlcan.htm?perform=buscar   
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1961.61 Other members include El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Panama and 
Belize have observer status.62 Guatemala has no active litigation in CACM prior to 2003. Since 
that time, however, it has sought reprieve against El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica for 
products including galvanized lamina, steel pipe, dairy products and drinks.63 Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica and El Salvador have in turn sued it because of grievances with bovine meat and dairy 
products, meat, transport service, dairy and drinks.64 Guatemala has therefore maintained 
membership in this regional dispute settlement body, but did not seek any reprieve prior to its 
cement disputes. This does not mean, however, that Guatemala did not use its inactive years to 
gather information on how it might use the institution if the need arises. 
Jamaica also has a history of membership in regional dispute settlement organizations. It 
has, for example, been a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), since August 1, 
1973.65 It is also an integral member of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)66, 
as well as the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), which replaced the United Kingdom’s Privy 
Council as the final court of appeal for the country / former British colonies.67 The CCJ’s 
Agreement was signed in 2001, but it began operations in 2005.68 What this means in strict terms 
is that at the point of the China – Cement dispute in 2003, the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council was Jamaica’s highest appellate court and not the regional CCJ.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See  “Central American Common Market (CACM)” http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Ca-
Clo/Central-American-Common-Market-CACM.html  
62 Ibid 
63 “Central American Common Market |CACM.” Integrated Database of Trade Disputes for Latin America and the 
Caribbean. https://idatd.cepal.org/mcca.htm?perform=buscar  
64 Ibid 
65 “Jamaica.” http://caricom.org/about-caricom/who-we-are/our-governance/heads-of-government/jamaica  
66 The CSME seeks to promote economic integration across the region. Some of its areas of focus include “anti-
dumping measures, banking and securities, competition policy, consumer protection, customs and intellectual 
property rights.” For more on the CSME, see “CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME).” 
http://caricom.org/work-areas/overview/caricom-single-marke-and-economy  
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In the case of China, while there is evidence of its involvement in regional organizations 
such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of South-Eastern Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), there are no records of these being dispute settlement institutions in the 
litigating sense. APEC, for instance, works to reduce trade and investment barriers, but does not 
require that members make legally binding obligations.69 Because of this, decisions are made 
through consensus where all members have an equal voice.70 In the case of ASEAN, China is not 
one of its ten members. It has signed, however, several agreements with the organization in order 
to promote economic, social and cultural cooperation in the region.71 In this sense, China 
therefore has a history of regional cooperation generally, but not one of dispute settlement more 
specifically.  
 
Table 6-3: Summary of Membership in Regional Dispute Settlement Organizations 
at the Time of the Dispute	  






United States Yes 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 “How APEC Operates.” Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. http://www.apec.org/About-Us/How-APEC-
Operates  
70 Ibid 
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Bown and McCulloch examine the work of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), 
arguing that it may help developing countries protect their foreign market access. Based on their 
studies, participation in the ACWL may help developing countries file more cases on their own, 
be more involved in other cases, and also to initiate claims over smaller trade volumes.72 This 
section will therefore discuss the ACWL and how participation in it can serve as a legal 
competency building institution for states that intend to use the DSB. 
The ACWL began operations in July 2001. It buttresses countries’ legal capacity by 
providing “free legal advice and training on WTO law.”73 Training takes the form of annual 
courses, periodic seminars (sometimes on noteworthy Panel and Appellate Body decisions), and 
training sessions.74 There is also a Secondment Programme for Trade Lawyers in which 
attorneys from developing and least-developed country spend nine months as paid trainees at the 
Centre. Here, they work with lawyers that have expertise and experience in dispute settlement 
and the WTO’s provisions so as to improve their competencies in those areas.75 
In the event of WTO dispute settlement cases, the ACWL provides support to its 
members at discounted rates.76 These services are mainly for developing and least-developed 
countries (LDCs), though some developed countries are members and serve as its main 
contributors.77 The ACWL’s rates, while reduced, still come at a cost to countries. Members are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Chad P. Bown and Rachel McCulloch. “Developing Countries, Dispute Settlement, and the Advisory Centre on 
WTO Law.” 2010. Policy Research Working Paper 5168. The World Bank. Development Research Group. Trade 
and Integration Team.  
73 “Advice, Support and Training to Developing and Least-Developed Countries.” ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/  
74 “Training.” ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/training-introduction/ 
75 The ACWL reports that to date, the programme has facilitated 16 developing countries and seven LDCs that have 
sent 31 government lawyers. Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Sweden have also made financial 
contributions to the programme. See “Training.” ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/training-introduction/  
76 “Advice, Support and Training to Developing and Least-Developed Countries.” ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/ 
77 Ibid. Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Switzerland and 
Australia are the 11 developed countries that have joined the ACWL and serve as its main contributors. See 
“Members.” ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/members-introduction/  
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placed in categories A,78 B,79 C80 and LDCs81 based on their share of world trade and per capita 
GDP, and this determines how much they pay.82 Below is the ACWL’s estimation of the most 
that each country type will pay for its services based on the projected number of hours that are 
needed for each proceeding. 
 
Table 6-4: Estimated Maximum ACWL Charges for a Complainant or Respondent 








A 47,628 143,856 85,212 276,696 
B 35,721 107,892 63,909 207,522 
C 23,814 71,928 42,606 138,348 
LDC 5,880 17,760 10,520 34,160 
Source: “Fees” ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/fees/ 
	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei and the United Arab Emirates are the members of the ACWL that make up this 
category. See “Members.” ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/members-introduction/ 
79 The members of this category include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Egypt, India, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Thailand, Uruguay, Oman, Mauritius, Turkey, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Seychelles and South Africa. See 
“Members.” ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/members-introduction/ 
80 Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Tunisia, Jordan, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Costa Rica and Cuba make up this group. See “Members.” 
ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/members-introduction/ 
81 The members of this category are Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Haiti, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. See “Members.” ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/members-introduction/ 
82 See “Members.” ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/members-introduction/ 
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Countries that plan to appear before the DSB as third-parties also have to prepare. The ACWL 
also has projected financial costs for these services. LDCs in this instance, may be exempted 
from paying in some circumstances.83 
 
Table 6-5: Estimated Maximum ACWL Charges for Third-Party Services (in Swiss 
Francs) 
Country Category Panel Proceedings Appellate Body 
Proceedings 
Total 
A 20,736 28,836 49,572 
B 15,552 21,627 37,179 
C 10,368 14,418 24,786 
LDC 2,560 3,560 6,120 
Source: “Fees” ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/fees/ 
 
The ACWL says that it charges a “modest fee” for its dispute settlement services.84 Since 
many countries contract private lawyers, it is difficult to ascertain the exact financial burden of 
DSB litigation. These may also vary based on the type of case and the specific countries that are 
involved. This disclosure by the ACWL is useful in that they would be based on current market 
trends. Since they are significantly reduced charges, they may represent the cheaper, financial 
costs that countries may pay to use the DSB. One estimate is that it costs anywhere from 
$300,000 to $1 million to use the DSB.85 Consequently, a country’s resort to use the ACWL may 
therefore represent its simultaneous need to cut litigation costs and to be adequately prepared to 
use the DSB. Which of these countries, then, has used the ACWL to prepare for their cases? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See “Fees” ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/fees/ 
84 Ibid 
85 See Christina L. Davis and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo in “Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/ 
WTO Adjudication.” The Journal of Politics. 2009. Volume 71, Number 3, p. 1039. 
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The ACWL came into being in 2001, so Guatemala and Mexico did not have this option 
at the time of their two cement disputes. The cases between China and Jamaica and the United 
States and Mexico both occurred in 2003. Neither Jamaica nor China has joined the ACWL. As a 
developed country, the United States is also absent as one of its contributors.86 In this regard, 
none of the countries under examination has availed itself of the services provided by the ACWL 
or contributed towards its functioning at the time of their disputes. It is important to note, 
however, that Guatemala later joined the ACWL and used its services in more than one dispute. 
The implications of this will be evaluated in the discussion section.  
 
Table 6-6 Summary of Membership in the Advisory Centre on World Trade 
Organization Law at the Time of the Dispute 
Case Country Membership 
China – Cement  China No 
 Jamaica No 
Guatemala – Cement I Guatemala N/A 
 Mexico N/A 
Guatemala – Cement II Guatemala  N/A 
 Mexico N/A 
United States - Cement Mexico No 
 United States No 
 
 
Having examined membership in various institutions that can promote increased legal 
capacity, let us now look at how participation in the DSB can induce continued participation and 
improve countries’ ability to file and respond to filings.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See “Members.” ACWL. http://www.acwl.ch/members-introduction/ 
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Countries’ WTO / DSB Experience at the Time of Their Trade Disputes 
China – Cement 
 
Figure 6-1: China’s WTO / DSB Experience 
 
Source: “China.” Map of Disputes Between WTO Members. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm 
 
Figure 6-1 illustrates China’s involvement in the DSB as a complainant or respondent. It 
has participated in 15 disputes as a complainant and 39 as a respondent. Of this number, China 
has brought one case against Greece; one against Italy; five complaints against the EU; and ten 
against the United States. As a respondent, China has had to defend itself against two suits from 
Japan; eight from the EU; three from Canada; 31 from the United States; four from Mexico; and 
one from Guatemala. What Figure 6-1 does not show is the number of times that China has been 
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a third-party to a dispute. To date, that number is 139.87 These numbers, however, are for 2017 
and do not reflect China’s current familiarity and dexterity with the WTO’s provisions. How far, 
then, had China participated in the DSB at the time of China – Cement on December 16, 2003? 
Experience at the DSB as a Complainant 
At the time of China- Cement, China had participated in only one trade dispute as a 
complainant. This was in “DS252: United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Certain Steel Products.” China requested consultations with the United States on March 26, 
2002, claiming that American safeguard measures imposed on certain steel products from China 
were inconsistent with the WTO’s provisions. The Panel ruled in favour of China.88 Brazil, 
Canada, Chinese Taipei, Cuba, European Communities, Japan the Republic of Korea, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
had joined as third-parties.89 
Experience at the DSB as a Respondent 
China had no prior experience as a respondent in the DSB at the time of China-Cement. 
The first suit against it was brought on March 18, 2004 by the United States. They later came to 
a mutually agreed solution.90 
Experience at the DSB as a Third-Party 
By December 2003, China had been involved in twenty-two cases as a third-party 
litigant. This consideration is important because by solely examining China’s history in the DSB 
as a complainant or respondent, it appears reticent and arguably underequipped with the legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 “Disputes by Member: China.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm  
88 See “DS252: United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds252_e.htm  
89 Ibid 
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facility required to use the institution. This is a feasible argument if one weighs the fact that 
China had just acceded to the WTO in December 2001. The large number of cases that in 
participated in as a third-party, however, suggests China was investing in learning the intricacies 
of the institution. In this sense, China’s legal capacity could have developed in part by 




Figure 6-2: Jamaica’s WTO / DSB Experience 
Source: “Jamaica.” Map of Disputes Between WTO Members. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm 
 
Figure 6-2 shows Jamaica’s inactivity in both filing and responding to trade disputes at 
the DSB. What is missing from this map is the fact that Jamaica has been a third-party 
participant in eight cases. These include DS27, DS108, DS132, DS152, DS165, DS265, DS266 
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and DS283.91 At the time of China – Cement, Jamaica had already participated in these cases. 
These disputes deal mainly with the “importation, sale and distribution of bananas,” subsidies on 
sugar and other goods that are critical to the Jamaican industry. As in the China case, using the 
DSB as a third-party is an invaluable source of learning how to navigate the institution, which 
lends itself to legal capacity building.  
Guatemala  
 
Figure 6-3: Guatemala’s WTO / DSB Experience 
Source: “Guatemala.” Map of Disputes Between WTO Members. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm 
 
Figure 6-3 reveals that Guatemala has been involved in nine cases as a complainant and 
two as a respondent. Of these numbers, Guatemala has filed three cases against the EU; two 
against Mexico; and one each against China, the Dominican Republic, and Peru. As a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 “Disputes by Member: Jamaica.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm  
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respondent, Guatemala defended itself against two cases from Mexico. Figure 6-3, however, 
does not include the fact that Guatemala has participated in 37 trade disputes as a third-party.92 
What then, did Guatemala’s DSB patterns look like at the onset of Guatemala – Cement? 
Experience at the DSB as a Complainant 
Guatemala had been involved in two DSB cases as a complainant when Guatemala – 
Cement I began. These cases are DS16: European Communities — Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas and DS27: European Communities — Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III). In both cases, Honduras, 
Mexico and the United States joined as co-complainants. Ecuador joined as a co-complainant in 
the second case. Both disputes led to a mutually agreed solution.93 
Experience at the DSB as a Respondent 
At the onset of Guatemala – Cement I, Guatemala had never been a respondent to any 
case at the DSB. This is important because while filing and responding both require knowledge 
and skill in the WTO’s provisions, defending one’s arguments requires an in-depth knowledge, 
assessment and countering of the litigant’s case. Guatemala therefore had no direct experience 
with this part of the DSB when Mexico filed against it. 
Experience at the DSB as a Third-Party 
Guatemala had been a third-party participant in one case when Mexico initiated 
proceedings against it. This was “DS58: United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products.” In this case, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand served as co-
complainants against America’s ban on imported shrimp from their territories. The Panel ruled in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 “Disputes by Member: Guatemala.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
93 See “DS16: European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas.”  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds16_e.htm and “DS27: European Communities — Regime 
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their favor.94 This case evoked a different agreement than the one Mexico used in its filing 
against Guatemala. Guatemala’s experience with the DSB was therefore very limited at this time. 
Let us now see how Mexico’s state compared with Guatemala’s at the start of Guatemala – 
Cement. 
 
Figure 6-4: Mexico’s WTO / DSB Experience 
Source: “Mexico.” Map of Disputes Between WTO Members. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm 
 
Figure 6-4 highlights Mexico activity in the DSB to date. It reveals that Mexico has filed 
24 cases overall. These include nine against the United States; four against China; three against 
the EU; two against Ecuador and Guatemala; and one against Argentina, Venezuela, Panama and 
Costa Rica respectively. Figure 6-4 also shows that Mexico has responded to fourteen cases. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Australia; Canada; Colombia; Costa Rica; European Communities; Ecuador; El Salvador; Hong Kong, China; 
Japan; Mexico; Nigeria; Philippines; Senegal; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Venezuela, the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela; Pakistan and Thailand also joined as third-parties. See “DS58: United States — Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm  
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These have come from the United States with six; the EU with three; Guatemala with two and 
Nicaragua, Brazil and Chile with one. Mexico has also participated in 82 trade disputes as a 
third-party litigant.95 These are missing from the Figure. Mexico’s results therefore reveal that it 
has been an active participant in the DSB. Let us now see how these patterns varied at the start of 
Guatemala – Cement. 
Experience at the DSB as a Complainant 
At the initiation of Guatemala – Cement, Mexico had filed four cases at the DSB. These 
include two trade disputes against the European Communities (now EU), and one each against 
the United States and Venezuela.96 Since it is the one that filed against Guatemala, it by that now 
had developed substantial legal capacity and familiarity in using the DSB.  
Experience at the DSB as a Respondent 
On October 17, 1996, Mexico had previously responded to one WTO dispute. This 
complaint was launched by the European Communities.97 
Experience at the DSB as a Third-Party 
Mexico had participated in three trade disputes as a third-party litigant when it initiated 
Guatemala – Cement I. These include DS38, a case that the European Communities filed against 
the United States; DS44, a suit against Japan by the United States; and DS58, a joint filing from 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand.98 
Guatemala – Cement II 
As countries increase their participation in the DSB, they can become adept at using it. 
With the first cement dispute between Guatemala and Mexico in October 1996, it is therefore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 “Disputes by Member: Mexico.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
96 Ibid 
97 See “DS53: Mexico — Customs Valuation of Imports.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds53_e.htm  
98 “Disputes by Member: Mexico.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
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important to see how their DSB usage had increased January 5, 1999, thereby suggesting an 
improvement in their legal capacity.  
Guatemala 
Guatemala’s participation in the DSB did not improve much when Guatemala – Cement 
II began. At that time, it had been party to two cases as a complainant, one as a respondent and 
one as a third-party.99 With the exception of its defense against Mexico, its participation at the 
DSB remained the same. Since, however, Guatemala – Cement II was filed by the same 
complainant (Mexico) over the same good (Ordinary Portland Grey Cement) and by evoking the 
same Anti-Dumping Agreement, Guatemala’s experience as a respondent would have increased 
its capacity to respond to Mexico the second time around. 
Mexico 
At Guatemala – Cement II, Mexico had gained far more experience in the DSB than 
Guatemala. It has been involved in five trade disputes as a complainant, three as a respondent 
and twelve as a respondent. This compares with four, one and three respectively in the first 
cement case. What this means is that like Guatemala whose first appearance as a respondent after 
Guatemala – Cement I was to answer to Mexico, Mexico’s first filing after that case was also to 
file again against Guatemala. What therefore had changed for Mexico? In contrast to Guatemala 
that had no other participation in the DSB after the 1996 case, Mexico had responded to two 
more cases and joined third-party litigations nine more times. In this sense, Mexico’s legal team 
would have had far more opportunities to engage with the DSB and to improve their agility in 
using the institution. Guatemala therefore went up against a more legally practiced Mexican 
team. Let us now see what the United States and Mexico looked like against each other in United 
– States Cement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 “Disputes by Member: Guatemala.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
 
	  




Figure 6-5: United States’ WTO / DSB Experience 
Source: “United States.” Map of Disputes Between WTO Members. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm 
  
Figure 6-5 shows the high level of participation that the United States has had in the 
DSB. Overall, it has filed 114 cases and responded to 130. As a complainant, it has initiated 21 
cases against China; 19 against the EU; six each against Mexico, Canada, India, South Korea and 
Japan; five suits each against Argentina; four each against Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, 
France and Brazil; three against Belgium, Ireland and the United Kingdom respectively; two 
each against Turkey, Greece, Spain and Germany; and one each against Pakistan, Egypt, 
Hungary, Portugal, Romania, Netherlands, Sweden, Chile and Venezuela. Of the countries that 
have taken the United States to the DSB, we have the EU with 33; Canada with 16; Brazil and 
South Korea with eleven each; China and India with ten each; Mexico with nine; Argentina; 
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eight from Japan; Thailand and Argentina that both filed five cases; three from Indonesia; two 
each from Viet Nam, Australia, New Zealand and Chile; and one each from Chinese Taipei, 
Philippines, Malaysia, Turkey, Switzerland, Norway, Antigua and Barbuda, Costa Rica, 
Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador respectively. The United States has also been involved in 140 
cases as a third-party.100 This information is missing from Figure 6-5. 
 United States- Cement was filed on January 31, 2003. It is therefore useful to examine 
not only what the United States’ total participation in the DSB is, but to evaluate specifically, its 
dispute history at that time.  
Experience at the DSB as a Complainant, Respondent and Third-Party 
When Mexico filed against the United States in United States – Cement, the US had a 
long an active history in the DSB. It had participated in 73 cases as a complainant, 76 as a 
respondent and 49 as a third-party.101 This demonstrates the fact that not only does the United 
States have the requisite, minimum skills to use the DSB, but its legal capacity and other 
resources for litigation far supersede many of the countries that use the institution. How then, did 
Mexico compare with the United States? 
At United States – Cement, Mexico had been involved in eleven cases as a complainant, 
seven as a respondent and 30 as a third-party. At face value, it would seem like Mexico was out 
of its league and would lose this case. The fact, however, that this case came to a mutually 
agreed solution is instructive. It indicates, as this study purports, that while legal capacity is 
important in a quantitative sense, this variable goes beyond numbers. Additionally, other 
considerations such as domestic audience costs can precipitate settlement at the DSB. This will 
be discussed more fully in the Chapter 7. Suffice it to say that legal capacity though important is 
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but one factor as states determine their strategies in trade disputes. Beyond a certain limit, once 
states have relatively comparable knowledge and expertise, the benefits accrued from 
participation may become marginal. 
 
Figure 6-6: Summary of Countries’ DSB Experience at the Time of Their Disputes 
 
(Guatemala I and II refer to its two cement cases, while Mexico I and II refer to Mexico’s state in the two 
cases that it filed against Guatemala. Mexico III is Mexico’s case with the United States.) 
 
The WTO allows countries to interpret the Anti-Dumping Agreement and to institute 
domestic laws to reflect its spirit and principles. In this section, I therefore argue that usage of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement domestically is an indication of a country’s legal capacity. Here, 
this Agreement is the reference point because all the countries under examination evoked it at the 
time of their trade disputes. To impose anti-dumping duties therefore means that the countries 
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wherewithal to investigate, determine and impose countermeasures. Again, the focus is on what 
the countries did up to the point of the disputes and not on their general history in the institution. 
China – Cement 
At the start of China – Cement, China had reported to the WTO that it had definitive anti-
dumping duties in force against products from thirteen countries. These include Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Russia, 
Singapore, United Kingdom and the United States.102 Some of the goods that it had duties on are 
acrylate; cold rolled stainless steel sheet; caprolactam; newsprint; polyester chip; polyester staple 
fibre; polyester film; and methylene chloride.103 Jamaica, on the other hand, had final anti-
dumping measures imposed on goods originating from three countries. These include Dominican 
Republic for inorganic fertilizer, and Indonesia and Thailand for Ordinary Portland Grey 
Cement.104 
The wide disparity between the number of domestic, final anti-dumping measures that 
China and Jamaica had in place is indicative of economic size and diversity. China, for instance, 
trades with many more countries and also produces more goods. Jamaica’s imposition of anti-
dumping duties on two countries other than China for Ordinary Portland Grey Cement suggests 
that cement is a critical domestic industry and that Jamaica has learnt to use the WTO provisions, 
at least domestically, to protect itself. Notably, China had no measures in place against cement. 
This implies that China may produce and export far more cement than it imports, and so there is 
no need to protect its cement industry through anti-dumping duties. Generally, however, both 
countries have used the Anti-Dumping Agreement domestically. The fact that this case did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 See “Semi-Annual Report Under Article 16.4. of the Agreement - People’s Republic of China.” 
G/ADP/N/105/CHN. 22 August 2003. World Trade Organization. 
103 Ibid 
104 “Semi-Annual Report Under Article 16.4. of the Agreement - Jamaica.” G/ADP/N/119/JAM. 21 October 2004. 
World Trade Organization. 
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mature to the DSB level therefore means that other factors other than legal capacity at the 
domestic level may be at play.  
Guatemala Cement I and II 
At the time of Guatemala – Cement I, Guatemala only had one anti-dumping measure in 
place. This was against Ordinary Portland Grey Cement from Mexico.105 This is important 
because not only was Guatemala’s first time at the DSB in response to this case, but the case had 
emanated because of its first domestic invocation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement against 
Mexican cement. This raises questions about what Guatemala’s familiarity and adroitness with 
the Agreement might have been then and is an important consideration since Guatemala did not 
back down from Mexico’s threat to litigate.  
 Mexico’s domestic use of the Anti-Dumping Agreement looks far different than 
Guatemala’s when Guatemala – Cement I began. At that time, Mexico had anti-dumping 
measures imposed on goods from 31 countries.106 Some of these products include hot-rolled 
sheet; corrugated rods; plate in coils; caustic soda; high fructose corn syrup; baby carriages; 
bicycle tires; toys; bovine meat; and electric power transformers.107 This extensive experience 
therefore gave Mexico a vantage position from which it could challenge the legality of 
Guatemala’s measure within the framework of the WTO. 
 By the time Guatemala – Cement II emerged, Guatemala’s experience with the domestic 
use of the Anti-Dumping Agreement had not increased. The anti-dumping measure against the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 “Semi-Annual Report Under Article 16.4. of the Agreement – Guatemala.” G/ADP/N/22/GTM. 15 May 1998. 
World Trade Organization. 
106 These countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Communities (EC), 
Estonia, France, Germany, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Netherlands, Russian Federation, Spain, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United States, 
Uzbekistan and Venezuela. See “Semi-Annual Report Under Article 16.4. of the Agreement – Mexico.” 
G/ADP/N/22/MEX. 21 March 1997. World Trade Organization. 
107 “Semi-Annual Report Under Article 16.4. of the Agreement – Mexico.” G/ADP/N/22/MEX. 21 March 1997. 
World Trade Organization. 
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cement from Mexico therefore remained the only one that it had in place.108 Mexico, conversely, 
had duties imposed on goods from fifteen countries.109 While this may seem like a reduction 
compared to the 31 that it had measures against in 1996, it could also mean that the time for 
some of the older duties had lapsed. Additionally, for those fifteen countries, Mexico had a total 
of 84 anti-dumping duties in place.110 This requires legal consideration of how Mexico’s trade 
with these countries may be violated through the importation of those goods, and also for an 
awareness of the applicable provisions. In this sense, Mexico at the time of the two cement 
disputes therefore appeared to have greater legal experience with the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
than Guatemala. 
United States – Cement 
The United States at the initiation of United States – Cement had levied anti-dumping 
duties against products from 48 countries.111 These countries had measures on a wide array of 
products that include barbed wire and barbless wire strand; honey; solid urea;  sugar; carbon 
steel butt-weld pipe fittings;  silicon metal; softwood lumber; apple juice: concentrated; non-
frozen; folding gift boxes; paper clips; sorbitol and preserved mushrooms.112 Like its activity in 
the DSB generally, the United States’ multiple application of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
domestically reflects its strong legal capacity. Comparatively, Mexico, when it filed this case, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 “Semi-Annual Report Under Article 16.4. of the Agreement – Guatemala.” G/ADP/N/65/GTM. 25 July 2000. 
World Trade Organization. 
109 “Semi-Annual Report Under Article 16.4. of the Agreement – Mexico.” G/ADP/N/53/MEX. 13 August 1999. 
World Trade Organization. 
110 Ibid 
111 Included in the list are Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
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Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan and Venezuela. See “Semi-Annual Report Under 
Article 16.4. of the Agreement – United States.” G/ADP/N/105/USA. 12 September 2003. World Trade 
Organization. 
112 “Semi-Annual Report Under Article 16.4. of the Agreement – United States.” G/ADP/N/105/USA. 12 September 
2003. World Trade Organization. 
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had domestic measures against imports from fourteen countries.113 Here, the difference can be 
attributed to market size and possibly a comparative advantage in legal capacity. On a base level, 
however, both countries appear to have had sufficient capability to use the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement effectively. 
 
Figure 6-7: Summary of Countries’ Domestic Experience with the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement 
 
(Guatemala I and II refer to its two cement cases, while Mexico I and II refer to Mexico’s state in 
the two cases that it filed against Guatemala. Mexico III is Mexico’s case with the United States.) 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 See “Semi-Annual Report Under Article 16.4. of the Agreement – Mexico.” G/ADP/N/105/MEX. 25 August 
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Countries’ Domestic Experience with the Anti-Dumping Agreement at the Time of their 
Disputes 
One of the arguments of this study is that participation in the DSB not only increases 
legal capacity, but also strengthens the possibility that countries will use the institution if another 
dispute emerges. It therefore tests if these countries actually file and not just their likelihood of 
doing so. In this section, I therefore examine the countries’ DSB trajectories with particular 
reference to the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Here, as in the rationale for analyzing domestic 
levies, I posit that countries that have some experience with the Agreement on the multilateral 
level are better equipped to respond to similar cases when they occur. Let us therefore see 
whether the litigants in the cases at hand had any history with the Anti-Dumping Agreement at 
the DSB. 
China – Cement 
When Jamaica’s Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Commission began its investigation of 
dumped cement from China, China had marginal experience with the Agreement at the DSB. It 
had never been a respondent or complainant in any case featuring the Agreement, but had been a 
third-party to four cases.114 These trade disputes are DS204, DS268, DS294 and DS295.115 
Jamaica’s DSB participation with the Agreement was also limited. Like China, at that time, 
Jamaica had never been a respondent or complainant in a case that evokes the Agreement, and 
had been a third-party litigant in just one case.116 That case was DS132: Mexico — Anti-Dumping 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 “Disputes by Member: China.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
115 Ibid  
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Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States. Here, Jamaica and 
Mauritius gave joint arguments.117 
In trying to ascertain why China – Cement did not proceed to the DSB, history with the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement multilaterally can easily be a consideration. Up to that point, neither 
country had individually filed or responded to a dispute of that type. Consequently, their 
experience with the Agreement domestically and even as third-parties did not easily translate to 
confidence and competence to use the DSB at that time. Arguably, there might be a learning 
curve where countries have to master domestic impositions, third-party involvement, and then to 
stand on their own at the DSB. Notably, even in its third-party involvement, Jamaica participated 
with Mauritius. This collaboration suggests a sharing of resources and could mean that both 
countries felt they could better advance their views by working together and not separately.  
China and Jamaica therefore may have not reached the level of maturation in legal capacity to 
file or defend the case at that time.  
Guatemala – Cement I and II 
At Guatemala – Cement I, Guatemala had no experience as a complainant, respondent or 
complainant using the Anti-Dumping Agreement at the DSB.118 Mexico, on the other hand, had 
filed under the Agreement twice,119 but never used it as a respondent or third-party.120 By the 
time Guatemala – Cement II was initiated, Mexico had evoked the Agreement three times as a 
complainant, and once as a respondent and third-party respectively.121 Guatemala’s fortune did 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 “Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States.” Report of 
the Panel. WT/DS132/R. 28 January 2000. p. 164 – 166. 
118 “Disputes by Member: Guatemala.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm  
119 These are “DS23” and “DS49.” See “Disputes by Member: Mexico.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
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not change much in that it still had zero cases as a complainant or third-party, but one as a 
respondent since Mexico had filed against it.122 
Guatemala’s experience is interesting because though it had no prior experience with the 
Agreement, when called upon to act it accepted the challenge and litigated. The fact that it won 
is even more remarkable. This gives rise to the possibility that there could be other factors other 
than legal capacity that catalyzed this case, and also that legal capacity can be garnered in the 
moment. In the case of Mexico, it too had limited experience with the Agreement at the DSB, but 
still more than what Guatemala had. It is therefore important to probe how these countries 
calculated the other costs of going to the DSB for these two cases. This will be discussed in the 
Chapter 7. 
United States – Cement 
 When Mexico initiated United States – Cement, it now had a strong history of using the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement at the DSB. This speaks to its increased legal capacity in this area. 
Mexico had participated in seven such cases as a respondent123, four as a respondent124 and three 
as a third-party.125 Conversely, the United States had been involved in three as a complainant126, 
twenty as a respondent127, and two as a third-party.128 In this instance, while Mexico had evoked 
the Agreement more than the United States, the US had responded to far more than Mexico had. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 “Disputes by Member: Guatemala.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
123 “DS23,” “DS49,” “DS60,” “DS156,” “DS182,” “DS191” and “DS234.” See “Disputes by Member: Mexico.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
124 “DS101,” “DS132,” “DS203” and “DS216.” See “Disputes by Member: Mexico.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
125 “DS136,” “DS217” and “DS268.” See “Disputes by Member: Mexico.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
126 DS101, DS132 and DS203. See “Disputes by Member: United States.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
127 “DS49,” “DS63,” “DS89,” “DS99,” “DS136,” “DS162,” “DS179,” “DS184,” “DS206,” “DS217,” “DS221,” 
“DS225,” “DS234,” “DS239,” “DS244,” “DS247,” “DS262,” “DS264,” “DS268” and “DS277” are these cases. 
See “Disputes by Member: United States.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
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The United States’ diversified market could make it a likely target for litigations,129 but its 
willingness to respond demonstrates its strong legal capacity. Here, both countries therefore had 
enough experience with the Agreement to induce participation at the time of the cement dispute. 
 
Figure 6-8: Summary of Countries’ Domestic Experience with the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement 
 
(Guatemala I and II refer to its two cement cases, while Mexico I and II refer to Mexico’s state in the two 
cases that it filed against Guatemala. Mexico III is Mexico’s case with the United States.) 
 
Support from Third Parties 
 The outcome of a trade dispute is sometimes dependent on not just how adept the 
litigants’ lawyers are, but also by the contributions of third parties. In this sense, third parties 
share the cost of filing by adding their expertise to the deliberations. Their skill and cogency in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Guzman and Simmons, for example, argue that high-income countries are often targets of complaints from low-
income countries because of the expected returns of these litigations. See Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons. 
“Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: the Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes.” 
Journal of Legal Studies. 2005. Volume 34, Number 2: 557-598. 
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the cases may therefore aid or derail the case at hand. Importantly, third party involvement is 
usually an indication of the interest that other countries have in the case being determined, and 
signals their intent to benefit from the precedent that will be set. Busch and Reinhardt, for 
example, posit that third parties can affect disputes from as early as the consultations stage and 
make it unlikely that the disputants will come to an early settlement. They believe, however, that 
any effect that third parties have on the direction of the outcome should be considered in light of 
the fact that it is their involvement that made the disputants more intractable, which necessitated 
a Panel ruling.130 Johns and Pelc add to this debate. In their view, since third parties may 
decrease the chances of settlement and increase the likelihood that countries will litigate, states 
with material interests in a dispute may not participate for strategic reasons.131 
 It is true that third-parties can increase the disputants’ resolve to litigate fully. Here, 
however, I focus on how the countries that actually participated strengthened the legal capacity 
of the complainants and the defendants in a particular case. Importantly, I consider how these 
summations coincide with the outcome, arguing that this knowledge can also make countries be 
more willing to complain or defend in the future if they know they will have this type of support.  
 Like complainants and defendants, third-party involvement is also the result of strategic 
calculations. That aspect in discussed in Chapter 8 where I evaluate why some countries joined 
the disputes, but others chose not to. Here, I focus only on the arguments that were presented and 
how these augmented or refuted the claims that were being made. China – Cement did not make 
it to the DSB and so it is not included here. Additionally, United States – Cement was settled 
before the Panel could deliberate so there were no third-party arguments even though Canada, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt. “Three's a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement.” World 
Politics, Vol. 58, No. 3 (April 2006), pp. 446-477. 
131  Leslie Johns and Krzysztof J. Pelc. “Fear of Crowds in World Trade Organization Disputes: Why Don’t More 
Countries Participate?” The Journal of Politics (2015), Volume 78, Number 1. 
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China, Chinese Taipei, European Communities and Japan had reserved their third-party rights.132 
Because of this, only Guatemala – Cement I and II will be evaluated. 
Guatemala – Cement I 
Four countries reserved their third-party rights in Guatemala – Cement I. These are 
Canada, El Salvador, Honduras and the United States.133 Canada, however, made no oral or 
written arguments to the Panel.134 El Salvador, in making its submission, stressed the fact that 
Guatemala was the first Central American country to execute an anti-dumping investigation and 
that Guatemala had done all it could to be WTO compliant.135 It therefore highlighted the 
precedent that the Panel’s ruling would set, and submitted inter alia, that the Panel should 
“refrain from recommending that Guatemala suspend its antidumping measures and refund the 
corresponding duties.”136 
Like El Salvador, Honduras also supported Guatemala’s case. It evoked Article 17 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement to argue that the Panel did not have a mandate to examine the 
definitive measure that Guatemala adopted on January 17, 1997.137 Honduras also used Article 
6.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding to contend that Mexico failed to request the 
establishment of a panel in writing and that it had also not specified the specific measures that 
were at issue. Its recommendation was therefore that Mexico’s complaint should be rejected.138 
The United States’ position in this dispute was about fairness to Guatemala and the 
inadmissibility of Mexico’s complaint. It argued, for instance, that Mexico had requested that a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 “DS281: United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement from Mexico.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds281_e.htm 
133 “DS60: Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds60_e.htm 
134 “Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico.” Report of the Panel. 
WT/DS60/R. 19 June 1998. p. 114. 
135 Ibid 
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panel be established to deliberate on the provisional anti-dumping measure that Guatemala had 
levied, but was instead seeking deliberations on the final anti-dumping duties that Guatemala had 
imposed.139 By doing this, the United States posited that Mexico was inconsistent with the WTO 
because it had not requested consultations with Guatemala on the latter issue; neither did it raise 
Guatemala’s imposition of the final antidumping measures when it requested the Panel.140 
Additionally, in accordance with Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Mexico had not 
expressed or demonstrated whether the provisional measures had any “significant” impact on its 
domestic industry. In this regard, the United States submitted that Mexico had not properly 
brought the matter before the Panel.141 
Essentially, with the exception of Canada that did not make any submissions, all the third 
parties to Guatemala – Cement I argued in support of Guatemala. In the case of the United 
States, its arguments were not whether Guatemala was right in imposing anti-dumping duties, 
but instead, challenged how Mexico initiated the case at the DSB. The case is important in 
assessing how third parties can increase a country’s legal capacity because Guatemala was a 
novice at the DSB on all levels. For example, the Panel ruled that Guatemala had breached 
Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In its view Guatemala did not have “sufficient” 
evidence of dumping, injury and causal link to initiate its investigation regarding Portland Grey 
Cement from Mexico.142 However, on August 4, 1998, Guatemala took this case to the Appellate 
Body. The Appellate Body in turn, reversed the Panel’s decision by highlighting that based on 
the stipulations of Article 6.2 of the DSU, Mexico had not properly brought the dispute before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Ibid, 117 -118. 
140 Ibid 
141 Ibid 
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the Panel because it did not specify what measure was the source of its complaint.143 Notably, 
these are some of the issues that the United States raised in its third-party submissions. 
Guatemala’s actions in this case are noteworthy because they defy the expectations of a 
first-time user. It was unfazed by the Panel’s ruling against it and went on to appeal and won. 
This in my view can be partly attributed to the legal support that Guatemala received from 
Canada, El Salvador, Honduras and the United States. In this regard, legal capacity in the form of 
support from third-parties can strengthen a country’s position and increase the chances that it 
will participate in the DSB.  
Guatemala – Cement II 
In Guatemala – Cement II, five countries/customs unions reserved their third-party rights. 
These include European Communities, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras and the United States.144 
The European Communities and Ecuador were not parties to the first cement dispute, while 
Canada did not join the second one. How then did these third-party submissions affect the 
outcome of the case?  Ecuador’s arguments to the Panel supported Guatemala’s stance. It agreed, 
for instance, that this case was again not properly brought before the Panel because one of the 
panelists had deliberated on the first case and this could affect the neutrality of the current 
judgment.145 Additionally, it argued against Mexico’s view that the precedent set in the first 
Panel’s report should be considered. Ecuador’s contention was that the Appellate Body had 
overturned it so the new Panel was free to consider other arguments.146 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Ibid 
144 “DS156: Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds156_e.htm 
145 “Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico.” Report of the Panel. 
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El Salvador also supported Guatemala in its articulations before the Panel. Its arguments, 
however, highlighted its strong cultural, commercial and friendship ties with Guatemala through 
the Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, and the desire to see the WTO’s 
provisions accurately applied to protect their interests.147 The European Communities did not 
support either side. Instead, it expressed an interest in the case because it had concerns about the 
interpretation and application of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It therefore raised the elements 
of the dispute that it was interested in, highlighted the contending positions, its own 
understanding of those issues, as well as the prevailing WTO norms relating to those matters.148 
Honduras reiterated its support for Guatemala in Guatemala – Cement II. It mentioned its 
own vulnerability to dumped cement from Mexico, and its economic interdependence with 
Guatemala. Honduras therefore felt that Guatemala had correctly applied the anti-dumping 
measure and supported this measure as a deterrence to future dumping of Mexican products into 
their domestic territories.149 The United States, however, disagreed with Guatemala in this 
instance. While it acknowledged Guatemala’s and any other WTO Member’s right to levy anti-
dumping measures, it stressed the fact that there are specific procedural requirements to do so. In 
its view, Guatemala had breached some of these stipulations and therefore could not be awarded 
the case.150 The Panel agreed and outlined in its report a detailed ruling against Guatemala.151 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Ibid, 34. 
148 See the EC’s arguments before the Panel in “Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland 
Cement from Mexico.” Report of the Panel. WT/DS156/R. 24 October 2000. p. 35 – 40. 
149 Ibid, 41. 
150 See the United States’ submissions before the Panel in “Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Grey Portland Cement from Mexico.” Report of the Panel. WT/DS156/R. 24 October 2000. p. 48 – 60. 
151 See for example, “DS156: Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from 
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Table 6-7: Summary of Third Party Support in the Disputes 
Case Third Parties Position 
China - Cement N/A N/A (case did not go to DSB) 
Guatemala – Cement I Canada Made no submissions 
 El Salvador Supported Guatemala 
 Honduras Supported Guatemala 
 United States Supported Guatemala 
Guatemala – Cement II European Communities Supported neither 
 Ecuador Supported Guatemala 
 Honduras Supported Guatemala 
 United States Supported Mexico 
United States - Cement Canada N/A (litigants settled) 
 China  
 Chinese Taipei  
 European Communities  
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Membership	  in	  WTO	  	  
Negotiation	  Groups	   Yes	  	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Membership	  in	  	  Int'l	  
Dispute	  Settlement	  




Organizations	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
ACWL	  Membership	   No	   No	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	   No	   No	  
DSB	  as	  a	  
Complainant	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
DSB	  as	  a	  
Respondent	   No	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
DSB	  as	  a	  Third	  Party	   Yes	  	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Anti-­‐Dumping	  
Agreement	  	  
Domestically	   Yes	  	   Yes	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Anti-­‐Dumping	  
Agreement	  	  
at	  the	  DSB	  
(Complainant)	   No	   No	   No	   Yes	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Anti-­‐Dumping	  
Agreement	  	  
at	  the	  DSB	  
(Respondent)	   No	   No	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Anti-­‐Dumping	  
Agreement	  at	  the	  
DSB	  (Third	  Party)	   Yes	  	   Yes	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Third	  Party	  Support	   N/A	   N/A	   Yes	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   N/A	   N/A	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Participation	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Result	   N/A	   N/A	   Win	   Lose	   Lose	   Win	   Settlement	   Settlement	  
 
(Guatemala I and II refer to its two cement cases, while Mexico I and II refer to Mexico’s state in the two 
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“Quantifying the Qualitative”: How Do Legal Capacity Costs Affect Participation in the 
Dispute Settlement Body? 
 The discussion above gave a rich examination of legal capacity costs and how they may 
reduce or increase the burden to use the DSB, therefore catalyzing participation or inducing non-
participation. This section broadens the analysis through a quantitative assessment of how 
knowledge about the independent variables can reduce uncertainty and increase the chances that 
states will use the DSB. The comparative case analytic method has a “quantify, count, compute 
and compare” four steps approach.152 This method will be used to empirically test the assertions 
about participation in the DSB as a function of legal capacity costs. 
Quantify: Setting up the Truth Table for Comparative Case Analysis 
 
Table 6-9: Truth Table for Legal Capacity Costs and their Effects on Participation in the 
Dispute Settlement Body153 
Source: Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor and Katya Drozdova. 2016. Quantifying the Qualitative Excel Implementation. June 7, 2017. URL:  
https://study.sagepub.com/drozdova  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Katya Drozdova and Kurt Taylor Gaubatz. Quantifying the Qualitative: Information Theory for Comparative 
Case Analysis. (London: Sage Publications, 2017), 75-76. 
153 See Appendix 2A for full results of the comparative case analysis with legal capacity costs. 
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Count: Calculating the Probabilities 
        In this method, all the independent variables (legal capacity costs) are represented as X, 
while the dependent variable (choice to litigate), is depicted as Y. Their joint occurrence is 
written (x, y).154  Drozdova and Gaubatz posit that there are four possible ways that the 
independent and dependent variables can co-occur.155 These are: 
x = 1, y = 1 
x = 0, y = 1 
x = 1, y = 0 
x = 0, y = 0   
 
The joint probabilities will therefore be calculated to determine each factor (independent 
variable) and outcome (dependent variable) combination.156 This is done by using the following 
matrix157: 
 X = 1 X = 0 
Y = 1 a b 
Y = 0 c d 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Katya Drozdova and Kurt Taylor Gaubatz. Quantifying the Qualitative: Information Theory for Comparative 
Case Analysis. (London: Sage Publications, 2017), 61. 
155 Ibid 
156 Ibid, 74. 
157 Ibid, 72. 
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Independent	  Variables	  X	  
p(xi	  =	  1,	  y	  =	  1)	  
a	  
p(xi	  =	  0,	  y	  =	  1)	  
b	  
p(xi	  =	  1,	  y	  =	  0)	  
c	  




Membership	  in	  WTO	  	  
Negotiation	  Groups	   0.75	  
0.00*	  






Membership	  in	  	  Int'l	  Dispute	  Settlement	  
Organizations	   0.75	  
0.00*	  




x3	   Membership	  in	  Regional	  Dispute	  
Settlement	  Organizations	   0.75	  
0.00*	  




x4	   ACWL	  Membership	  
0.00*	  
(0.000001)	   0.75	  
0.00*	  
(0.000001)	   0.25	  
	  
x5	   DSB	  as	  a	  Complainant	   0.75	  
0.00*	  
(0.000001)	   0.125	   0.125	  
	  
x6	   DSB	  as	  a	  Respondent	   0.625	   0.125	  
0.00*	  
(0.000001)	   0.25	  
	  
x7	   DSB	  as	  a	  Third	  Party	   0.75	  
0.00*	  





Anti-­‐Dumping	  Agreement	  	  





Anti-­‐Dumping	  Agreement	  	  
at	  the	  DSB	  (Complainant)	   0.5	   0.25	  
0.00*	  
(0.000001)	   0.25	  
	  
x10	  
Anti-­‐Dumping	  Agreement	  	  
at	  the	  DSB	  (Respondent)	   0.5	   0.25	  
0.00*	  
(0.000001)	   0.25	  
	  
x11	  
Anti-­‐Dumping	  Agreement	  at	  the	  DSB	  






Third	  Party	  Support	   0.375	   0.375	  
0.00*	  
(0.000001)	   0.25	  
Source: Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor and Katya Drozdova. 2016. Quantifying the Qualitative Excel Implementation. June 7, 2017. URL: 
https://study.sagepub.com/drozdova 
Joint probability = p(x, y) = count (x, y) / n158 
*the negligible value 0.000001 is substituted for pure zero values in order to ensure that logarithms are defined.159 
Compute: Computing the Uncertainty Measures 
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        The uncertainty measures are calculated in three steps. The first step measures the 
uncertainty of the outcome, litigation (Y). This is written as H (Y).160 Here, in the absence of the 
knowledge of the x variables (legal capacity costs / factors), the information entropy measures 
uncertainty about whether the states will litigate.161 H (Y) can be written as: 
H (Y = y) = - p (y = 1) log2 p(y = 1) – (1 – p(y = 1) log2 (1 –p(y = 1) 
         The second step in computing the uncertainty measures is to find the conditional 
uncertainty, or the conditional information entropy. This is represented as H (Y/X).162 It 
measures the amount of uncertainty that we have that states will litigate, given that we have 
knowledge about the litigation costs variables.163 It is calculated by using the following formula: 
H(Y = y | X = xi) = - p (xi = 0) [p (y = 0 | xi = 0) log2 p (y = 0 | xi = 0) 
 + p (y = 1 | xi = 0) log2 p (y = 1 | xi = 0)] 
 -p (xi = 1) [p (y = 0 | xi = 1) log2 p (y = 0 | xi = 1) 
 + p (y = 1 | xi = 1) log2 p (y = 1 | xi = 1)]164 
              After finding the conditional uncertainty, the next step is to find the uncertainty 
reduction or information gain. This is also called mutual information.165 This is written as I (Y; 
X), and “measures the reduced uncertainty in Y due to the knowledge of X.166 It is computed as: 
I (Y; X) = H(Y) – H(Y/X) 
              = I (Y = y; X = xi) 
             = H (Y = y) – H(Y = y | X = xi)167 
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Independent	  Variables	  X	   H	  (Y)	   H	  (Y	  /	  X)	   I	  (Y;	  X)	   Direction	  
	  
x1	  
Membership	  in	  WTO	  	  




Membership	  in	  	  Int'l	  Dispute	  Settlement	  
Organizations	   0.8110	   0.8110	   0.0000	   Positive	  
	  
x3	   Membership	  in	  Regional	  Dispute	  
Settlement	  Organizations	   0.8110	   0.0000	   0.8110	   Positive	  
	  
x4	   ACWL	  Membership	   0.8110	   0.8110	   0.0000	   Negative	  
	  
x5	   DSB	  as	  a	  Complainant	   0.8110	   0.5180	   0.2930	   Positive	  
	  
x6	   DSB	  as	  a	  Respondent	   0.8110	   0.3450	   0.4660	   Positive	  
	  
x7	   DSB	  as	  a	  Third	  Party	   0.8110	   0.8110	   0.0000	   Positive	  
	  
x8	  
Anti-­‐Dumping	  Agreement	  	  
Domestically	   0.8110	   0.7550	   0.0560	   Positive	  
	  
x9	  
Anti-­‐Dumping	  Agreement	  	  
at	  the	  DSB	  (Complainant)	   0.8110	   0.5000	   0.3110	   Positive	  
	  
x10	  
Anti-­‐Dumping	  Agreement	  	  
at	  the	  DSB	  (Respondent)	   0.8110	   0.5000	   0.3100	   Positive	  
	  
x11	  
Anti-­‐Dumping	  Agreement	  at	  the	  DSB	  




Third	  Party	  Support	   0.8110	   0.6070	   0.2040	   Positive	  
Source: Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor and Katya Drozdova. 2016. Quantifying the Qualitative Excel Implementation. June 7, 2017. URL: 
https://study.sagepub.com/drozdova 
 
Compare: Understanding the Outcomes 
         Table 6-9 generates some interesting results. It shows, for example, that there is a positive 
relationship between Membership in WTO Negotiation Groups (x1); Membership in 
International Dispute Settlement Organizations (x2) and DSB Experience as a Third Party (x7) 
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and the likelihood that states will participate in the DSB. Membership in the ACWL (x4) is 
shown to have a negative relationship with DSB litigation. The 0.0000 reading for the mutual 
information, however, reveals that whereas the direction of these relationships is given, they 
cannot accurately predict that a country will use the DSB if it is aggrieved. What, then, are the 
variables that this model shows will be good indicators of DSB participation? 
            Based on Table 6-9, the strongest predictor of DSB usage is Membership in Regional 
Dispute Settlement Organizations (x3). This variable has an 81% certainty. The other indicator of 
DSB participation is DSB Experience as a Respondent (x6). This has a 47% certainty. Experience 
with the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a Complainant (x9) and Respondent are also likely to 
induce DSB participation, but these have a low expectation of 31%. The positive relationship 
between these two variables and the outcome are logical since all of the cases involved evoking 
the Agreement. Finally, Experience at the DSB as a Complainant is also a predictor of litigating, 
but this has a low forecast of almost 30%. 
Conclusion 
 In concluding, this chapter explores legal capacity costs and how they affect 
participation in the DSB.  As a departure from previous studies, it conceptualizes legal capacity 
by including membership in regional and multilateral dispute settlement organizations, and 
experience at the DSB as a complainant, defendant or third-party. These are captured up to the 
point of the disputes to assess how ready countries were to act upon the cases. Since all the 
examined cases evoke the Anti-Dumping Agreement, legal capacity is also measured by tracing 
how much the countries had used the Agreement domestically and internationally when their 
cases were initiated. Since third parties can also enhance or impede a litigant’s position, the 
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chapter also examines how having third-party legal support affected the outcome and tendency to 
use the DSB again. 
Guatemala – Cement I and II reveal the power of legal capacity and the possible 
influence of the United States as a third-party litigant. In both cases, the ruling of the Panel 
coincided with the U.S. position. While this may reflect the superb understanding and dexterity 
that the United States has with the WTO’s position, it may also be an indication of its influence 
in directly affecting the outcome. Arguably, Guatemala could have been emboldened by the 
third-party support that it got in the first case and so it did not back down when Mexico 
threatened to file the second time around. This reflects Guatemala’s naiveté and underdeveloped 
legal capacity at that point. Notably, Guatemala – Cement I did not make a determination on the 
substantive issues of the dispute. The Appellate Body simply held that Mexico did not properly 
bring the matter before the Panel. Mexico therefore had leave to pursue the matter in a new case 
if it so desired.168 Guatemala’s “victory” in the first case was therefore short lived.  
Another important result of Guatemala – Cement II is that it did not make a 
determination on whether Mexico had in fact dumped cement into Guatemala’s domestic 
industry. Rather, the determination was that Guatemala had proceeded wrongfully in what it 
perceives as dumping. This highlights one of the issues raised in Chapter Five that the Anti-
Dumping Agreement itself can be a hindrance to countries seeking recourse, and ultimately, to 
their participation in the DSB. Mexico, for example, did not argue with Guatemala on whether it 
had in fact been dumping. Instead, it challenged Guatemala on how it initiated the investigation, 
determined that “dumping” had occurred and levied the duties. All of these are technical and 
ambiguous provisions that are outlined in the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Essentially, a country 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




	   	  
191 
can have a legitimate case but still lose at the DSB if it does not strictly adhere to its stipulations. 
Legal capacity, then, can swing a case in either direction if the litigants know what they are 
doing. In regards to third-party submissions, these can buttress a country’s case and promote 
greater participation in the DSB, or arguably, deter participation. Support in one case, however, 
does not necessarily forebode the same outcome in the next. Legal capacity is therefore a critical 
component of any trade dispute, and often helps to secure victory for the WTO astute. 
Jamaica and China had the least experience with the Anti-Dumping Agreement at the 
DSB and their non-participation in China – Cement remains puzzling. This is so because 
Guatemala had no experience but chose to litigate against Mexico and even to appeal the Panel’s 
decision. The United States and Mexico on the other hand, had sufficient experience with the 
Agreement at all levels and settled after the DSB was evoked. These cases underscore the 
integral role that legal capacity plays in determining participation in the DSB, and the high costs 
that countries pay if they dare go before the institution without being sufficiently prepared. 
Conversely, countries that seek aid through organizations like the ACWL not only reduce the 
transaction costs of using the DSB, but also get needed legal assistance to increase their chances 
of litigating and winning. However, since the countries that were examined had different levels 
of legal capacity and made different calculations about litigating, it means that other types of 
costs factor in their calculations.  
On a systematic, comparative level, the information theory approach reveals that 
membership in regional dispute settlement organizations is the greatest predictor of litigating at 
the DSB. Experience in the DSB generally and also with the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a 
respondent and complainant are also good indicators that countries will participate in dispute 
settlement. Legal costs, however, are not the only considerations that states make. The next 
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chapter will therefore discuss the other costs that these countries had at that time and how they 
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CHAPTER VII 
CALCULATED COSTS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON PARTICIPATION IN THE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY 
Introduction 
 This study probes how the costs associated with the WTO litigation process affect a 
country’s decision to file or respond to a filing. As outlined in Chapter Two, many studies have 
examined costs and their impact on DSB participation. These studies, however, tend to 
emphasize the disparity in DSB usage between developing and advanced nations and 
hypothesize that developing countries are incapacitated by the exorbitant costs that are associated 
with the process. In their view, these refer to the resources states need to contract legal services, 
the ability to impose countermeasures, as well as to absorb possible retaliatory, punitive actions 
from their powerful counterparts. I agree with these conjectures. This research argues, however, 
that focusing on just the burden that developing countries face to litigate assumes that these 
countries are not sometimes culpable of trade violations. As a result, it is more likely that 
developing countries will seek redress against larger economies and not vice versa. This thinking 
does not take into account the cases that developed nations have pursued against weaker states. 
Highlighting the challenges that developing countries face when they litigate also overlook the 
fact that not all advanced nations are frequent DSB users. In essence, while costs are an 
important factor, capability to meet those costs does not necessarily mean that states will litigate. 
Costs are therefore calculated relative to the benefits, and this determines what countries will do 
regardless of their capabilities. Instead of focusing on developing countries as they try to get 
redress against trade violations from their more powerful trading partners, this study therefore 
looks at dyads and the strategic considerations that states make there.  
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One of the earliest and most trenchant studies on DSB participation as a function of costs 
is Bown’s 2005 work. Here, Bown uses legal capacity and political economy costs to evaluate an 
exporter’s choice to become a complainant, interested third-party or non-participant in a trade 
dispute.1 This study does not refute Bown’s findings. It adds, however, to the literature on non-
participatory membership by examining not only the exporter’s decision to file, but the 
importer’s choice to become a defendant as well. This is done by probing why China chose to 
avoid the DSB, while Guatemala and the United States accepted their complainants’ threat to 
litigate. Consequently, it addresses why states initiate disputes as well as why states pursue and 
not back down from threats. As a distinction from Bown’s work, it also takes a more inductive 
approach through the exploratory nature of the cases.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the extant literature has focused on costs in the narrower 
sense. Studies have therefore looked at the financial, reputational, audience and interdependent 
payoffs, but hardly in a single study. This project therefore takes a more general approach to 
costs to test for a wider variety of determinants of non-participatory membership in the DSB. 
Chapter Four features an extensive form game that models trade and dispute settlement. This 
game theoretic approach is appropriate because it provides a more general, yet parsimonious 
emphasis that examines sensitivity to costs in ways that empirical studies struggle to do. It uses 
delta, for example, to measure all the costs that are associated with the dispute settlement 
process. These costs affect the strategies, payoffs and outcomes of the game as states consider 
Pareto-optimal gains from trading. In that chapter, costs are operationalized as delta. In this 
chapter, I therefore disaggregate delta to show all the different variables that are considered as 
costs to use the DSB.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Chad P. Bown. “Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders.” 
The World Bank Economic Review. 2005. Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 287- 310. 
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As mentioned in Chapter Five, the cases under examination are China – Cement, 
Guatemala – Cement I and II, and United States – Cement. Chapter Six explored how legal 
capacity can lower the costs to participation in the DSB through membership in other dispute 
settlement organizations and experience as a complainant, respondent or third-party. This chapter 
continues the discussion by evaluating the other variables that are composited in delta. These are 
also the explanations for non-participatory membership that Chapter Two discusses. They 
include ability to impose countermeasures, reputational costs and benefits, domestic audience 
costs, interdependent payoffs, availability of alternative forums, expectation to win, existing 
bilateral agreements and complex interdependence. Notably, Bown also uses some of these 
variables in his study. He does not, however, include reputational costs and benefits, domestic 
audience costs, expectation to win or the availability of alternative forums in his deliberations. 
These are addressed by other scholars such as Chaudoin, Busch, Fang, Davis and Brewster. Delta 
is therefore a composite calculation of all the costs that are associated with the process. 
Importantly, as a distinction from all previous studies, this is the first known study to use the 
information theory approach to comparatively assess the independent variables’ effects on the 
outcome (litigation) when there are elements of uncertainty. 
As in the discussion on legal capacity, the aim of this chapter is to discuss these variables 
with specific reference to the timing of the disputes. As a result, it will analyze what was 
happening within the states at the time of the disputes and how they weighed whether it was 
profitable to litigate or avoid the institution. It should be noted, however, that by presenting a 
composite definition of costs, that this study does not purport to be the most comprehensive. 
Indeed, other variables that could be seen as costs are not included here. The choice of these 
variables are therefore meant to demonstrate that there are quantitative and qualitative utility 
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calculations that states make as they consider litigation. Broadening the scope of these 
deliberations through delta allows for this. Admittedly, some factors weigh more than others in 
the minds of states. This study does not measure this; it simply considers how each factor may 
contribute to the overall cost assessment. Measuring how each variable figures in the cost 
deliberations is therefore a good next step for this project since some factors matter more to some 
states than others. Hence, some costs are more likely to precipitate disputes than others. For now, 
however, the focus is on how the states in question evaluated what they had to pay for each 
variable, and how this assessment led to their participation or avoidance of the DSB. 
Contested Good’s Contribution to Affected Countries’ Gross Domestic Product 
Trade disputes occur because countries care about the goods that are being contested. 
This is often due to the gains or projected gains from trade. In an effort to determine why states 
participate in or avoid using the DSB, it is therefore important to discuss whether the good that is 
the subject of the dispute is a significant contributor to the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP). Here, the argument is that states will not wrangle over goods that are minimal economic 
generators, while they will fight vociferously over products that generate, or have the potential to 
generate national wealth.2 Of course, the observation must be made that not all goods matter 
equally in all countries. A particular product may therefore be the life line in one country, while 
in another, it is just an added source of income. This may help to explain why some countries 
impose protective measures and even initiate filings over some goods, and the other country does 
not respond in like manner. Understanding therefore, the relevance of cement in the respective 
countries is critical to any discussion on non-participation in the various cases. 
China 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See for example, Chad P. Bown and Bernard M. Hoekman. “Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade 
Agreements: Why Dispute Settlement is Not Enough.” 2007. Policy Research Working Paper 4450. The World 
Bank. Development Research Group. Trade Team. 
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China is the world’s top producing cement country.3 The U.S. 2015 Geological Survey 
reports that in 2013, China produced an estimated 2,420,000 tonnes of cement.4 This figure 
increased to 2,500,000 in 20145. Added to this mix is its leading estimated clinker capacity of 
1,900,000 tonnes in 2013, and 2,000,000 in 2014.6 Cement is therefore a good in which China 
dominates the world. How then does this translate to its effect on the GDP? China’s economy 
can be divided into primary, secondary and tertiary industries.7 Based on this classification, 
agriculture makes up the primary sector, construction and manufacturing fall within the 
secondary division, and the service sector comprises the third.8 Cement is one of the goods that 
makes up China’s construction and manufacturing industry. Data gathered from 2013 reveal how 
each sector contributes towards the country’s GDP. 46% of its GDP comes from the tertiary 
industry, 44% the secondary industry, and 10% from the primary industry.9 Where the timing of 
China – Cement is concerned, at that time, the secondary industry of which cement is a part, 
contributed towards 46% of China’s GDP.10 What this means is that cement is a very important 
good to the Chinese economy, and one that it would want to protect.  
The fact that China accepted an antidumping duty on its cement even after protesting 
some of the procedures can mean one of a few things. China was new to the WTO and may 
therefore have not yet mastered litigation. Considering its lengthy accession process and the 
number of trade liberalizations that it had to make, China may have been reluctant to file so 
quickly. Alternatively, it could mean that Jamaica was simply not one of China’s main cement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 “U.S. Geological Survey, 2015, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2015: U.S. Geological Survey.” 196 p., 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3133/70140094 .  
4 Ibid, 39. 
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid 




10 Ibid  
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markets and so China could afford the levy. This will be discussed more fully under the 
Availability of Other Markets section. Here, however, we can conclude by saying that cement is 
a major income generator for China, and under ordinary circumstances, this is a good that it 
would want to protect, even if it requires litigating in the DSB. The fact that it did not means that 
other costs were calculated. 
Jamaica 
 Jamaica is not a leading producer of cement. Its manufacturing industry contributes to 
about one-eighth of its GDP and employs less than one-tenth of the labour force.11 Manufactured 
products include processed foods such as rum, sugar and molasses, along with textiles and metal 
products.12 Cement and chemicals fall within this category.13 Jamaica has one cement producing 
company, Caribbean Cement Company Limited (CCCL). In the July to September quarter of 
2003, it produced 149, 084 tonnes, which increased to 186, 752 for the same period in 2004. This 
output was deemed to be a 2% increase in the manufacturing industry’s contribution to the 
nation’s real GDP.14 While Jamaica’s cement production is nowhere near larger markets, its 
value is prized in a country that relies heavily on services and tourism. There is therefore a lot of 
national pride associated with this commodity, and this helps to explain why steps like an anti-
dumping duty would be used to keep it from collapsing.15 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See James A. Ferguson, Clinton V. Black, Patrick Bryan and David J. Buisseret. “Jamaica.” 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Jamaica      
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid 
14 “Increase in GDP for Manufacturing and Processing Sector.” Jamaica Information Service. 6 January 2005. 
http://jis.gov.jm/increase-in-gdp-for-manufacturing-and-processing-sector/ 
15 See for example, “Caribbean Cement Corporate Profile.” http://www.caribcement.com/about  
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Guatemala 
The main cement company in Guatemala is Cementos Progreso S.A, which has an 
estimated annual capacity of 3,000 metric tonnes.16 Some of its plants in the country include San 
Miguel, Sanarte and El Progreso.17 Cement in Guatemala, falls under its industry category, and 
include items such as food processing, publishing, mining, textiles, clothing, tires and 
pharmaceuticals.18 These make 20% of the nation’s GDP, which translates to US$9.6 billion.19 
At the time of the disputes, Cementos Progreso was the largest cement company in Central 
America20 and was therefore a key component of Guatemala’s economy. This underscores why 
Guatemala would want to have an antidumping duty in place if it felt that this industry was being 
threatened. 
Mexico  
 Manufacturing is the largest contributor to Mexico’s GDP.21 Some of the goods produced 
include cement, glass, pottery, china and earthenware.22 Cementos Mexicanos, or CEMEX, is the 
largest cement producing company in Mexico. By 1994, it was the fourth largest cement 
company in the world, with annual profits of US$3 billion.23 CEMEX is multinational, with 
outlets in the United States and twenty-five European, Asian and Latin American countries.24 
Merrill and Miró report that in 1993, Mexico’s total cement output was 27 million tonnes. This, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Steven T. Anderson. “U.S. Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook 2010: Guatemala.” 
https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2010/myb3-2010-gt.pdf     Accessed June 2, 2017.  
17 Ibid 
18 “Guatemala.” Nations Encyclopedia. http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Americas/Guatemala.html  
19 Ibid 
20 Christiansen, Bryan and Muslum Basilgan. Economic Behavior, Game Theory, and Technology in Emerging 
Markets. (Pennsylvania: Business Science Reference, 2014), 362. 
21 See Tim L. Merrill and Ramón Miró, eds. “Mexico: A Country Study.” Washington: GPO for the Library of 
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however, is prefaced by a fall from 4.5 million tonnes in 1988, to 1.4 million tonnes in 1992.25 
This decrease is attributed to the high demands for cement, and also the imposition of 
antidumping duties from the United States.26 
 At the time of Guatemala – Cement I, CEMEX would have been expanding globally and 
facing challenges with the changes in demand for cement, plus the added burden of the United 
States’ levy on its cement. This means that Guatemala’s new anti-dumping duty would have 
been an added attack on its industry. With this product contributing so significantly to its GDP, 
this would be a case that Mexico would respond to so as to protect its interests. 
United States 
 The United States is a world leading cement producer, with an estimated installed 
capacity of 100 metric tonnes per year.27 Its cement industry is a conglomeration of multinational 
firms such as Lafarge, CEMEX, Holcim and HeidelbergCement, and local companies that 
include Ash Grove Cement and Texas Industries.28 In 2015, cement sales were about $9.8 
billion, with Texas, California, Missouri, Florida, and Alabama being the top producing states.29 
Even with the leading role that the United States has in cement production, it has performed for 
many years below capacity levels.30 This reality, along with global shocks such economic 
recessions would precipitate protection of this industry. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid 
27 “Cement in the USA.” Global Cement. 14 March 2012. http://www.globalcement.com/magazine/articles/698-
cement-in-the-usa  
28 Ibid 
29 Hendrik G. van Oss. “Mineral Commodity Summaries 2016.” U.S. Department of the Interior: U.S. Geological 
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Table 7-1: Summary of Contested Goods as Significant GDP Contributors for the 
Countries 






United States Yes 
 
 
Countries’ Expected Utility Calculations 
The variables that will be discussed henceforth will evaluate the different factors that 
may help states determine the payoffs of litigating versus the costs associated with the process. 
 One of the considerations of this research is that if countries have other lucrative markets, 
this will lessen the chances that they will litigate over some duties. This is because they can 
afford to lose that revenue and compensate for it in other countries. There are two opposing 
arguments to this thinking. One is that it depends on the country. If the particular country is a 
major market, then the other state will want to litigate to protect its interests. Additionally, even 
if the market is not “significant,” the affected country may fear contagion whereby all its trading 
partners may institute countermeasures against its products and so it may litigate to deter that 
type of action. Consequently, availability of markets may make some countries forego litigation 
with one country, or pursue it with another depending on what the perceived stakes are. It is 
therefore important to see how calculations about alternative markets informed the decisions to 
use or avoid the DSB at the time of the disputes. This, however, is not a discussion on 
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prospective markets that the disputants could divert trade to since there would be startup 
expenses. It is, instead, an evaluation of the trading partners that were already in place and how 
calculating the gains from trade in those areas could make countries forego or litigate a pending 
dispute. 
 In the figures below, statistics from 2015 are used. These are used in lieu of missing data 
from the respective years. Here, the intention is to provide information on the different types of 
countries that buy cement from each disputant. These in turn, are alternative markets in the event 
that one country loses a trading partner after a dispute 
China 
 
Figure 7-1: China’s 2015 Top Cement Exporting Countries 
 
Source: “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by China.” Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, whether or not 
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Figure 7-1 shows the top ten countries that China supplies with cement. Bangladesh tops 
the list with US$110,464,000, while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is 10th with 
US$20,388,000. While the Figure only outlines the main countries that buy cement from China, 
China exports the commodity to a total of 152 states.31 This means that in the event of any trade 
fallout with Jamaica, there are many countries that can be used as alternative markets; some of 
which are not overly concerned with the rule of law and WTO rulings. In this regard, then, 
China’s ability to provide the world with cement seems to a buttress for its continued trade 
relations with other countries. Any losses incurred from the Jamaican market could therefore be 
quickly compensated elsewhere. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by China.” Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, 








Figure 7-2: Jamaica’s 2015 Top Cement Exporting Countries 
 
Source: “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by Jamaica.” 
Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, whether or not coloured. 
http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|388||||2523|||4|1|1|2|2|1|2|1|1 
 
Figure 7-2 illustrates Jamaica’s 2015 export destinations for cement. Of these countries, 
Venezuela is the main recipient with a value of US$10,682,000 and Cuba is 7th with $US45, 000. 
In previous years, Jamaica has also exported cement to the Cayman Islands, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Montserrat, Netherlands, Anguilla, Trinidad 
and Tobago, and the United States. For 2015, however, it did not export cement to any of these 
countries.32 In terms of importing, the United States, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Belgium, 
Japan, Turkey, United Kingdom, Trinidad and Tobago, Spain and Canada are Jamaica’s main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by Jamaica.” Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, 
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providers.33 China is a distant 12th. Additionally, only the top three countries export significant 
dollar amounts of the product to Jamaica.34 Clearly, Jamaica’s has a much smaller cement market 
when compared with China. It therefore means that it would be easier in this instance, for 
Jamaica to put a domestic measure in place to protect its fledging cement industry, than for 
China to formally complain about this measure. Importantly, however, in the absence of any 
Chinese withdrawal of cement from its market, Jamaica would have other choices which provide 
even more cement than China does. 
Guatemala 
 
Figure 7-3: Guatemala’s 2015 Top Cement Exporting Countries 
 
Source: “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by Guatemala.” Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, whether or not 
coloured. http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|320||||2523|||4|1|1|2|2|1|2|1|1 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 “List of Supplying Markets for a Product Imported by Jamaica.” Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, 
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 In 2015, Guatemala exported cement valued at US$7,184,000.35 Figure 7-3 shows that of 
this amount, Belize was the highest buyer, followed by Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua. 
The volumes of cement imported by Belize, Honduras and El Salvador, however, far supersedes 
the others. In 2015, Guatemala also exported cement to Panama and the United States. Panama 
bought goods valued at US$72,000, while those consumed by the United States amounted to 
US$7,000.36 Historically, Jamaica, Mexico and Venezuela also bought Guatemalan cement. In 
2015, however, they did not import any.37 On the importing side, in 2015, Guatemala’s top 
cement sellers were the Republic of Korea, China, Barbados, Japan, Mexico, Honduras, Peru, 
Spain, Denmark and Nicaragua, in descending order.38 Of these suppliers, the dollar amount 
from the Republic of Korea was US$27,116,000 and Mexico, with US$3,890,000.39 Belize, El 
Salvador, Costa Rica and Panama also exported cement to Guatemala, but in far lesser 
amounts.40 These figures and countries are important because they demonstrate that Mexico is 
not the main provider of cement to Guatemala. Consequently, in the event of any withdrawal of 
cement from Guatemala, it would still be able to find viable alternatives. 
 The illustration of Guatemala’s cement buyers is noteworthy. Belize, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama are all Central American countries. In Guatemala 
– Cement I and II, however, only El Salvador and Honduras joined as third parties and supported 
Guatemala. This is particularly interesting since Belize is a top consumer, yet it took no formal 
interest in the case. This reoccurrence of non-participatory membership could be an incident of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by Guatemala.” Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, 
whether or not coloured. 
http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|320||||2523|||4|1|1|2|2|1|2|1|1 
36 Ibid  
37 Ibid 
38 “List of Supplying Markets for a Product Imported by Guatemala.” Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, 
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free riding. This will be discussed more fully in Chapter 8. For here, we can conclude that all the 
countries in the region trade with Guatemala and this suggests economic interdependence. The 
extent to which they demonstrate support for Guatemala through the cases is another matter.  
Mexico  
 
Figure 7-4: Mexico’s 2015 Top Cement Exporting Countries 
 




In 2015, Mexico exported cement valued at US$93,761,000.41 Figure 7-4 reveals that of 
this amount, the United States bought US$61,102,000 worth. This is followed by Belize, Brazil 
and Guatemala. El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama and Honduras also buy Mexican cement.42 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by Mexico.” Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, 
whether or not coloured. 
http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|484||||2523|||4|1|1|2|2|1|2|1|1    
42 Ibid 
61,102	  

























Mexico's	  2015	  Top	  Cement	  Expor1ng	  Countries	  
 
	  
	   	  
208 
United States is also the main exporter of Cement to Mexico, while Canada is tenth in this 
category.43  
The types of countries that buy cement from Mexico is important for the cases at hand. 
Guatemala, for example, is the 4th highest importer of Mexican cement. This weighs on the 
Guatemala – Cement trade disputes because it shows that if Guatemala had stopped importing 
this cement, or continued its levy, Mexico would have lost much revenue. Compounding this 
issue is also the fact that El Salvador and Honduras also buy Mexican cement. Since, as 
discussed earlier, they joined the disputes in support of Guatemala, these countries could also 
stop buying cement from Mexico and continue to import Guatemalan cement. If this resulted, 
Mexico would have lost much more from the trade disputes than Guatemala. 
As in the case of Guatemala, here Belize, Nicaragua and Panama’s importation of 
Mexican cement is also curious since these countries did not participate in the trade dispute. 
While it could be very likely that they did not want to side with any of the litigants, since they 
buy cement from both countries, they would likely suffer or benefit from the outcome. The 
factors that led to their non-participation are therefore worthwhile exploring. Ecuador’s stance in 
these cement disputes is also noteworthy. While not a Central American country, it also imports 
cement from Mexico. It, however, joined the second case in support of Guatemala, and later 
imposed anti-dumping duties on Mexican cement. This demonstrates that several countries may 
have been experiencing predatory trading practices from Mexico. Here, Canada can also be 
mentioned since it is the 10th largest importer of Mexican cement. This may help to explain its 
reservation of third party rights in the first Guatemala case since any ruling may affect future 
cement sales within its territory. It is still not clear though, why Canada did not make any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 “List of Supplying Markets for a Product Imported by Mexico.” Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, 
whether or not coloured. 
http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|484||||2523|||4|1|1|1|2|1|2|1|1   
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submissions before the Panel, and why it did not participate in the second case. Why some chose 
to participate and others did not, is interesting and adds value to the study. More of this is 
discussed in Chapter 8. From the figures, however, we can see that Mexico had other options, but 
would lose in other ways if it lost Guatemala as a cement trading partner. 
The United States’ position as the main buyer and seller of cement to and from Mexico is 
also important. These economies are very closely linked and this forebodes significant 
repercussions for both if any should withdraw support from the other. In a sense, while they both 
have alternative venders and consumers, one can appreciate why they settled at the WTO and not 
prolong their dispute for much longer. These countries therefore have too much to lose and made 








Figure 7-5: United States’ 2015 Top Cement Exporting Countries 
 
Source: “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by United States of America.” Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, 
whether or not coloured. http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|842||||2523|||4|1|1|2|2|1|2|1|1 
 
 
 For 2015, the United States sold US$249, 472, 000 worth of cement.44 Figure 7-5 
illustrates who the top buyers are. Canada tops the list, followed by Mexico, Bahamas and 
France. Of this list, Canada and Japan reserved their third party rights in United States – Cement. 
China also joined as a third party and is listed as 13th top cement exporter from the United 
States.45 Since this case was settled, it is unclear what their positions would have been. Their 
formal involvement, however, represents their substantive interest in the case. Specifically as it 
relates to this section, the Figure shows that Canada consumes more cement from the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by United States of America.” Product: 2523 Cement, incl. 
cement clinkers, whether or not coloured. 
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States than Mexico does. Mexico’s contribution, however, is still significant. The United States 
therefore has viable options in the event of a falling out with Mexico, but would still lose large 
amounts of cement revenue if its relationship with Mexico were to disintegrate.  
 
Table 7-2: Summary of Availability of Alternative Markets 





United States Yes 
 
 
Ability to Enforce Countermeasures 
 One of the main criticisms of the WTO’s dispute settlement system is that is has 
provisions for recourse, but not redress. Essentially, the institution adjudicates cases that are 
brought before it, but countries must impose countermeasures on their own. As a result, some 
countries choose not to initiate a dispute in the first place because they cannot afford to punish 
their aggressors. Pauwelyn’s arguments on this are delineated in Chapter 2.46  Bown also studies 
this phenomenon, arguing that exporters with more capacity to withdraw concessions from their 
respondent’s markets are more likely to initiate disputes.47 Countermeasures, however, are not 
the automatic first step after successful litigation. The trade violator is given a “reasonable period 
of time” to bring its measures into compliance. It is after that period has elapsed that the DSB 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See Joost Pauwelyn. “Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules-Toward a More Collective 
Approach.” The American Journal of International Law (April 2000), Volume 94, Number 2. 
47 Chad P. Bown. “Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders.” 
The World Bank Economic Review. 2005. Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 306 -307. 
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allows for bilateral countermeasures that are similar and proportional to the offense.48 Countries, 
upon litigating, must therefore be prepared to impose countermeasures in the event that the 
violator does not bring its measures into compliance in a timely manner. In this section, I will 
therefore examine each country’s trade profile to see if at the time of their disputes, they were 
also to impose punitive sanctions against their culpable trading partners. The postulation is that 
the more capable a state is to respond accordingly, the lower the anticipated costs of DSB 
participation. These “low” costs in turn, increase the chances that an aggrieved party will use the 
institution, either as a complainant or respondent. 
China 
If China had initiated the dispute with Jamaica, its role would have been that of a 
complainant. This case therefore did not materialize because China did not file. Additionally, if 
litigated, Jamaica would have been required to bring its measures into compliance by removing 
the duties. After the allotted period of time, China could have the institution’s permission to 
implement countermeasures against Jamaica. What then, did the antidumping duties against 
China look like and how prepared was China to respond? 
Jamaica, in its Semi-Annual Report of Anti-Dumping Actions for the Period 01 January to 
30 June 2004, outlined to the WTO that it had initiated investigations against the alleged 
dumping of Chinese cement into its territory. Based on its Preliminary Determination, dumping 
was believed to have occurred and a provisional duty of 96.27% was imposed on March 3, 2004. 
This was adjusted to 89.79% on June 14, 2004, when the definitive duty was levied. This was to 
be applied to 112,999 metric tonnes of Chinese cement, which constituted 16% of domestic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See the Articles of the Dispute Settlement Unit in “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes.” Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm  
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consumption.49 China’s economic state at the time of the trade dispute shows that it would have 
been able to impose countermeasures against Jamaica if it had filed and Jamaica failed to remove 
those measures in a timely fashion. International Trade Statistics 2003 delineates that in contrast 
to global trends, China’s exports and imports rose by 30% between 2000 and 2002.50 By 2002, it 
was the “fourth largest merchandise trader,” and had become the chief supplier for many 
economies and also an important export destination.51 China’s economic growth and position in 
the global economy therefore made it very capable to respond to this trade dispute if it had 
occurred. How then did Jamaica compare? 
The nature of the dispute shows that Jamaica, as the aggrieved partner, Jamaica had used 
the WTO provisions to protect itself domestically. As long as China respected this duty, it had 
nothing else to do. In the event, however, that China continued to dump products into Jamaican 
territory, Jamaica could respond by dumping other products in China, or some other form of 
retaliation. With flagrant, continuous violations, Jamaica could also seek recourse at the DSB. 
Was it in any shape to retaliate in a similar and proportional manner to China? China does not 
buy cement from Jamaica so a direct response in that area was not possible.52 Jamaica, however, 
is “China’s biggest trading partner in the English-speaking Caribbean.”53 China imports cane 
sugar, aluminum and bauxite from Jamaica, while Jamaica imports textiles, clothing and light 
industrial products from China.54 In 2004, trade volumes between the two countries totaled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See “Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of the Agreement.” G/ADP/N/119/JAM. 21 October 2004. World 
Trade Organization. 
50 “International Trade Statistics 2003.” World Trade Organization, p. 1. 
https://www.wto.org/ENGLISH/res_e/statis_e/its2003_e/its2003_e.pdf  
51 Ibid 
52 See “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by Jamaica.” 
Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, whether or not coloured. 
http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|388||||2523|||4|1|1|2|2|1|2|1|1    
53 “China & Jamaica: Bilateral Economic and Trade Relations, Economic and Technical Cooperation.” 
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US$395.98 million. This was a 90.8% increase from with the previous year.55  Of this amount, 
Chinese export volume came to US$126.13 million, while its imports amounted to US$269.85 
million. The importance that China places on Jamaica as a trading partner in the Caribbean 
region and the amount of trade between the two demonstrate that Jamaica would have been able 
to impose countermeasures against China.  
Guatemala and Mexico 
 In Guatemala – Cement I and II, Guatemala was the aggrieved party. In its Semi-Annual 
Report on Anti-Dumping Measures for the Period 1 July -31 December 1996, it indicated that on 
August 28, 1996, it had imposed a provisional 38.72% duty on Mexican cement. This was in 
relation to 67.193 million tonnes2 of cement, which represented 10.06 % of domestic 
consumption.56 Guatemala, in its submissions before the Panel, showed that Mexico was well 
able to retaliate even without going to the DSB, and especially after, if Guatemala did not 
remove the measures. Guatemala argued, for instance, that “during 1996, exports of grey 
Portland cement from Mexico to Guatemala represented only 0.016 per cent of Mexican exports 
of all products to all countries.”57 This was calculated by showing that for 1996, Mexico’s 
cement exports to all countries totaled US$96 billion, with Guatemala receiving US$15.6 
million.58 Moreover, Guatemala contended that in that year, Mexico’s overall exports to 
Guatemala amounted to US$360 million. Mexico’s cement exports were therefore just 4.3% of 
its overall exports to Guatemala.59 These arguments by Guatemala highlight the fact that Mexico 
could easily retaliate against Guatemala outside the DSB. Coupled with this is the observation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Ibid 
56 “Semi-Annual Report Under Article 16.4. of the Agreement – Guatemala.” G/ADP/N/22/GTM. 15 May 1998. 
World Trade Organization. 
57 “Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico.” Report of the Panel. 
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that Guatemala’s provision duty was in place for only four months. This suggests that Mexico 
had not suffered greatly. The fact that it took the case to the DSB could mean that Mexico is 
invested in institutional governance. Since, however, it did not suffer great losses from the levy 
and could retaliate but chose not to, means that other costs / benefits were also calculated in 
Mexico’s participation in the DSB. 
 In the case of Guatemala, if it had been the complainant in this dispute, it too would have 
been able to impose countermeasures against Mexico. As previously mentioned, Guatemala 
operates the largest cement company in Central America. In regards to its direct trade with 
Mexico, Guatemala exports goods such as “sugar, coffee, petroleum, apparel, bananas, fruits and 
vegetables, cardamom, manufacturing products, precious stones and metals, as well as 
electricity.”60 Mexico is its fourth largest recipient of its exports.61 In this regard, Guatemala 
would have been trading sufficient volumes of trade with Mexico to be able to impose 
countermeasures. 
United States and Mexico 
 The United States and Mexico share large volumes of trade. The United States reports for 
instance, that in 2003, it exported goods valued at US$97,411.8 million and imported products 
amounting to US$138,060.0.62 While this shows a trade deficit on the part of the United States, 
with both countries being major producers of cement and other goods, either would have been 
able to impose countermeasures within and without the DSB. The fact that both attempted 
institutional recourse over cement for more than a decade suggests that other factors played into 
their calculation, and they counted on the influence and authority of the DSB to resolve the 
conflict. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 CIA World Factbook: Guatemala. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.html  
61 Ibid 
62 “2003: U.S. Trade in Goods with Mexico.” https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html#2003 
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Table 7-3: Summary of Ability to Enforce Countermeasures 
Case Country Ability to Enforce 
Countermeasures 
China - Cement China Yes 
 Jamaica Yes 
Guatemala – Cement I Guatemala  Yes 
 Mexico Yes 
Guatemala – Cement II Guatemala  Yes 
 Mexico Yes 
United States - Cement United States Yes 
 Mexico Yes 
 
Reputational Costs / Benefits 
 In Chapter Two, several authors are cited for their thoughts on how reputational costs / 
benefits can induce participation in multilateral institutions. Guzman, for example, opine that 
often reputational costs are so high that threats to use institutions are often seen as credible.63 
Pelc joins the conversation by arguing that threats that are made multilaterally are more likely to 
be seen as credible. Without this, states suffer reputational losses if their “illegitimate” threats are 
resisted. Countries therefore use institutions to protect their reputation, and to concurrently signal 
their resolve.64 In the context of this research, all the disputants evoked some aspect of the WTO, 
yet three were litigated and one was not. This section will therefore discuss what, in a 
reputational sense, each disputant had to win or lose, and consequently, why they participated or 
avoided the DSB. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Andrew T. Guzman. “The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution.” The 
Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 31, Number 2 (June, 2002), pp. 303 – 326. 
64 Krzysztof J. Pelc. “Constraining Coercion? Legitimacy and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy, 1975–2000.” 
International Organization, Volume 64, Number 1, (Winter, 2010). 
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China – Cement 
 China acceded to the WTO in December 2001. Jamaica initiated its anti-dumping 
investigation against China in December 2003. At that time, China had only filed against one 
country, which was the United States in DS252. It had never been a complainant, and had been a 
third party litigant in 22 cases. With China’s transition from a non-market economy still in 
progress, there were many speculations about China being an unfair trader. In this regard, China 
could have filed to correct that stereotype. This would have been a reputational benefit. At the 
same time, however, this volume of trade may not be worth fighting over, considering the very 
many alternatives that China has. Bown alludes to this, contending that countries consider the 
market size that is at stake when they are to litigate. He also posits that states that are able to 
reciprocate by instituting countermeasures will do so and not litigate.65 Here we see however, 
that China did not consider Jamaica’s market share significant, but it not retaliate with an 
antidumping duty of its own or withdraw bilateral aid. I argue that at this point, China did not use 
the DSB because if China had filed against Jamaica and lost, this would have done significant 
damage to the reputation that it was trying to create as a new WTO-compliant Member.66 This 
loss would also have repercussions in other cases. In essence, China had more to lose from 
litigating than from avoiding the DSB. 
 In the case of Jamaica, if China had filed and it resulted in victory, the reputational 
benefits would be great. Jamaica, as a smaller state, being willing to not only take on China, but 
also win, would create many psychological benefits for a country that had never used the DSB as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Chad P. Bown. “Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why are So Few 
Challenged?” 2005. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3540. 
66 See also, Dukegeun, Lee and Park. They argue that WTO Members are less likely to use the DSB is the 
respondent “is smaller than the complainant, has less reputational concern, and faces less retaliatory capacity of the 
complainant.” Dukgeun Ahn, Jihong Lee and Jee-Hyeong Park. 2013. “Understanding Non-Litigated Disputes in 
the WTO Dispute Settlement System.” 47 Journal of World Trade, (2013) Issue 5, pp. 985–1012. 
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a complainant or respondent. On the cost side, Jamaica would not lose significantly if it lost 
against China. Since it had never filed, its attempts would have been lauded, and would have 
even increased its statute as a country that is willing to protect its industry by seeking recourse at 
the DSB.  
Guatemala Cement I and II 
 In the two cases that Mexico filed against Guatemala, Mexico lost more of its 
reputational standing in the international political economy, while Guatemala gained. In the first 
case, Guatemala used the Anti-Dumping Agreement domestically and internationally for the first 
time. Mexico, however, challenged the imposition of the duty and initiated the dispute. 
Arguably, by firstly not backing down, and secondly, challenging the ruling of the Panel and 
winning, Guatemala’s reputation soared across Central America and the world. On the other 
hand, since Mexico was the more powerful state that filed and lost, it suffered tremendous 
reputational costs. At the same time, Mexico would also have been commended by its 
constituents for not allowing Guatemala to get away with an “illegal” protective measure. In the 
second case, Mexico won and Guatemala lost. In this instance, Mexico was able to recover some 
reputational benefits by being vindicated through the verdict, while Guatemala, suffered some 
reputational losses. Generally, however, Guatemala emerged from these cases by making a name 
for itself, while Mexico’s standing fluctuated. 
United States – Cement 
 This case ended in a mutually agreed solution.67 This settlement was a sage move from 
both parties since the outcome would have led to significant reputational losses and benefits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Based on the terms of the agreement, the United States will phase out the restrictions over a three year period, 
totally eliminating them by 2009. During the transition, the U.S. will allow 3 million tonnes of Mexican cement into 
its territory, and this cap will increase over the 2nd and 3rd transitional years. Additionally, CEMEX, will receive 
about US$1 million in settlement, and will remove about US$65 million in liabilities. See “United States and 
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depending on the outcome. The great importance that cement plays in both economies impacted 
on the huge reputational costs that were at stake. Neither party wanted to be proven wrong. For 
as long as the dispute remained before the multilateral institution however, both countries 
received reputation benefits. This is because they would have been able to signal commitment to 
the issue to their domestic audiences, and also to the international observing public. Settling this 
case was therefore in the best interest of both parties. This is because the case had gone on for so 
long that to hold out and lose after investing so much in the case could have reputational 
consequences. (The United States had imposed the anti-dumping duty in August 199068). 
Conversely, either country could have used this as a benefit since they could claim that they did 
all that they could to fight the issue, but the institution ruled against it.69 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Mexico Agree to Resolve Antidumping Order on Mexican Cement.”  19 January 2006. 
http://www.CEMEXusa.com/MediaCenter/PressRelease/resolve-antidumping-order-20060119.aspx    
68 Gregory Wells Bowman, Nick Covelli, David A. Gantz and Ihn Ho Uhm. 2010. Trade Remedies in North 
America. (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2010), 614. 
69 See for example, the arguments about political cover in Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth.  “Legitimizing Dispute 
Settlement: International Legal Rules as Domestic Political Cover.” The American Political Science Review, 
Volume 100, Number 2 (May 2006). 
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Table 7-4: Summary of Reputational Costs / Benefits in Each Dispute 
Case Country Reputational Cost Reputational 
Benefit 
China - Cement China Yes Yes 
 Jamaica No Yes 
Guatemala – 
Cement I 
Guatemala  No Yes 
 Mexico Yes Yes 
Guatemala – 
Cement II 
Guatemala  Yes Yes 
 Mexico No Yes 
United States - 
Cement 
United States Yes Yes 
 Mexico Yes Yes 
 
 
Domestic Audience Costs 
 The influence that domestic audience costs have on participation in institutions is 
discussed in Chapter Two. Scholars like Lohmann posit that audience costs can make the threat 
to use institutions more credible.70 Martin also argues in similar fashion.71 Consequently, 
countries that face domestic pressures to protect their interests, will use the formal, legal dispute 
settlement procedures of the WTO to demonstrate to their constituents that their concerns are 
being taken seriously.72 This part of the study will therefore examine what was going on within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Susanne Lohmann. “Why Do Institutions Matter? An Audience Cost Theory of Institutional Commitment.” 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 16, No. 1, (January, 2003) pp. 
95–110. 
71 Lisa L. Martin. “Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions.” World Politics, 
Volume 45, Number 3 (April, 1993), pp. 406 – 432. 
72 See also Christina L. Davis in Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO. (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2012) 
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the countries at the time and how this influenced their decision to use the DSB. As with all 
domestic tensions, more than one “voice” is usually clamoring for the government’s attention. 
The question then becomes, why do some voices matter and others do not? This is a classic 
interest groups argument. Hence, when costs are concentrated and benefits are diffused, those 
who pay the costs are better able to organize and advocate. In analyzing domestic audience costs, 
this section therefore focuses on the main pressures that were within the state to use or avoid the 
DSB and not the general debates. The argument is that the greater the audience costs, the higher 
the chances that the disputants will litigate. 
China – Cement 
 In many anti-dumping investigations, an aggrieved local firm nudges its government to 
begin proceedings on its behalf. This case is therefore peculiar because no domestic Jamaican 
company lobbied for reprieve. Instead, the Jamaican Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Commission 
decided to pursue this matter of its own volition. This is permissible pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 4 of the Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act, 1999.  It therefore identified 
Mainland International Limited, a local company, as the importer of the alleged dumped goods. 
These products were produced by Longkou Fanlin Cement Company Limited, and exported by 
Shandong Metals and Minerals, both of which are located in China.73  The affected domestic 
producer was Caribbean Cement Company Limited. 
The Commission reported that Mainland first entered the Jamaican market in 1999, and 
that since then, there had been an increase in the number of its import sources up to the point of 
the present investigation. In 1999, for example, of the four countries from which Mainland 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73“Notice of Affirmative Preliminary Determination.” REF. No. AD-01-2003. 15 March 2004. Antidumping and 
Subsidies Commission, Jamaica: Kingston.  
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imported cement, two had been found to be at dumped prices.74 The Commission’s actions 
therefore while serving in the long run to protect Caribbean Cement, seems in my mind, to have 
been purposed in the first instance to regulate the activities of Mainland by bringing its practices 
into conformity with the local and international stipulations. China therefore was not the initial 
target, but became party to the dispute because its companies are both the producer and exporter 
in this particular case.  
It can be argued, however, that the Jamaica Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Commission 
simply preempted Caribbean Cement and acted before an official complaint could be made. This 
may be true. What is clear though, it that even with the frictions in the market at that time, no 
domestic firm prompted the Commission to act.  It later, however, faced lawsuits for failing to 
impose the determined anti-dumping duties on Chinese cement.75 
In 2003, China was leading the world in “raw coal, steel, cement, color TV and mobile 
phones.”76 Additionally, it was moving towards becoming a full market economy.77 China was 
therefore cooperative with the Jamaican authorities and seemed to want to show that it was in 
compliance. For example, since it was a non-market economy, it agreed with the use of 
Indonesia as a surrogate for comparison. It also welcomed the Jamaican investigating authorities 
to visit the cement companies to see that there was no violation.78 These, in my mind, support the 
thinking that there were no domestic audience costs propelling China to file against Jamaica. On 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Statement of Reasons, REF. No. AD-01-2003. June 14, 2004. Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Commission, Jamaica: 
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75 See for example, “Caribbean Cement Company v The Attorney General and the Minister of Finance and 




76 “China's Economy in 2003(2004/01/09).” http://www.china-un.ch/eng/ljzg/shjjtj/t85857.htm   
77 Ibid 
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the contrary, China’s openness to the investigation seemed to be more intended to persuade the 
Jamaican authorities that they did not in fact have a case.  
Guatemala – Cement I and II 
Mexico, at the time of this trade dispute was facing a severe recession. This resulted in 
“excess cement production capacity in 1995.”79 Guatemala therefore became a cement 
destination to offset some of this excess production.80 In the case of Guatemala, its local firm 
Cementos Progreso had monopolistic control of the cement market for most of its years since 
1899.81 In 1995, it was experiencing cement shortages and this is when Mexico’s Cruz Azul 
began exporting to Guatemala.82 Within six months of operations, Cruz Azul took over almost a 
quarter of the Guatemalan market.83 Yocis shows that Cementos Progreso had concerns about its 
competitiveness in the open market and this led it to seek the government’s protection through 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.84 At that time, Cementos Progreso was the largest cement 
company in Central America, while Cruz Azul was the second largest cement company in 
Mexico.85 
 An additional consideration in the Guatemala – Cement I dispute is that Guatemala had 
just elected a new government the same week that the investigation was launched.86 Mexico was 
therefore of the view that the Guatemalan business elite was using its close ties with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 “Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico.” Report of the Panel. 
WT/DS156/R. 24 October 2000. Paragraph 4.92. 
80 Ibid 
81 David A. Yocis. “Hardened Positions: Guatemala Cement and WTO Review of National Antidumping 
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government to protect its interests.87 This thinking coincides with Rosendorff and Smith’s 
arguments that countries tend to be more litigious at the WTO when they have new changes in 
government.88 In response to the investigation, Cruz Azul had provided its own data, but this was 
not verified.89 Mexico’s contention was therefore that proper protocols were not followed in 
investigating and levying the antidumping duty, and so it sought recourse at the DSB. In this 
regard, Guatemala’s new competition from Mexican cement as well as the change in the political 
climate precipitated its antidumping duty. For Mexico, losses from the recession and challenges 
from the new market that it wanted to get a foothold in made it initiate the dispute. The fact that 
these two countries are contiguous and have recurrent border clashes would have made it even 
more likely that they would formalize this dispute. 
 The stakes in Guatemala – Cement II are arguably higher than in the previous case. 
Guatemala’s victory would have shocked Mexico, with possible ricocheting effects on Mexico’s 
other trading relationships. With this loss and Mexico feeling that it had a valid and viable case, 
domestic sentiments would have been stronger to right this wrong. Guatemala, on the other hand, 
would feel some sense of vindication for having imposed the antidumping measure against 
Mexico. If there were strong ties between the business community and the government as 
Mexico purported, then the government would have scored political points were standing up to 
its more powerful neighbour and winning. This would have made it even more determined to 
litigate in the second case. In both instances, domestic audience costs would have therefore 
catalyzed litigation at the DSB. 
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https://wp.nyu.edu/faculty-rosendorff/wp-content/uploads/sites/1510/2015/06/May28_2015WTOOnset.pdf 
89 David A. Yocis. “Hardened Positions: Guatemala Cement and WTO Review of National Antidumping 
Determinations.” New York University Law Review. 2001. Volume 76, Number 4, p. 1281. 
 
	  
	   	  
225 
United States – Cement 
 In 1989, the Southern Tier Cement Committee filed an antidumping petition to the U.S. 
Department of Commerce.90 This group contended that Mexico was selling cement at below 
market level prices within the United States and that its producers were being negatively 
affected. The Department of Commerce then verified that CEMEX was indeed selling cement at 
less than fair market value prices.91 On August 30, 1990, the United States instituted an 
antidumping duty on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico.92  
The imposition of this antidumping duty, longevity of the dispute and later settlement, all 
reveal the strong domestic audience costs in this dispute. As discussed in Availability of Other 
Markets, the United States is the top consumer of Mexican cement. With the large volumes of 
cement that the United States buys from Mexico, this severe and sustained measure would have 
had deleterious effects on Mexico’s cement industry. The pressures for the government to pursue 
litigation and fight this measure would therefore have been great. Mexico therefore fought this 
under GATT, NAFTA, and later the WTO. In 1992, the GATT ruled in favour of Mexico, but 
this judgment was not upheld by the United States.93 Under NAFTA, Mexico filed 14 times 
regarding the cement dispute, but still did not get any termination of the duties.94 When it filed at 
the DSB on January 31, 2003, that was therefore its latest attempt to have the levy removed. 
Mexico’s persistence highlights the fact that it felt that it had a case, and needed institutional 
relief.  
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 Within the United States, the influence of the Southern cement producing states is 
obvious. Consequently, while they were the ones to advocate for the imposition of the duty, they 
were the ones who also helped the United States to consider its removal. In 2006, the United 
States was facing cement shortages. This was mainly due to the damage caused by Hurricane 
Katrina and the need to rebuild. Commerce Secretary Carlos M. Gutierrez in his statement 
alluded to this by indicating that, "The agreement will help ensure that Gulf Coast communities 
have the resources to rebuild and it will also help U.S. cement producers access the Mexican 
market.”95 Domestic political considerations therefore played an integral part in this dispute, both 
for the U.S. consumers that now needed cement, and for the Mexican producers that wanted to 
sell it. 
 
Table 7-5: Summary of Domestic Audience Costs at the Time of the Disputes 
Case Country Domestic Audience Costs 
China - Cement China No 
 Jamaica No 
Guatemala – Cement I Guatemala  Yes 
 Mexico Yes 
Guatemala – Cement II Guatemala  Yes 
 Mexico Yes 
United States - Cement United States Yes 
 Mexico Yes 
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Interdependent Payoffs / Precedent Setting 
 Countries often litigate in the DSB because they are concerned about how the 
institution’s rulings can be used as a bargaining tool and precedent in other cases (Davis 2012; 
Leal-Arcas 2007; Pauwelyn 2000; Reinhardt 1999; Fang 2010). The argument is therefore that if 
a prospective litigant expects that the payoffs from winning can be used elsewhere, this will 
increase the likelihood that it will participate in the DSB. This section therefore examines each 
country embroiled in a trade dispute, and what expectations it had regarding interdependent 
payoffs. 
China – Cement 
 While this case did not end up at the DSB, the deliberations that the countries made can 
help us to ascertain whether they were concerned about precedent. On Jamaica’s part, the Anti-
Dumping and Subsidies Commission’s independent move to investigate products from China is 
insightful. It reveals a national investigative authority that is fully abreast with trends in the local 
market. It also shows a government that is willing to institute measures to protect its domestic 
industry, even against a more powerful, yet important trading partner. In this vein, Jamaica 
therefore wanted to make it clear that it was not afraid of violating trade partners, and would act 
again if necessary to protect itself. 
 In China’s case, I will argue that it was not concerned about precedent. Countries 
sometimes litigate against their weaker trading partners because they want to stymie potential 
bandwagon effects whereby all the smaller, affected economies also want to punish it with 
domestic, protective measures. The fact, however, that China allowed this measure to go 
unchallenged therefore means that it did not consider this a battle worthwhile fighting. Arguably, 
the costs for litigating would have outweighed the benefits of winning.  
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Guatemala – Cement I and II 
 Both Guatemala and Mexico were interested in the interdependent payoffs from these 
disputes. In the case of Guatemala, since it was its first usage of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, if 
validated through winning, this could propagate future use of the Agreement against other 
parties. Its victory could also be used as a deterrent against possible suits from other countries 
since its success would demonstrate accurate understanding and application of the Agreement. 
Affected countries could therefore believe that Guatemala’s experience would make it more 
likely that it would also win in future. As it relates specifically to Mexico, the victory in the first 
case gave Guatemala the confidence to initiate and win cases against Mexico. For example, in 
June 2005, it filed a complaint against Mexico for its antidumping duties on Guatemalan steel 
pipes and tubes. Guatemala won this case.96 This step, for a country that had no previous 
experience with the Agreement until Mexico’s filing, is therefore an instance of precedent 
setting. 
 At the time of the first dispute, Mexico had initiated two cases using the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. Its case against Guatemala, however, was the first time it was filing over cement. Six 
cases have been initiated at the WTO involving cement.97 Of these cases, Mexico has featured in 
five.98 Its victory in the second Guatemalan cement case could therefore have given it the 
impetus to file against other countries for imposing duties on its cement. For example, after that 
case, Mexico initiated two cases against Ecuador which are still in consultations, and one against 
the United States which was settled.99 Mexico, it seems, was therefore bent on retaliating against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See “DS331: Mexico — Anti-Dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from Guatemala.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds331_e.htm  
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Ecuador that joined as a third party supporting Guatemala in the second case, and also to 
increase its ammunition against the United States. Litigating and winning against Guatemala was 
therefore important for Mexico. 
United States – Cement 
 The United States and Mexico have a long litigating history in NAFTA as well as the 
WTO. The fact that these two countries expended so much time and resources in this case 
suggests that both were interested in what any final determination of the dispute might mean for 
their future trading relations. Moreover, since cement is so important to both countries and they 
both buy and sell each other the product, then any determination on who was right and wrong 
would affect what they did next. In this context, the result of this case was important because of 
the large volumes of trade that were at stake. 
 
Table 7-6: Summary of Interdependent Payoffs 
Case Country Interdependent Payoffs 
China - Cement China Yes 
 Jamaica Yes 
Guatemala – Cement I Guatemala  Yes 
 Mexico Yes 
Guatemala – Cement II Guatemala  Yes 
 Mexico Yes 
United States - Cement United States Yes 
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Expectation to Win 
 Sometimes the choice to litigate is based on the calculated odds of winning (Fischer 
1982; Pauwelyn 2000; Maggi 2015; Reinhardt 2001). Each state therefore had different 
expectations about the outcome of their disputes and this informed their decision to participate of 
avoid the DS. 
China – Cement 
 As outlined in Chapter Five, the Anti-Dumping Agreement has specific provisions for 
determining a like product, that dumping is taking place, causality and domestic industry. China 
did not protest Jamaica’s finding of a like product though the two types of cement had different 
tariff headings.100 It also did not contest the designation as a non-market economy and hence the 
use of Indonesia as a surrogate. It raised, however, objections to Caribbean Cement being treated 
as the domestic industry since it was also an importer of the alleged dumped product.101 China 
could have also disputed the “positive evidence” of dumping and also the margin. Additionally, 
China had submitted documentation about its economy and the steps that were being taken to 
industrialize. With only one case ever initiated at the DSB and never responding to any, I argue 
that China was still learning about the litigation process through its third party involvement. 
Since Jamaica had delineated its case with corroborating evidence, China was not yet confident 
of its chances of winning, and hence it did not file. 
 In the case of Jamaica, if China has filed against it, Jamaica’s calculated chances of 
winning were high. In its Statement of Reasons, it provides details about the investigation, 
determination of dumping and its causation of material injury to Caribbean Cement, and also the 
dumping margin. Information is also given on the steps that it had to take to make a fair 
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determination in light of the known and unknown facts about the Chinese economy. In this 
sense, though having limited experience at the DSB, the Commission had done due diligence in 
its case against China. 
Guatemala Cement I and II 
 Mexico is a much larger economy that had more experience at the DSB than Guatemala 
did. Additionally, Mexico also had evidence that Guatemala did not follow the dictates of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement as the Panel ruled in the second case. Based on these facts, Mexico 
was therefore confident of winning in the first case. Guatemala also calculated that it would have 
won the first case. This is so because it did not back down from Mexico’s filing even though it 
had less experience. Its estimation of its chances also grew when the third parties joined. This 
support also increased Guatemala’s projection about the second case. The Appellate Body’s 
ruling in the first case was that Mexico had not brought the case properly before the Panel. It did 
not, however, address Mexico’s complaints substantively. In this regard, Mexico was therefore 
confident that with the matter properly before the Panel, it should win the case. 
United States – Cement 
 States sometimes use institutions to show that they are really interested in their 
constituents’ concerns. In this case, however, both countries were invested in not just the 
political implications of litigating, but in the outcome as well. Consequently, Mexico’s relentless 
pursuit of this case in alternative forums and the United States’ staunch defense of it, means that 
they both felt that the odds were in their favour. In the case of the United States, its power and 
position in GATT and NAFTA helped it to undermine rulings and keep the duty in place. Its 
continued litigation at the WTO therefore means that it felt that it would continue to have its 
way. For Mexico GATT had ruled in its favour, but the United States vetoed the result. While 
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NAFTA did not grant Mexico any real recompense, Mexico could have been encouraged by the 
earlier GATT ruling and also the restructured WTO that this time it would be also to triumph. 
 
Table 7-7: Summary of Expectation to Win 
Case Country Expectation to Win 
China - Cement China No 
 Jamaica Yes 
Guatemala – Cement I Guatemala  Yes  
 Mexico Yes 
Guatemala – Cement II Guatemala  Yes 
 Mexico Yes 
United States - Cement United States Yes 
 Mexico Yes 
 
 
Availability of Alternative Forums 
States strategize not only when to litigate, but also where. Busch links this argument to 
precedent, explicating that countries will choose the forum whose ruling is most useful in the 
future.102 Here, the focus is not on precedent, but on the costs associated with the different 
options. The thinking is that states will choose the forum that costs the least, but gives the 
highest payoff. Importantly, countries that have fewer dispute settlement options will find the 
process more cumbersome, while those with more choices are more likely to litigate. This is 
because more forums open up more opportunities to pursue the case. This part of the study 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Marc L. Busch. “Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade.” 
International Organization (Autumn, 2007), Volume 61, Number 4.  
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therefore probes whether the disputants had other dispute settlement alternatives and how this 
affected their decision to use the DSB. 
China – Cement 
 In 2003, Jamaica and China had already established diplomatic ties and bilateral 
cooperation on trade.103 They had also signed several agreements on economic cooperation, 
though many of them did not occur until 2004 and beyond.104  In this regard, they could appeal to 
their budding relationship to resolve this dispute. Outside of this, the WTO was the main dispute 
settlement organization that was available to hear trade disputes. The fact that they did not use it 
could mean that they considered it an expensive choice. Notably, at that time China had begun 
“courting” the Caribbean. Initiating trade disputes would therefore not be in its best interest. 
Guatemala - Cement I and II 
 In 1996 and 1999, Guatemala and Mexico did not have any other forum in place for trade 
dispute settlement. They were, however, members of regional organizations like the 
Organization of American States (OAS).105 It was not until 2001 that the Mexico – Northern 
Triangle came into force. This is a free trade agreement between Mexico, El Salvador and 
Guatemala, and later Honduras.106 This institution’s Chapter XIX governs the dispute settlement 
mechanism.107 Up to the point of the two cement disputes, the WTO was therefore the only 
appropriate forum that Mexico and Guatemala had. Their decision to use it twice suggests that 
the benefits of litigating were greater than the costs. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 See for example, “China & Jamaica: Bilateral Economic and Trade Relations, Economic and Technical 
Cooperation.” http://jm.china-embassy.org/eng/zygx/jmhz/t211230.htm  
104 See “China & Jamaica: Bilateral Political Relations.” http://jm.china-embassy.org/eng/zygx/zzgx/t211492.htm  
105 “Member States.” Organization of American States. http://www.oas.org/en/member_states/default.asp  
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United States – Cement 
 As discussed earlier, the United States and Mexico are a part of a trilateral agreement in 
NAFTA. The fact that Mexico filed this case there fourteen times and once under GATT means 
that there were other options available to them. While Mexico seemed to have exhausted 
appealing to NAFTA for help when it used the WTO, the fact is that they had alternative forums 
in which to litigate this dispute. 
 
 Table 7-8: Summary of Availability of Alternative Forums 
Case Country Availability of Alternative 
Forums 
China - Cement China No 
 Jamaica No 
Guatemala – Cement I Guatemala  No 
 Mexico No 
Guatemala – Cement II Guatemala  No 
 Mexico No 
United States - Cement United States Yes 
 Mexico Yes 
 
 
Existing Preferential and Regional Trade Agreements 
 This section flows from the previous one, but in a more nuanced way. Here, instead of 
measuring how more options might lessen the costs to litigate, this part examines the impact that 
having an existing bilateral agreement may have on litigation. Bown, for instance, argues that 
exporters in common preferential trade agreements are less likely to initiate disputes or 
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participate in them as third parties.108  Li and Qiu also come to similar conclusions.109 While 
focusing on armed conflict, Mansfield and Pevehouse offer similar assertions by showing the 
inverse relationship between commerce and conflict.110 In their estimation, as trade increase 
between countries in a preferential trade agreement, they less likely they will be to have 
conflicts.111 This section therefore evaluates not just how these types of agreements, if they 
existed influenced China and Mexico’s choices to file, but also Guatemala and the United States’ 
decision to respond. 
China – Cement 
 In 2010, China entered into a “Duty-Free Treatment for LDCs” preferential trading 
agreement (PTA), with forty-one countries.112 Since Jamaica is not an LDC, it is not included in 
this list. China also has PTAs with Australia, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, 
Switzerland and Turkey.113 China is also involved in many regional trade agreements (RTAs).114 
It does not, however, have any PTA or RTA with Jamaica. 
 On Jamaica’s side, it has PTAs with Australia, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States.115 The Caribbean Basin Recovery 
Act and the Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff make up its other PTAs.116 In terms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Chad P. Bown. “Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders.” 
The World Bank Economic Review. 2005. Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 307. 
109 See Tan Li and Larry D. Qiu. 2014. “Free Trade Agreements and Trade Disputes.” 
http://www.freit.org/WorkingPapers/Papers/TradePolicyRegional/FREIT775.pdf 
110 Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse. “Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict.” 
International Organization Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 775-808. 
111 Ibid. 
112 “Duty-Free Treatment for LDCs.” Preferential Trade Agreements. http://ptadb.wto.org/ptaBeneficiaries.aspx   
113 “China.” Preferential Trade Agreements. http://ptadb.wto.org/Country.aspx?code=156  
114 These include ASEAN – China; Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA); Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) - 
Accession of China; Australia – China; Chile – China; China - Costa Rica; China - Hong Kong, China; China - 
Korea, Republic of; China - Macao, China; China - New Zealand; China – Singapore; Iceland – China; Pakistan – 
China; Peru – China and Switzerland – China. See “China.” List of RTAs in Force. 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByMemberResult.aspx?lang=1&membercode=156&redirect=1  
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RTAs, Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and EU - CARIFORUM 
States EPA are the ones that it is involved in.117 The thesis about shared PTAs reducing the 
incidences of conflict does not seem to hold in the China / Jamaica case. Both countries do not 
share any of these agreements, yet they restrained from going to the DSB. Other factors are 
therefore important in this dispute.  
Guatemala Cement I and II 
 Guatemala has PTAs with Australia, Canada, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, 
Russia, Switzerland and Turkey.118 It is also involved in a number of RTAs.119 Of note is the 
Mexico – Central America, which was signed between Mexico and El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala. This goods and services agreement, however, entered into 
force in September 2013, long after the two disputes.120  
 Mexico also shares PTAs with Australia, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Russia and 
Turkey.121 Like Guatemala, it is also involved in a number of RTAs.122 Importantly, however, 
these countries were not involved in a preferential or regional trade agreement at the time of their 
disputes. This could have factored into their cost consideration to litigate since there would be no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 “Jamaica.” List of RTAs in Force. 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByMemberResult.aspx?lang=1&membercode=388&redirect=1  
118 “Guatemala.” Preferential Trade Agreements. http://ptadb.wto.org/Country.aspx?code=320  
119 These include Central American Common Market (CACM); Central American Common Market (CACM) - 
Accession of Panama; Chile - Guatemala (Chile - Central America); Colombia - Northern Triangle (El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras); Dominican Republic - Central America; Dominican Republic - Central America - United 
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR); EU - Central America; Guatemala - Chinese Taipei; Mexico - Central 
America; Panama - Guatemala (Panama - Central America). See “Guatemala.” List of Notified RTAs in Force. 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByMemberResult.aspx?lang=1&membercode=320&redirect=1  
120 Ibid 
121 “Mexico.” Preferential Trade Agreements. http://ptadb.wto.org/Country.aspx?code=484  
122 These include Chile – Mexico; Colombia – Mexico; EFTA – Mexico; EU – Mexico; Global System of Trade 
Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP); Israel – Mexico; Japan – Mexico; Latin American Integration 
Association (LAIA); Mexico - Central America; Mexico – Panama; Mexico – Uruguay; North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA); Pacific Alliance; Peru – Mexico and Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN). “Mexico.” List 
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formal regional organization mediating their grievances. The absence of a PTA and RTA also 
eliminated the threat of regional sanctions, making them free to proceed to the DSB. 
United States – Cement 
 Mexico’s PTAs and RTAs are already listed so only those that the United States is 
involved in will be discussed here. It is party to PTAs such as Generalized System of Preferences 
– United States, African Growth and Opportunity Act, Andean Trade Preference Act, Caribbean 
Basin Economic Recovery Act, Former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and Trade 
Preferences for Nepal.123 It all of these, the United States is the provider of the preferences to the 
countries.124 It is also involved in several RTAs.125 Even with all these PTAs and RTAs, 
however, the United States and Mexico only share NAFTA. This shared agreement did not stop 
them from seeking recourse within that RTA, and also at the DSB. In essence, countries with 
trading agreements may choose to litigate or avoid participation in the DSB. The particular case 
at hand, domestic pressures as well as other costs associated with the process are all important 
considerations as states decide what to do. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 “United States.” Preferential Trade Agreements. http://ptadb.wto.org/Country.aspx?code=840  
124 Ibid 
125These include Dominican Republic - Central America - United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR); 
Korea, Republic of - United States; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); United States – Australia; 
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Table 7-9: Summary of Existing PTAs / RTAs at the Time of the Disputes 
Case Country Existing PTAs / RTAs with 
Disputant 
China - Cement China No 
 Jamaica No 
Guatemala – Cement I Guatemala  No 
 Mexico No 
Guatemala – Cement II Guatemala  No 
 Mexico No 
United States - Cement United States Yes 




The international political economy is interconnected. Often, what obtains are instances 
of asymmetric interdependence whereby one side is needier and more susceptible to 
manipulation from the less reliant party. Two types of complex interdependence are therefore 
present – vulnerability and sensitivity. States that are “vulnerable” suffer the costs from a total 
breakdown in the relationship, while “sensitive” trading partners are affected by changes within 
the relationship.126 In relationship to trade disputes, the more vulnerable a country is, the less 
likely it is to sue. This is because it fears what it may lose if the more capable state retaliates. 
Here, I therefore evaluate whether each disputant was “vulnerable” or “sensitive,” and how this 
informed the decision to litigate or not use the DSB. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence:  World Politics in Transition, 3rd 
ed., (Boston:  Little-Brown, 1989), 3-32. 
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China – Cement 
In 2017, Jamaica is vulnerably interdependent on aid from China. In 2003, this was also 
the case. The Chinese government reports, for instance, that in 2004, China exported US$126.13 
million worth of goods to Jamaica. This represented a 23.6% increase from 2003.127 In terms of 
imports, products imported from Jamaica valued US$269.85 million, which represented a 
155.9% growth from 2003.128  The context to this trade is that China was undergoing increased 
trade liberalization and was also in search of new trading partners. Its quest to be a world power 
would also mean that it would forge agreements with countries that historically received bilateral 
aid from the United States. Jamaica was therefore an ideal location based on its geopolitical 
location, and also the types of goods that it produces. By 2012, Jamaica had a trade deficit of 
US$755.4 million with China.129 Vulnerability interdependence refers to the costliness of 
foregoing a relationship. Since in 2003 both countries were on the eve of increased, formal 
relations, I posit that China had sensitivity interdependence, while Jamaica was vulnerably 
interdependent. This is because though China was importing more than it was exporting, it had 
more market access and trading partners. It therefore needed Jamaica as a trading a partner, but 
Jamaica would suffer more if the relationship were to be severed than China would.  
Guatemala Cement I and II 
 Guatemala, like in Jamaica’s case is vulnerably interdependent on Mexico. This is due to 
the Mexico – Northern Triangle Free Trade Agreement that was signed in 2001. Mexico is its 
second leading import country, receiving US$2.01 billion in goods in 2015.130 Mexico, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 “China & Jamaica: Bilateral Economic and Trade Relations, Economic and Technical Cooperation.” 
http://jm.china-embassy.org/eng/zygx/jmhz/t211230.htm    
128 Ibid 
129 Julian Richardson. “Jamaica Now Top Caribbean Trading Partner for China.” The Jamaica Observer. 23 
August 2013. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/business/Jamaica-now-top-Caribbean-trading-partner-for-
China_14928589      
130 “Guatemala.” Observatory of Economic Complexity. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/gtm/    
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is not one of Guatemala’s top exporting countries.131 Mexico, in 2015, was the world’s 10th 
leading export economy, with the United States, Canada, China, Germany and Japan as its main 
export markets.132 The United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Japan are its top sources for 
imports.133 Mexico’s size and Guatemala’s reliance on it for imports therefore make Guatemala 
vulnerably interdependent. At the time of the trade disputes, however, this was not the case. 
Mexico was still a powerful economy, but there was not much trade integration until after the 
disputes in 2001 when the RTA was signed. Guatemala, for example, complained that it was not 
a traditional market for Mexican cement until Mexico’s recession. Guatemala also had its 
position as the leading economy in Central America and was more reliant on trade from the 
United States. Consequently, though the nature of their relationship has now changed 
significantly, at the time of their disputes, these states were sensitivity interdependent. 
United States – Cement 
 The United States and Mexico, at the onset of their dispute and at present, have 
sensitivity interdependence. With the exception of four years, from 1990 (the date of the 
antidumping levy), to 2017, the United States has had a trade deficit with Mexico, importing 
more than it exports.134 Mexico in turn, is a top importer of goods such as machinery, vehicles, 
agriculture, plastics and mineral fuels from the United States.135 In this regard, both need each 
other to be in its best economic shape and are therefore sensitivity interdependent.  
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132 “Mexico.” Observatory of Economic Complexity. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/mex/  
133 Ibid 
134 “Trade in Goods with Mexico.” Foreign Trade. https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html  
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Table 7-10: Summary of Complex Interdependence between the Disputants 




China - Cement China Yes No 
 Jamaica No Yes 
Guatemala – Cement 
I 
Guatemala  Yes No 
 Mexico Yes No 
Guatemala – Cement 
II 
Guatemala    
 Mexico Yes No 
United States - 
Cement 
United States Yes No 
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Significantly	  to	  GDP	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Availability	  of	  
Alternative	  Markets	   Yes	  	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Ability	  to	  Enforce	  
Countermeasures	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Reputational	  Costs	   No	   Yes	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Reputational	  
Benefits	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Domestic	  Audience	  
Costs	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Interdependent	  
Payoffs	   Yes	  	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Expectation	  to	  Win	   Yes	  	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Availability	  of	  
Alternative	  Forums	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   No	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	  
Existing	  PTAs	  /	  RTAs	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	  
Sensitivity	  
Interdependence	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Vulnerability	  
Interdependence	   Yes	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	  
Participation	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	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“Quantifying the Qualitative”: How Do Dispute Settlement Costs Affect Participation in 
the Dispute Settlement Body? 
 Chapter Six evaluated legal capacity costs through the information theory method. This 
chapter picks up this analysis by looking at the other dispute settlement costs by comparing the 
cases. 
Quantify: Setting up the Truth Table for Comparative Case Analysis 
 
Table 7-12: Truth Table for Legal Capacity Costs and their Effects on Participation in the 
Dispute Settlement Body136 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 See Appendix 2b for full results of the comparative case analysis with dispute settlement costs. 
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Count: Calculating the Probabilities 




Independent	  Variables	  X	  
p(xi	  =	  1,	  y	  =	  1)	  
a	  
p(xi	  =	  0,	  y	  =	  1)	  
b	  
p(xi	  =	  1,	  y	  =	  0)	  
c	  




Contested	  Good	  Contributes	  
Significantly	  to	  GDP	   0.75	  
0.00*	  
(0.000001)	   0.125	   0.125	  
	  
	  
x2	   Availability	  of	  Alternative	  Markets	   0.75	  
0.00*	  





Ability	  to	  Enforce	  Countermeasures	   0.75	  
0.00*	  




x4	   Reputational	  Costs	   0.65	   0.125	   0.125	   0.125	  
	  
x5	   Reputational	  Benefits	   0.75	  
0.00*	  




x6	   Domestic	  Audience	  Costs	   0.75	  
0.00*	  




x7	   Interdependent	  Payoffs	   0.75	  
0.00*	  




x8	   Expectation	  to	  Win	   0.75	  
0.00*	  
(0.000001)	   0.125	   0.125	  
	  




x10	   Existing	  PTAs	  /	  RTAs	   0.25	   0.5	  
0.00*	  
(0.000001)	   0.25	  
	  




Vulnerability	  Interdependence	   0.125	   0.625	   0.125	   0.125	  
 
Source: Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor and Katya Drozdova. 2016. Quantifying the Qualitative Excel Implementation. June 7, 2017. URL: 
https://study.sagepub.com/drozdova 
Joint probability = p(x, y) = count (x, y) / n137 
*the negligible value 0.000001 is substituted for pure zero values in order to ensure that logarithms are defined.138 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137  Katya Drozdova and Kurt Taylor Gaubatz. Quantifying the Qualitative: Information Theory for Comparative 
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Compute: Computing the Uncertainty Measures 




Independent	  Variables	  X	   H	  (Y)	   H	  (Y	  /	  X)	   I	  (Y;	  X)	   Direction	  
	  
x1	  
Contested	  Good	  Contributes	  
Significantly	  to	  GDP	   0.8110	   0.5180	   0.2930	   Positive	  	  
	  
	  
x2	   Availability	  of	  Alternative	  Markets	   0.8110	   0.8110	   0.0000	   Positive	  
	  
x3	  
Ability	  to	  Enforce	  Countermeasures	   0.8110	   0.8110	   0.0000	   Positive	  
	  
x4	   Reputational	  Costs	   0.8110	   0.7380	   0.0730	   Positive	  
	  
x5	   Reputational	  Benefits	   0.8110	   0.8110	   0.0000	   Positive	  
	  
x6	   Domestic	  Audience	  Costs	   0.8110	   0.8110	   0.0000	   Positive	  
	  
x7	   Interdependent	  Payoffs	   0.8110	   0.8110	   0.0000	   Positive	  
	  
x8	   Expectation	  to	  Win	   0.8110	   0.5180	   0.2930	   Positive	  
	  
x9	   Availability	  of	  Alternative	  Forums	   0.8110	   0.5000	   0.3110	   Negative	  
	  
x10	   Existing	  PTAs	  /	  RTAs	   0.8110	   0.6890	   0.1220	   Negative	  
	  




Vulnerability	  Interdependence	   0.8110	   0.7380	   0.0730	   Negative	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Compare: Understanding the Outcomes 
               Table 7-14 contradicts some of the extant literature on DSB participation. It shows, for 
instance, that with reduced uncertainty, Availability of Alternative Markets (x2); Ability to 
Enforce Countermeasures (x3); Reputational Benefits (x5); Domestic Audience Costs (x6); and 
Interdependent Payoffs (x7) do not provide any information about when states might use the 
DSB. All of these have a 0.0000 chance of predicting participation. Table 7-13 shows, however, 
that there is a negative relationship between Availability of Alternative Forums (x9) and using 
the DSB. This means that the more mediatory states are a part of, the less likely they are to use 
the DSB. This finding, however, is tempered by the fact that it has a 31% chance of predicting 
DSB litigation. Based on the model, the other two indicators of participation in the DSB are 
Contested Good Contributes Significantly to GDP (x1) and Expectation to Win (x8). While these 
have a positive relationship with the dependent variable, the predictability power is a weak 29%. 
The level of certainty is therefore low.  
         The comparative case analysis is specific to the cases that it probes. Different variables and 
countries can therefore produce different results. Based on these four cement cases, the model 
shows general, positive results between many of the variables and expected DSB participation. 
There is, however, too much uncertainty to say definitively that with these present, there is a 
high chance that countries will use the DSB. 
Conclusion 
 
       In the final analysis, this chapter has examined dispute settlement costs and how they 
influence states’ decisions to participate in the DSB or forego that option. The chapter builds on 
the legal capacity costs outlined in Chapter Six, and evaluates the other costs that are associated 
with the process. As a starting point, it agrees with Bown’s work that international political 
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economy costs may enhance or impede DSB participation. As a departure from Bown, however, 
this study considers not just how costs affect filing and third party litigation, but also responding 
to formal complaints. Costs, as discussed in this chapter, are the aggregation of delta from the 
formal model in Chapter Four. Delta is therefore disaggregated in order to evaluate DSB usage. 
Variables such as the value of the good, ability to enforce countermeasures, availability of 
different markets and forums, reputational costs and benefits, interdependent payoffs, expected 
utility and complex interdependence are considered. 
         The choice to use the DSB is relative to the good and the two states that are embroiled in 
the dispute. The study therefore finds that China failed to litigate against Jamaica because it was 
cementing their trading relationship, had other viable customers and was not confident of 
victory. In the case of Guatemala and Mexico, high domestic audience costs, expectations of 
winning and ability to impose countermeasures factored in their decision making. For the United 
States and Mexico, the gains from trade for the contested good as well as domestic audience 
costs catalyzed their participation in multiple forums and the DSB. In all cases, the countries 
weighed the benefits against the projected costs and chose the option that gave the greater 
payoff. In regards to China, litigating would have been more costly than accepting the levy. For 
the other disputants the benefits were vested in litigating and securing a win and so they pursued 
litigation.  
           When the cases are comparatively assessed, the information theory model shows that with 
reduced uncertainty measures, states’ expectation to win and the good’s contribution to GDP are 
the likely predictors that they will litigate. The model also shows a negative relationship between 
alternative forums and DSB participation. This suggests that the more options countries have, the 
lesser the chances that they will use the DSB. These findings are specific to the cases that were 
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analyzed. They do, however, provide a parsimonious assessment of how these costs associated 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE PUZZLE OF NON-PARTICIPATORY MEMBERSHIP - DISCUSSIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction  
 This research probes non-participatory membership in robust institutions. The World 
Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Body is the surrogate for institutions. This study has 
acknowledged that not all countries use the DSB, and that some may never need to. 
Consequently, they still engage and continue to benefit from the global system of trade 
governance that the WTO provides. There are, however, cases where countries have legitimate 
cases, but have refrained from using the recourse that is available to them. Those are the cases 
that this study focuses on, calling them the puzzle of non-participatory membership.  
As outlined in Chapter One, non-participatory membership can take place in three main 
ways. These are pure non-participatory membership, strategic bargaining and free riding. Pure 
non-participatory membership can occur in two ways. In the first instance, states avoid 
institutional dispute settlement because they can afford to resolve the conflict on their own. They 
may do this through tit-for-tat strategies, or through conciliatory measures with the affected 
party. Some states, however, engage in non-participatory membership because they simply 
cannot afford the costs that are associated with the process. Countries may therefore practice 
non-participatory membership by choice or through circumstance. In strategic bargaining, states 
avoid the institution, but evoke its authority as a bargaining tool and to elicit concessions from 
their trading partners. Free riders are those that have authentic cases, but avoid dispute settlement 
because they want others to bear the costs of litigation while they reap the benefits of rulings. In 
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this vein, states have varying reasons for opting to stay outside the DSB whenever a trade dispute 
arises. 
This study is primarily focused on those countries that do not use the DSB because they 
are inhibited by exorbitant costs. It does, however, evaluate the other incidences of non-
participatory membership because they form parts of the broader puzzle that the research probes. 
In an attempt to represent the world system of trade and dispute settlement, the project uses a 
formal model that depicts the strategies, payoffs and outcomes of two trading partners as they 
move sequentially and oscillate between free trade and protectionism; DSB and No DSB; and 
litigate and acquiesce. The empirical implications of the model are then tested with four cases. 
Variables representing costs are then comparatively assessed though the information theory 
method to see how well they predict litigation under conditions of reduced uncertainty. 
The four cases that are used are China – Cement, which is a dispute between China and 
Jamaica; Guatemala – Cement I and II, two disputes between Guatemala and Mexico; and 
United States – Cement, a longstanding conflict between the United States and Mexico. These 
cases were chosen because they feature the same good, which is cement. All the countries also 
evoked the same WTO provision, the Anti-Dumping Agreement. These countries have power 
disparities, but their trajectories are not what those dynamics predict. For example, China does 
not file against Jamaica’s anti-dumping duty, though it challenges the procedures for 
determination. Additionally, it does not retaliate with countermeasures or by withdrawing 
bilateral aid. Guatemala, too, accepts Mexico’s threat to initiate a dispute and wins. The United 
States and Mexico take their case to the institution and then work out a solution on their own. 
The choice to litigate or avoid the DSB as well as the divergent outcomes therefore make these 
cases worth studying. As this study concludes, it is therefore important to discuss some of the 
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highlights of the cases. I will also discuss the project’s contribution to the extant literature, 
limitations, recommendations and the next step for this research. 
Why Did Guatemala’s Case Proceed to the DSB While China’s Did Not? 
Guatemala’s participation in the DSB as a response to Mexico’s challenge and China’s 
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Table 8-1 contains the summary of the legal capacity and other associated dispute settlement 
costs for China and Guatemala at the time of their disputes. These states had recently joined the 
WTO and this makes their decisions instructive. In terms of commonalities, in both countries, the 
good contributed significantly towards GDP, they had alternative markets, could enforce 
countermeasures and could use that dispute to set a precedent in other cases. These similarities, 
however, do not depict the whole picture. We see, for example, that Guatemala was not 
concerned about reputational costs since it was a first time defendant, while China had to 
consider the consequences of filing against a weaker state and losing. 
 In the legal capacity debate, history of using the DSB is seen as indicator that countries 
will litigate. Here, both countries are fairly even. Guatemala had filed twice as a co-complainant, 
while China had complained once against the United States. Interestingly, however, China had 
used the Anti-Dumping Agreement domestically and as a third party at the DSB, while 
Guatemala had no experience with the Agreement. This is important because if experience 
should lower legal capacity costs, Guatemala would have had a higher burden to respond than 
China would have to file. Guatemala’s stance therefore means that there were other costs and 
benefits that were included, which made the choice of going to the DSB advantageous.  
 One of the arguments in Chapter Seven is that countries that share free trade agreements 
are less likely to have formal trade disputes against each other. At the time of their disputes, 
China had no PTAs or RTAs with Jamaica; neither did Guatemala have any with Mexico. If this 
argument is valid, then we have two opposite findings here. We see the absence of a free trade 
agreement promoting DSB usage in one case, but inducing non-participation in the other. This 
means that this factor is insufficient in explaining the variation in outcome. One consideration 
could be the fact that Guatemala and Mexico had no alternative forum to hear their grievance 
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since they did not set up their RTA until 2001, while China and Jamaica had been strengthening 
their relationship with cooperation in economics and trade. In this regard, China and Jamaica 
may have had an opportunity to resolve their conflict and forego the DSB alternative, while 
Mexico and Guatemala did not since Mexico had just started to export cement to Guatemala. 
 Both Guatemala and China had sensitivity interdependence when their disputes emerged. 
Guatemala was more reliant on trade with the United States, while China had many other trading 
partners. Countries that do not suffer greatly from foregoing a relationship should have no 
reservations to litigate. I argue here, as in Chapter Seven, that whereas China had alternative 
markets, the timing of this dispute lessened the chances that it would file against Jamaica. This is 
because China was increasing its global partners and found Jamaica to be of geostrategic 
importance. With it being on the eve of signing several new agreements and deepening its 
relationship with Jamaica, filing would have been anachronistic.  
A possible counter argument is the fact that Jamaica’s duty was so small relative to 
China’s market share that it did not make economic sense for China to file. That point is valid. 
Litigation, however, is not always about the expected gain. Larger states sometimes file against 
weaker states to punish them and also to deter similar cases. China could therefore have 
considered filing in light of the reputation that it wanted to create. In 2003, however, China may 
not have developed a culture of litigation and so it avoided the DSB. It is important though, to 
balance this point with an observation. China, in the fifteen cases that it has initiated cases at the 
DSB, has never complained against a low or middle income country. All its grouses have been 
against the United States and the European Union.1 These are its two largest markets for exports. 
This fact suggests that China is not interested in cases that do not have huge trade volumes at 
stake. If this is the case, then this would be an ironic benefit of being a small state. Since larger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Disputes by Member: China.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
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economies may not pursue litigation against smaller states, these weaker countries may be able 
to regularly breach the WTO’s provisions and get away with it. More capable states do not have 
this luxury. 
Guatemala’s decision to respond to Mexico can be largely attributed to domestic politics. 
With the importation of Mexican cement, its company Cementos Progreso was facing 
competition. This is compounded by the fact that these countries are contiguous so the effects of 
the competition would be immediately seen and felt. Additionally, Chapter Seven delineates the 
political changes and how this increased the country’s resolve to litigate. China did not have this 
type of domestic pressure. The Chinese government was more interested in demonstrating its 
compliance than in filing. In this regard, when all the variables are considered, domestic tensions 
plus proximity with Mexico would increase the chances that Guatemala would use the DSB, 
even with little experience. 
Third Parties and their Strategic Participation in the Trade Disputes  
Guatemala – Cement I and II 
 As in the case for countries that engage the DSB as a complainant or respondent, states 
that become third party litigants also factor in the discussion on non-participatory membership. 
Chapter Six began this discussion by highlighting the fact that of the Central American countries, 
only El Salvador and Honduras joined in support of Guatemala. Both countries alluded to their 
economic and cultural ties, as well as their desire to see their domestic interests protected by the 
WTO. This suggests that these economies may have felt prone to dumped goods from Mexico, 
and wanted to protect themselves. In this regard, interdependent payoffs would be a reason for 
countries participate in the DSB as third party litigants. This could be because they have a 
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similar industry that is being affected and want to use the ruling of the current case as a deterrent 
to continued violation. 
 The United States and Canada also reserved their third party rights. Here, I argue that 
because of their NAFTA relationship and importance of cement to their economies, both of these 
countries joined the dispute. The United States, with its levy on Mexico firmly in place at this 
time, was more invested in the dispute. In this sense, the United States would also be concerned 
about precedent, but in a different way. In this case, it may have been interested in how a win for 
Guatemala’s antidumping duty on Mexico could be used as validation for its own levy. This 
makes sense if one considers the fact that the United States argued against Mexico in this first 
case. Canada’s no submission on the other hand, can be seen as posturing. Its reservation of its 
third party rights indicate that it was making sure that all concessions made in the dispute would 
also apply to it. Legal capacity costs. Canada’s decision to not make any submissions could 
therefore mean that it assessed the situation and felt that it was in its best interest not to proceed. 
This may also explain why it did not participate in the second case. Non-participation may 
therefore be the result of an assessment of whether the third party stands to benefit from the 
outcome. 
 Chapter Seven continues the discussion on dispute settlement and costs by showing that 
Belize, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Nicaragua all buy cement from both Mexico and Guatemala. 
Why then did these countries not participate in the two trade disputes while Honduras and El 
Salvador did? Belize has never been a complainant or respondent at the DSB. It has, however, 
been a third party to four disputes.2 All of these occurred after the two cement disputes under 
consideration. This means that at Guatemala – Cement I and II, Belize had never used the DSB 
in any capacity. In the case of Nicaragua, at the time of both disputes, it had been a third party in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “Disputes by Member: Belize.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
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one dispute, but never as a complainant or respondent.3 Costa Rica had participated in one case 
as a complainant and 3 as a third party,4 while Panama had filed one case and joined as a third 
party to 3.5 How then did these non-participants compare with the states that actually joined as 
third party litigants? 
 At the point of the Guatemala – Mexico cement trade disputes, El Salvador had never 
used the DSB as a complainant or respondent. It had also been a third party in just one case.6 
Honduras had no respondent or third party experience, but it had been a co-complainant in two 
disputes (DS16 and DS27). The relative little DSB experience that both the third party 
participants and non-participants had suggests that this was not the reason why some joined and 
the others did not. One important observation is that when the first cement case was filed, 
Guatemala and Honduras had the same amount of experience as a complainant. They had co-
complained against the European Communities in protection of their banana regime in DS16 and 
DS27. While this shared history may have given Honduras an inclination to support Guatemala’s 
causes, it is still not clear why El Salvador joined. 
 One indication of the support that Guatemala may have received from Honduras and El 
Salvador is the fact that they are members of the Central American Common Market (CACM).7 
This organization integrates the economies of these countries. Nicaragua and Costa Rica are also 
members.8 The economic closeness that Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras have may have 
therefore prompted the latter two to participate in the disputes. Since Guatemala was the first 
Central American country to use the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Nicaragua and Costa Rica may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 “Disputes by Member: Nicaragua.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
4 “Disputes by Member: Costa Rica.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
5 “Disputes by Member: Panama.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
6 “Disputes by Member: El Salvador.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 





	   	  
258 
have found the process too expensive, or were free riding. Belize and Panama may also have 
been doing the same. 
 Ecuador and the European Communities participated as third parties in Guatemala – 
Cement II. Then, Ecuador had participated in the DS27 case as a co-complainant, had been a 
third party to 2 disputes, but had no respondent experience.9 The European Communities, on the 
other hand, had participated in numerous disputes.10 This country and customs union participated 
in the dispute because of interdependent payoffs. In the case of Ecuador, it imported cement 
from Mexico. By October of 1999, Mexico filed a case against it. Like Guatemala, its first two 
defended cases were against Mexico for alleged dumped cement.11 In the case of the European 
Communities, it is a major producer of cement. Figures from 2006, show that its output for that 
year amounted to 10.5% of total global production.12 As mentioned in Chapter Six, in its 
submission to the Panel, the EC was concerned about the correct interpretation and application of 
Anti-Dumping Agreement. This suggests that with its wide consumer base, the EC wanted to be 
clear on how the Agreement should be used in order to protect itself from prospective suits.  
United States - Cement 
In this trade dispute, Canada, China, Chinese Taipei, European Communities and Japan 
all reserved their third party rights.13 Since this case was settled, none of these countries gave any 
submissions. Their willingness to formally join this dispute, however, gives us some indication 
of what their interests might have been. Canada is one of the world’s leading cement producers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “Disputes by Member: Ecuador.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
10 “Disputes by Member: European Union (formerly EC).” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
11  
12 “Cement and Lime.”  European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/raw-materials/industries/non-
metals/cement-lime_en 
13 “DS281: United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement from Mexico.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds281_e.htm       
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The United States is its top destination for cement exports, while Mexico is at a distant 73rd.14 As 
a member of NAFTA, Canada would therefore be fully aware of the longstanding dispute 
between the United States and Mexico. Importantly, since Canada sells the United States so 
much cement, it would be concerned about how the ruling in this case might affect its trading of 
cement with the United States.  
China, Chinese Taipei and Japan are also leading cement manufacturers. In China’s case, 
the United States is its second largest cement destination, while Mexico is at 68th.15 For Chinese 
Taipei, the United States is its 4th main buyer,16 while Japan sells more cement to the United 
States than it does to Mexico.17 These countries / customs union therefore had major interests in 
the outcome of this dispute. This was due to their trade with both countries, and especially with 
the United States.  
Notably, El Salvador and Honduras did not join this dispute. This gives credence to the 
thought that countries are more likely to join as a third party if they share a regional trade 
agreement with one of the litigants. This shows all the more than these Central American 
countries had closer ties with Guatemala and not Mexico, and this explains why they participated 
in the Guatemala – Cement disputes. In essence, third party participation may be a function of 
the good’s value to an economy, interdependent payoffs, and closeness with one of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by Canada. Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, 
whether or not coloured.” Trade Map – International Trade Statistics. 
http://www.trademap.org/(X(1)S(1vz4jqa00d550f55bukilgzt))/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm
=1|124||||2523|||4|1|1|2|2|1|2|1|1      
15 “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by China.” Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, 
whether or not coloured. Trade Map – International Trade Statistics. 
http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|156||||2523|||4|1|1|2|2|1|2|1|1 
16 “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by Taipei, Chinese.” 
Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, whether or not coloured. 
http://www.trademap.org/(X(1)S(1vz4jqa00d550f55bukilgzt))/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm
=1|490||||2523|||4|1|1|2|2|1|2|1|1      
17 “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by Japan.” 
Product: 2523 Cement, incl. cement clinkers, whether or not coloured. 
http://www.trademap.org/(X(1)S(1vz4jqa00d550f55bukilgzt))/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm
=1|392||||2523|||4|1|1|2|2|1|2|1|1       
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disputants. Non-participation on the other hand, may be due to disinterest, fear of retaliation, or 
free riding. 
Contributions to the Extant Literature 
There are several important and unique contributions that this study makes to the field of 
international relations generally, and to the international political economy literature. 
1. From a theoretical standpoint, this research fills a gap between realism and neoliberal 
institutionalism. These schools of thought challenge the efficacy and agency of 
institutions. This study shows, however, that both divides do not consider that institutions 
could be working well, but countries choose not to participate in them. Non-participatory 
membership is therefore overlooked and is addressed by this project. 
2. Chapter Six discusses legal capacity costs and how they are conventionally measured 
with number of lawyers in Geneva and at home, plus experience at the DSB. This study 
re conceptualizes legal capacity by adding to those measurements countries’ capabilities 
up to the time of their disputes and not their legal capacity broadly. This specificity to the 
disputes’ time is also used for states’ history at the DSB as a complainant, respondent and 
third party. The assessment of legal capacity also incorporates states’ experience with the 
Agreement that they are evoking, both at the domestic and international levels. An 
additional consideration is that other institutions can build legal capacity. Incorporating 
membership in WTO negotiation groups as well as regional and international dispute 
settlement organizations are therefore unique measurements of legal capacity. 
3. The extant literature on DSB participation is mainly focused on disparities in usage 
between developed and developing countries. Here, the prevailing idea is that smaller 
economies are not usually complained against. This study, however, assumes that weaker 
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states can and will be sued, so it measures their participation as both complainants and 
defendants.  
4. Many of the studies on the WTO’s dispute settlement process concentrate on how the 
general provisions for reprieve frustrate countries that want to use them. This study 
departs from those studies by highlighting the specific Agreement that the countries 
evoked and how they struggle with its technicalities. Hence, while evaluating the Anti-
Dumping Agreement itself and not just general provisions for recourse, this project adds 
to that literature. 
5. Many of the studies on participation in the DSB are longitudinal. By using a case study 
analysis that is centered on the same good and the same Agreement, this project provides 
a new look on dyads in a smaller and more focused way. 
6. There are several ways in which costs can be measured. This study adds to that 
methodology by using a formal model that represents costs as a composite variable.  
7. An important contribution that this study makes is the methodological assessment of 
costs. Legal capacity and the other associated costs are therefore assessed through the 
information theory method. This method measures the likelihood that litigation will occur 
given knowledge of the variables. The comparative case analysis through the information 
theory method is therefore a valuable contribution that this study makes. This method can 
be replicated to determine the chances or outcomes under conditions of reduced 
uncertainty.   
Outcomes Predicted by the Formal Model 
 The formal model has several equilibrium solutions that illuminate the strategic use of the 
DSB in light of costs. These are: 
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a. Free Trade, No DSB; Free Trade, No DSB 
b. Protect, No DSB; Protect, No DSB 
c. Protect, No DSB, DSB, Acquiesce; Free Trade, No DSB, DSB, Acquiesce 
d. Protect, DSB, Acquiesce; Protect, DSB, Acquiesce  
e. Protect, No DSB; Free Trade, No DSB 
Equilibrium a is the ideal solution. Since this project examines trade disputes, this 
solution was not evident in the cases. The mutual protectionism and avoidance of the DSB would 
have been closest to the China case. Since China did not retaliate, this equilibrium solution was 
also not observed.  
At face value, equilibrium d seems to mirror the United States – Mexico trade dispute. 
This is because they both engaged in some form of protectionism, used the DSB and then came 
to a mutually agreed solution where the duty was withdrawn. This, however, is one of the 
limitations of the model – it does not allow for states to change strategies. In the model, litigation 
and acquiescence are dichotomous choices. In the real life situation, however, both states 
litigated first, then they decided to acquiesce. In this sense, the model predicts this outcome, but 
only if states are allowed to change their strategies before they make a final choice.  
        While equilibrium d may be at odds with the outcome of the United States – Cement 
case, the use of the institution here is important. Arguably, these countries faced similar costs to 
use the institution and could also retaliate outside. The fact that Mexico kept seeking institutional 
recourse over so many years means that the type of good is important. Additionally, this also 
means that the domestic audience, economic and reputational costs were so high that both 
countries felt that the multilateral institution was the best forum to settle their grievances. One 
could argue though, that the fact that these countries came up with their own solution and then 
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informed the institution means that they could do without it. This is not the case. In fact, it is the 
presence of the institution that provided the context for these states to settle and not act outside. 
In this regard, a significant good can make states more likely to use DSB, even if they do not go 
through full scale litigation. 
Equilibria c and e predict that a country with lower costs to use the DSB will choose 
protectionism as its dominant strategy. The country with the higher burden to litigate will then be 
forced to continue as a free trader and avoid the DSB, or retaliate and acquiesce at the DSB. The 
cases with Guatemala and Jamaica refute these findings. In Jamaica’s case, though it would have 
the greater costs, it returns China’s protectionism, but the DSB option is not evoked. In 
Guatemala’s case, if faces higher costs, retaliates, goes to the DSB and litigates. In these two 
instances, the disputes end differently than what the equilibria predict. This does not mean that 
other cases do not support these findings. With specific reference to the four cases that are 
studied, however, the disputes play out in unexpected ways. 
Results of the Comparative Case Analysis 
 The comparative case analysis generated some results that are worth exploring. In 
relation to legal capacity, the model shows that membership in WTO negotiation groups and 
other international dispute settlement bodies can tell us nothing about how likely states are to 
litigate. The same finding holds for using the DSB a third party, and also the negative 
relationship between the ACWL and litigating. This might mean that some skills are not easily 
transferable from one institution to the next. The ACWL result is not surprising since none of the 
countries had used it and it had come into being after two of the cases. Other studies where 
members had a chance to use it but did not, may therefore produce other results.  
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 The legal capacity results also show that the strongest predictor of DSB participation is 
membership in regional dispute settlement organizations, followed by DSB experience as a 
respondent. Experience with the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a complainant is also a positive, 
but weak indicator. These underscore the importance of experience in the DSB generally, and 
especially with the Anti-Dumping Agreement if that is the provision that states are going to use 
for reprieve.  
The model results for the other dispute settlement costs are also informative. They reveal 
that of the twelve variables for cost, only the GDP contribution of the good and the expectation 
to win are likely to catalyze DSB participation. This suggests that countries are not going to fight 
over goods that do not make a significant contribution to their economy. Moreover, even with 
the good having great gains from trade, states are not going to pursue cases where they anticipate 
adverse findings. This may mean that with dispute settlement costs being high, the benefits must 
outweigh the costs if countries are to litigate. 
Availability of alternative forums is shown by the model to have a negative effect on 
litigation. The fewer choices that countries have, the more likely they are to use the DSB and 
vice versa. The cases with Guatemala and Mexico support this finding. Sometimes, however, 
even with many choices, states opt for an institution if they are concerned about precedent. The 
United States and Mexico therefore had recourse through NAFTA, but got no reprieve there even 
though Mexico tried repeatedly. Participation in the DSB therefore occurred in spite of recourse 
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Hypotheses 
 There are several conjectures that the study makes in Chapter Three. This section will 
now address them in order to explicate the extent to which they are supported by the cases. In all 
instances, costs are evaluated relative to the benefits. 
Hypothesis 1 – the lower the litigation costs, the more credible is the threat to use the DSB when 
a dispute arises. 
This hypothesis is supported by Mexico’s threat to initiate against Guatemala, and also 
against the United States. In Guatemala’s case, Mexico was defending the interests of CEMEX, 
which is one of the world’s leading cement producers. Mexico’s economic might would also 
convince Guatemala that Mexico is able to pay the litigation costs. Guatemala therefore took 
Mexico’s threat as credible and responded accordingly. 
In the case of the United States, it and Mexico had litigated so much with this case that 
the costs to prepare the case were now significantly reduced. What was at stake was the return of 
market access that Mexico needed. The United States therefore knew that Mexico was serious. 
Hypothesis 2 – the higher the litigation costs, the less likely it is that states will use the DSB 
when a trade dispute arises. 
This hypothesis is supported by China’s refusal to file against Jamaica. As a neophyte to 
the DSB, the costs that China would pay to litigate would be huge in comparison to the benefit 
that it would get from winning. 
Hypothesis 3 – the higher the litigation costs, the less likely it is that trading partners will engage 
in free trade. 
 All the countries were brought before the DSB with an accusation of protectionism. In all 
instances of litigation, the accused defended itself. In the context of the model, the relationship 
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between high costs and free trade is seen in either avoiding the DSB, or going to the DSB and 
litigating. While this is a very possible and plausible outcome, none of the cases examined 
supported this phenomenon specifically. 
Hypothesis 4 – the more confident a country is that is has observed a trade violation, the more 
likely it is to use the DSB when a trade dispute emerges. 
This hypothesis posits that the better able states are to observe their trading partners and 
identify specific breaches of the WTO’s provisions, the greater are the chances that they will 
litigate. All of the countries that used the DSB had large amounts of information on what their 
trading partner was doing. Guatemala observed Mexico’s exportation of cement, and the United 
States made the same observation of Mexico. Their invocation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
was therefore in relation to observable behavior. Of course, whether they used the Agreement 
correctly is another matter. Here, however, observation of trade violations caused them to 
litigate. 
Hypothesis 5 – Countries that expect to win are more likely to use the DSB. 
The cases that were brought before the DSB are examples of countries that expected to win. This 
is true in cases where the countries initiated the disputes, and also in cases where they responded. 
In the one case that was not filed, China anticipated an adverse filing and so it opted out of the 
DSB. 
Hypothesis 6 – countries with membership in other dispute settlement organizations are more 
likely to use the DSB when a trade dispute arises. 
The comparative case analysis reveals that only membership in regional dispute 
settlement organizations is likely to promote DSB participation. In this regard, only the case 
between the United States and Mexico validates this hypothesis.  
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Hypothesis 7 – countries with experience at the DSB are more likely to participate as a 
complainant or respondent when a trade dispute emerges. 
This hypothesis is supported by Guatemala, Mexico and the United States, but refuted by 
China. All of the litigants had at least one case experience at the DSB. China, however, had 
complainant and third party experience, but did not file. 
Hypothesis 8 – countries with experience with the specific WTO provision are more likely to 
participate as a complainant or respondent when that provision is evoked. 
This hypothesis is validated by the United States and Mexico, but refuted by Guatemala 
and China. The United States and Mexico had experience with the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
and participated in the DSB when the dispute emerged. Guatemala had no experience with the 
Agreement, yet it responded to Mexico’s threat. China had experience with the Agreement but 
did not initiate the dispute. 
Research Questions 
As this chapter closes, it is also important to address the research questions to see what specific 
and generalized conclusions we can draw from the results of the study. 
Main Question 
Why do aggrieved Member countries choose not to participate in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Body? 
 This research has shown that participation in the DSB is an intricate, multilayered 
consideration that is specific to the countries that are involved, the type of good that is being 
contested, and the timing of the dispute. Firstly, power disparities do not seem to be strong 
predictors of litigation. Some stronger countries do not file and some weaker countries defend 
themselves and win. What, then, can we conclude from the cases? 
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 To understand the cases and what they tell about DSB participation, we can examine 
those that were litigated, and those that were not. For the litigated cases, the gains and potential 
gains from trade of the good, expectation to win and domestic audience costs all seem to matter. 
This is accompanied by DSB experience generally, and also with the Agreement that is being 
used for reprieve. In the case that was not filed, expectation to lose, new WTO Membership, 
reputational costs and budding trading relations all seemed to play a role. Where third party 
involvement is concerned, the countries joined if they had considerable market share of the good, 
traded large volumes of the product with one of the litigants, and if they were concerned about 
precedent. These indicate that costs are evaluated differently on a per country basis, and that 
countries will choose what is in their best interest at that time. This may mean litigating or 
foregoing that option based on the circumstance. 
Secondary Questions 
1. What effect does participation or nonparticipation have on states’ trading relations? 
Participation in the DSB for the most part, provides some legitimacy to states’ actions. States 
therefore use the authority of the institution to resolve the conflict, or to bring their trading 
partner to the negotiating table. In the case of China, non-participation did not have any adverse 
effect on its relationship with Jamaica. For the litigants, participation also seemed to harmonize 
their relations. The United States and Mexico were able to come to a mutually agreed solution 
after 16 years. Guatemala and Mexico were able to form a regional trade agreement two years 
after the second dispute. All the states therefore made a strategic choice and benefited from it by 
securing better trading relations with their disputants in the aftermath.  
2. Does the DSB create opportunities for trading partners to exploit members? 
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The cases that were explored attest to the fact that the DSB can create opportunities for trading 
partners to exploit each other. This is typified in the Anti-Dumping Agreement. With the 
provisions being so arcane, countries that are more legally adept use them to their advantage. In 
this sense, litigation can become more about who understands the Agreement better, and less 
about who is wrong or right. 
3. Does the DSB influence state behaviour? Does the DSB control undesirable state 
behaviour? 
The DSB influences state behaviour. All the countries involved understood its authority, and 
challenged each other in light of how well they were adhering to the rules. Domestic 
countermeasures, litigation and resolution of conflicts are examples of the DSB curtailing 
undesirable state behaviour. The challenge to this is that the DSB does not universally police 
states. Aggrieved members therefore have to call upon the institution to act, or suffer. 
4. Does the DSB mitigate defection between trading partners with asymmetric interests? 
In the cases that were examined, all the countries accepted the governance of the DSB, thereby 
suggesting that it mitigates defection. This is seen in Guatemala that brought its measures into 
compliance after the second cement case, and the United States and Mexico that worked out their 
conflict. China’s acceptance of Jamaica’s antidumping duty without retaliation is also an 
example of this mitigating effect. 
5. To what extent is the DSB representative of dispute resolution mechanisms in institutions 
generally? 
As mentioned in Chapter Six, the DSB is most similar to the International Court of Justice and 
the International Convention on the Law of the Sea. These are multilateral institutions whose 
rulings are legally binding. Their broad membership also has similitude to the DSB. The DSB, 
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like these organizations, only hears cases that are brought before it and does not seek out 
culpable states to prosecute. Getting recourse in these institutions therefore requires knowledge 
of the provisions, just as in the DSB. Additionally, they function in like manner by hearing cases 
submitted only by states. In these ways, the DSB can be said to be representative of dispute 
settlement mechanisms in other institutions. 
Importantly, this study makes the claim that non-participatory membership is a phenomenon that 
is not unique to the DSB. Consequently, any institution that has a dispute settlement body will 
face this challenge. This is because, like the cost factors such as legal capacity, GDP potential of 
the good, experience and expectation to win, all affected countries will weigh how much they 
have to pay relative to how much they expect to gain. Whether countries act as claimants or 
defendants therefore come down to whether they are willing to pay the costs of participation. In 
these ways, the DSB can be argued to be representative of other dispute settlement mechanisms. 
6. Why do institutions ossify? 
Non-participatory membership can cause institutions to ossify. With pure non-participatory 
membership, if states avoid institutions because of collective action problems and ability to act 
independently, then over time, the institution can lose its relevance for those states. In cases 
where states do not participate in institutions because they cannot afford dispute settlement costs, 
this can cause them to abandon their membership, or seek cheaper alternatives for reprieve. If 
recourse is not available to all, institutions run the risk of being ceremonial organizations, with 
no real clout to police violators, and inaccessible assistance for those that need it. 
Limitations of the Study 
 Even with the many contributions that this study makes to the existing body of literature, 
there are limitations in how far its findings can be applied. These will now be discussed. 
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1. The formal model has only complete and perfect information. 
The world trading system is obscure, with many uncertainties about what trading partners are 
doing. Limiting the iterations of the model to only complete and perfect information therefore do 
not accurately represent this reality. 
2. The formal model does not include third party contributions. 
One of the considerations of this study is how the addition of third parties may increase the 
chances that countries will use the DSB. Here, the argument is that third parties reduce legal 
capacity costs by providing support for one of the litigants. This, however, is not included in the 
model. The model is therefore restricted to individual states and what they pay, without 
consideration of support from other states. 
3. The formal model is not time bound. 
Trade and dispute settlement often take years to occur. It is therefore easy to assume from the 
model that states make immediate, sequential steps. This is not the case. The model therefore 
does not include waiting periods and how quickly states move in relation to each other. 
4. The formal model assumes that states evaluate their payoffs the same way. 
In the model, the payoffs are standard and they are known. States are therefore aware of what 
each other’s moves are and the payoffs for choosing those strategies. With so many variables in 
delta, however, different factors may matter differently to each state. Consequently, reputational 
costs may weigh more on a deliberation for one state, while domestic audience costs may matter 
more to another country. This variation in the payoffs’ assessment is therefore not included in the 
model. 
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The information theory approach provides a systematic measurement of the chances that states 
will litigate given the costs. This study, however, does not measure how each unique factor 
affects the outcome. It should be noted, however, that the model allows for this calculation. This 
is therefore a limitation of the study and not of the model itself. 
6. The information theory approach uses binary measurements for the variables. 
The information theory approach mainly uses binary variables. This therefore computes whether 
variables are present and not their range. As a result, the calculations only measure if the states 
had those costs and not how those costs vary in relation to one another. Another version of the 
model can therefore be used to accomplish this. 
7. Generalization challenges 
This study examines four cases, analyzing how each country deliberated on the choice to litigate. 
This, however, is a small N study. There are also only six cases that feature cement. On a goods’ 
basis, the cases are therefore representative of the universe of cases and can help us to make 
important conclusions about non-participatory membership. In terms of a larger N study, there 
would have to be the inclusion of other types of goods that are litigated and also disputed without 
filing to see if the results of this research hold across those cases. 
Recommendations 
 The WTO remains the main regulatory body for international trade. In light of the 
recurrent challenges to using the DSB, I hereby make some recommendations on how the burden 
of litigating can be reduced. 
1. Revise / Simplify the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
Chapter Five outlined how ambiguous and technical the Anti-Dumping Agreement is. For 
countries that need this provision for protection, they first need to understand it. This may 
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require expending resources in legal capacity. In the second cement case with Guatemala, it lost 
because it failed to adhere to the Agreement. This was Guatemala’s first time using it. The 
complexity and obscurity of the Agreement therefore complicated what could have been a 
legitimate case for Guatemala. The Panel / Appellate Body’s rulings are sometimes just as vague. 
The WTO therefore needs to revise and simply the Anti-Dumping Agreement to reduce the costs 
that are spent just to understand it, and also the revenue that goes into litigating based on 
misunderstanding it. 
2. Consider pro bono cases for developing countries. 
The WTO does not charge a fee for dispute settlement. There are, however, other costs 
associated with the process. This includes residence in Geneva, studying and preparing for the 
dispute, as well as the other costs outlined in Chapters Six and Seven. Some countries cannot 
afford it. If the WTO wants to be truly representative of all its Members, then it should 
implement some system whereby needy countries can receive pro bono services from competent 
lawyers. 
3. Give firms legal standing before the institution. 
All the cases that were studied showed two firms at war with each other. In Guatemala’s 
case, it was its Cementos Progreso against Mexico’s Cruz Azul. Technically, Guatemala and 
Mexico were not disputing with each other; their two firms were. Since only countries have legal 
standing before the institution, the cases are registered as countries against each other. This often 
leads to strong, domestic lobbying as firms try to get their governments to act on their behalf. If, 
however, firms had legal standing, they could advocate their own cases. This would also reduce 
the incidences of domestic policies that are implemented to benefit the elites, with no real benefit 
to the average consumer. 
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4. More countries should join the ACWL. 
The ACWL was formed to help developing countries better prepare for their cases. 
Guatemala is one example of a state that got highly involved in the ACWL and has since been 
successful in some of its cases that it has initiated. At the time of the disputes, none of the 
countries had joined it. More countries that need legal support should take advantage of this 
mechanism. 
5. Countries should get involved in more legal capacity building institutions. 
One of the findings of the information theory model is that membership in regional 
dispute settlement organizations can increase the likelihood of DSB participation. The large 
number of cases that the United States and Mexico have filed and counter filed against each 
other in NAFTA can be said to have increased their legal capacity over time. States should 
therefore seek and participate in other legal capacity institutions to strengthen their readiness to 
use the DSB.  
Next Steps 
 This study has provided some insightful results that I would like to study some more. 
Below is therefore an enumeration of my research agenda moving forward. 
1. Game with imperfect information 
An iteration of the model with imperfect information might be a more realistic depiction of the 
world trading system. I am also interested in seeing how the equilibrium solutions change under 
conditions of uncertainty. 
2. Guatemala as a case study 
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Guatemala’s DSB history is very interesting. I would therefore like to study it more fully. I 
especially would like to get a sense of how its legal capacity changed pre and post ACWL 
membership. 
3. Information Theory model with continuous variables. 
WTO litigants have cost differentials. Rerunning these factors as continuous variables may 
therefore further illuminate the chances of litigating when they are present. 
4. Add third parties to the formal model 
The formal model is already complex. I would like, however, to either remodel it, or add the 
support of third parties to see how doing so affects the equilibrium solutions. 
5. Model different costs for each trade remedy 
This study has modeled cost as a composite variable. The cases also only looked at the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. There are, however, three trade remedies that are available to WTO 
Members. A next step might therefore be to model the different costs associated with each 
remedy to find out why anti-dumping proceedings largely outnumber the other two. 
6. Probe vulnerability interdependence and the equilibrium solutions that lock some 
countries out of recourse 
The formal model generated two equilibrium solutions that I would like to study some more. 
These show that countries that pay higher costs to litigate may have the “protect, protect” 
equilibrium taken away from them, and that they may be worse off than they would be in a world 
where the institution does not exist. These results have implications for the WTO as an 
organization. I would therefore like to examine dyads of asymmetric relationships along with 
their litigation patterns to see if these findings hold.  China in Africa is a potential starting place. 
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 In the final analysis, non-participatory membership remains a puzzle that is best 
unraveled by the individual state in question and the estimated costs that it faces. This state must 
contemplate the costs of using the institution, versus the costs of staying outside. Non-
participatory membership is not a static phenomenon. Indeed, countries frequently engage and 
disengage with the DSB simultaneously. This study has shown that costs matter. They matter 
differently, however, for each country. The uniqueness of the decision to participate, predicated 
upon time and circumstance, suggests that no one explanation is universal. This study therefore 
joins the debate, fully cognizant of the fact that this phenomenon will again be probed; time and 
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APPENDIX I 
FACTS ABOUT THE CASES 
a. China – Ordinary Portland Grey Cement 
 
1. “Notice of Affirmative Final Determination.” REF. No. AD-01-2003. June 14, 2004. 
Antidumping and Subsidies Commission, Jamaica: Kingston. 
2. “Notice of Affirmative Preliminary Determination.” REF. No. AD-01-2003. March 15, 
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RESULTS OF THE GANGER CASUALITY TESTS USED TO MAKE 
DETERMINATIONS IN THE ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATIONS ON EXPORTS OF 
ORDINARY PORTLAND GREY CEMENT FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 
(Source: Statement of Reasons, REF. No. AD-01-2003, Antidumping and Subsidies 
Commission, Kingston, Jamaica) 
 
Definition of Variables 
DR  -  Change in CCCL Sales Revenue to own Production 
DMSC  -  Change in Mainland Sales of Chinese Cements 
DEX  -  Change in Exchange Rate 
DOIS  -  Change in other Import Sales (all except export CCCL and China) 
Downtime - Dummy variable taking account of all CCCL downtime episodes 
 
Pair wise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample 2002:08 to 2003:09 
Null Hypothesis: DOIS does not Granger Cause DR 
Lags Obs F-Static Probability 
1 14 3.13699 0.10420 
2 14 0.83570 0.46462 
3 14 0.94428 0.46910 
 
Pair wise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample 2002:08 to 2003:09 
Null Hypothesis: DEX does not Granger Cause DR 
Lags Obs F-Static Probability 
1 14 0.09674 0.76159 
2 14 0.89830 0.44086 
3 14 071675 0.57269 
 
Pair wise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample 2002:08 to 2003:09 
Null Hypothesis: DMSC does not Granger Cause DR 
Lags Obs F-Static Probability 
1 14 5.32520 0.04147 
2 14 2.70835 0.12000 
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Pair wise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample 2002:08 to 2003:09 
Null Hypothesis: DOWNTIME does not Granger Cause DR 
Lags Obs F-Static Probability 
1 14 0.17258 0.68581 
2 14 6.28432 0.01958 
3 14 3.09088 0.09900 
 
Note: The level of Confidence with which the null can be rejected is 1 minus probability. So that 
if the probability is 0.04, the confidence level is 1 minus 0.04 = 0.96 or 96 per cent. A rejection 
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b. Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico 
 





DS60: Guatemala — Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from 
Mexico 
Current status 
• Report(s) adopted, no further action required on 25 November 1998  
Key facts 
Short title: Guatemala — Cement I 
Complainant: Mexico 
Respondent: Guatemala 
Third Parties: Canada; El Salvador; Honduras; United States 
Agreements cited: 
(as cited in request for 
consultations) 
Anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994): 
Art. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 7.1, Annex I 
GATT 1994: Art. VI 
Request for 
Consultations received: 
17 October 1996 
Panel Report circulated: 19 June 1998 
Appellate Body 
Report circulated: 
2 November 1998 
Summary of the dispute to date 
Consultations 
Complaint by Mexico. 
On 15 October 1996, Mexico requested consultations with Guatemala in respect of an anti-
dumping investigation commenced by Guatemala with regard to imports of Portland cement 
from Mexico. Mexico alleged that this investigation was in violation of Guatemala’s obligations 
under Articles 2, 3, 5 and 7.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
On 4 February 1997, Mexico requested the establishment of a panel. At its meeting on 25 
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Panel and Appellate Body proceedings 
Further to a second request to establish a panel by Mexico, the DSB established a panel at its 
meeting on 20 March 1997. The US, Canada, Honduras and El Salvador reserved their third-
party rights. On 21 April 1997, Mexico requested the Director-General to determine the 
composition of the Panel. On 1 May 1997, the Panel was composed. The report of the Panel was 
circulated to Members on 19 June 1998. The Panel found that Guatemala had failed to comply 
with the requirements of Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by initiating the 
investigation on the basis of evidence of dumping, injury and casual link that was not 
“sufficient” as a justification for initiation. 
On 4 August 1998, Guatemala notified its intention to appeal certain issues of law and legal 
interpretations developed by the Panel. The report of the Appellate Body was circulated to 
Members on 2 November 1998. The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding that the dispute 
was properly before the Panel, on the grounds that Mexico did not comply with Article 6.2 of the 
DSU in its request for a panel since it did not identify the measure it was complaining against. 
Having found that the dispute was not properly before the Panel, the Appellate Body could not 
make any conclusions on the findings by the Panel on the substantive issues that were also the 
subject of the appeal. The Appellate Body stressed that its decision was without prejudice to 
Mexico’s right to pursue new dispute settlement proceedings on this matter. 
At the DSB meeting on 25 November 1998, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body Report and the 
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c. Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from 
Mexico 
 





DS156: Guatemala — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from 
Mexico 
Current status 
• Implementation notified by respondent on 12 December 2000  
Key facts 
Short title: Guatemala — Cement II 
Complainant: Mexico 
Respondent: Guatemala 
Third Parties: European Communities; Ecuador; El Salvador; 
Honduras; United States 
Agreements cited: 
(as cited in request for 
consultations) 
Anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994): 
Art. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 18, Annex I, Annex II 
Request for 
Consultations received: 
5 January 1999 
Panel Report circulated: 24 October 2000 
Summary of the dispute to date 
The summary below was up-to-date at 24 February 2010   
Consultations 
Complaint by Mexico. (See DS60) 
On 5 January 1999, Mexico requested consultations with Guatemala concerning definitive 
anti-dumping duties imposed by the authorities of Guatemala on imports of grey Portland cement 
from Mexico and the proceedings leading thereto. Mexico alleged that the definitive anti-
dumping measure is inconsistent with Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 12 and 18 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement and its Annexes I and II, as well as with Article VI of the GATT 1994. 
On 15 July 1999, Mexico requested the establishment of a panel. At its meeting on 26 July 1999, 
the DSB deferred the establishment of a panel. 
Panel and Appellate Body proceedings 
Further to a second request to establish a panel by Mexico, the DSB established a panel at its 
meeting on 22 September 1999. Ecuador, El Salvador, the European Communities, Honduras 
and the United States reserved their third-party rights. On 12 October 1999, Mexico requested 
 
	  
	   	  
301 
the Director-General to determine the composition of the panel. On 2 November 1999, the Panel 
was composed. The panel report was circulated on 24 October 2000. The panel concluded that 
Guatemala’s initiation of an investigation, the conduct of the investigation and imposition of a 
definitive measure on imports of grey Portland cement from Mexico’s Cruz Azul is inconsistent 
with the requirements in the Anti-Dumping Agreement in that: 
• Guatemala’s determination that there was sufficient evidence of dumping and threat of 
injury to initiate an investigation, is inconsistent with Article 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
    
• Guatemala’s determination that there was sufficient evidence of dumping and threat of 
injury to initiate an investigation and consequent failure to reject the application for anti-
dumping duties by Cementos Progreso is inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement; 
    
• Guatemala’s failure to timely notify Mexico under Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement is inconsistent with that provision; 
    
• Guatemala’s failure to meet the requirements for a public notice of the initiation of an 
investigation is inconsistent with Article 12.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
    
• Guatemala’s failure to timely provide the full text of the application to Mexico and Cruz 
Azul is inconsistent with Article 6.1.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;  
  
• Guatemala’s failure to grant Mexico access to the file of the investigation is inconsistent 
with Articles 6.1.2 and 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
    
• Guatemala’s failure to timely make Cementos Progreso’s 19 December 1996 submission 
available to Cruz Azul until 8 January 1997 is inconsistent with Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement; 
    
• Guatemala’s failure to provide two copies of the file of the investigation as requested by 
Cruz Azul is inconsistent with Article 6.1.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
    
• Guatemala’s extension of the period of investigation requested by Cementos Progreso 
without providing Cruz Azul with a full opportunity for the defence of its interest is 
inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
    
• Guatemala’s failure to inform Mexico of the inclusion of non-governmental experts in the 





	   	  
302 
• Guatemala’s failure to require Cementos Progreso’s to provide a statement of the reasons 
why summarization of the information submitted during verification was not possible is 
inconsistent with Article 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
    
• Guatemala’s decision to grant Cementos Progreso’s 19 December submission 
confidential treatment on its own initiative is inconsistent with Article 6.5 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement; 
    
• Guatemala’s failure to “inform all interested parties of the essential facts under 
consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive 
measures” is inconsistent with Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
    
• Guatemala’s recourse to “best information available” for the purpose of making its final 
dumping determination is inconsistent with Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
    
• Guatemala’s failure to take into account imports by MATINSA in its determination of 
injury and causality is inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; and 
  
• Guatemala’s failure to evaluate all relevant factors for the examination of the impact of 
the allegedly dumped imports on the domestic industry is inconsistent with Article 3.4. 
The DSB adopted the panel report on 17 November 2000. 
Implementation of adopted reports 
At the DSB meeting of 12 December 2000, in accordance with Article 21.3 of the DSU, 
Guatemala informed the DSB that in October 2000 it had removed its anti-dumping measure and 
had thus complied with the DSB’s recommendations. Mexico welcomed Guatemala’s 
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d. United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement from Mexico 
 
Source: “DS281: United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement from Mexico.” 




DS281: United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement from Mexico 
This summary has been prepared by the Secretariat under its own responsibility. The summary is 
for general information only and is not intended to affect the rights and obligations of Members. 
Current status 
• Settled or terminated (withdrawn, mutually agreed solution) on 16 May 2007  
Key facts 
Short title: US — Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement 
Complainant: Mexico 
Respondent: United States 
Third Parties: Canada; China; Chinese Taipei; European 
Communities; Japan 
Agreements cited: 
(as cited in request for 
consultations) 
Anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994): 
Art. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18, Annex II 
GATT 1994: Art. III, VI, X 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization: Art. XVI:4 
Request for 
Consultations received: 
31 January 2003 
Mutually Agreed 
Solution notified: 
16 May 2007 
 
Latest document 
• United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement from Mexico - Notification of 
Mutually Agreed Solution  
G/ADP/D46/2#G/L/604/Add.1#WT/DS281/8 | 21 May 2007 
 
Summary of the dispute to date 
The summary below was up-to-date at 24 February 2010  
Consultations 
Complaint by Mexico. 
On 3 February 2003, Mexico requested consultations with the US concerning several 
antidumping measures imposed by the US on imports of Gray Portland cement and cement 
clinker from Mexico, including: 
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• the final determinations in several administrative and sunset reviews; 
  
• the US authorities’ determination regarding the continuation of the antidumping 
orders; and 
  
• the US authorities’ rejection of a request by Mexican producers to initiate an 
administrative review based on changed circumstances as well as. 
In addition to the above measures, Mexico’s request included a number of laws, regulations and 
administrative practices (such as “zeroing”) used by the US authorities in the above 
determinations. Mexico considered that the above antidumping measures are incompatible with 
Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 18 of the Antidumping Agreement, Articles III, VI and 
X of the GATT 1994 and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. 
On 29 July 2003, Mexico requested the establishment of a panel. At its meeting on 18 August 
2003, the DSB deferred the establishment of a panel. 
Panel and Appellate Body proceedings 
Further to a second request to establish a panel by Mexico, the DSB established a panel at its 
meeting on 29 August 2003. China, the EC, Japan and Chinese Taipei reserved their third-party 
rights. On 5 September 2003, Canada reserved its third-party rights. 
On 24 August 2004, Mexico requested the Director-General to compose the panel. On 3 
September 2004, the Director-General composed the panel. 
On 1 March 2005, the Chairman of the Panel informed the DSB that it would not be able to 
complete its work in six months, inter alia due to the large number of claims involved, the 
complexity of the issues and certain postponements in the Panel’s timetable and that the Panel 
hoped to complete its work by the end of October 2005. On 3 October 2005, the Panel informed 
the DSB that  due to its continued consideration of the issues in this dispute, it would not be 
possible for the Panel to complete its work by the end of October, and that the Panel expected to 
complete its work in January 2006. 
On 16 January 2006, the Chairman of the Panel informed the DSB that in the context of 
negotiations to find a mutually acceptable solution to this dispute, Mexico had requested the 
Panel to suspend its proceedings, in accordance with Article 12.12 of the DSU, until further 
notice. The Panel agreed to this request. Since the Panel was not requested to resume its work, 
pursuant to Article 12.12 of the DSU, the authority for establishment of the panel lapsed as of 14 
January 2007. 
Mutually agreed solution 
On 16 May 2007, the United States and Mexico notified the DSB of a mutually agreed solution 
under Article 3.6 of the DSU. The mutually agreed solution was in the form of an agreement 
between the United States and Mexico, dated 6 March 2006 (the “Trade in Cement Agreement”). 
The Trade in Cement Agreement makes possible increased imports of Mexican cement, 
encourages US cement exports to Mexico, and settles outstanding litigation relating to the US 
anti-dumping order on Mexican cement. The Agreement also provides for the anti-dumping 
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APPENDIX II 
COMPARATIVE CASE ANALYSES RESULTS 
a. Legal Capacity Costs and their Effects on Participation in the Dispute Settlement Body 
b. Other Dispute Settlement Costs and their Effects of Participation in the Dispute 
Settlement Body 
Source: Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor and Katya Drozdova. 2016. Quantifying the Qualitative Excel 
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